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Abstract
From stable priors to maximum Bayesian evidence via a generalised rule
of succession
M.B. de Kock
Merensky Building, Merriman Ave.
Stellenbosch University
Private Bag X1, Matieland, 7602, South Africa.
Dissertation: PhD (Theoretical Physics)
April 2014
We investigate the procedure of assigning probabilities to logical statements. The sim-
plest case is that of equilibrium statistical mechanics and its fundamental assumption of
equally likely states. Rederiving the formulation led us to question the assumption of
logical independence inherent to the construction and specifically its inability to update
probability when data becomes available. Consequently we replace the assumption of log-
ical independence with De Finetti’s concept of exchangeability. To use the corresponding
representation theorems of De Finetti requires us to assign prior distributions for some
general parameter spaces. We propose the use of stability properties to identify suitable
prior distributions. The combination of exchangeable likelihoods and corresponding prior
distributions results in more general evidence distribution assignments. These new evi-
dence assignments generalise the Shannon entropy to other entropy measures. The goal
of these entropy formulations is to provide a general framework for constructing models.
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Uittreksel
Van stabiele a priori-verdelings tot maksimum Bayes-getuienis via ’n
veralgemeende Laplace-opvolgwet
M.B. de Kock
Merenskygebou, Merrimanlaan
Stellenbosch Universiteit
Privaatsak X1, Matieland, 7602, Suid-Afrika.
Proefskrif: PhD (Teoretiese Fisika)
April 2014
Ons ondersoek the prosedure om waarskynlikhede aan logiese stellings toe te ken. Die
eenvoudigste geval is die van ewewig-statistiese meganika en die ooreenkomstige funda-
mentele aanname van ewekansige toestande. Herafleiding van die standaard formulering
lei ons tot die bevraagtekening van die aanname van logiese onafhanklikheid en spesifiek
die onmoontlikheid van opdatering van waarskynlikheid wanneer data beskikbaar raak.
Gevolglik vervang ons die aanname van logiese onafhanklikheid met De Finetti se aanname
van omruilbaarheid. Om die ooreenkomstige voorstelling stellings te gebruik moet ons a
priori verdelings konstrueer vir ’n paar algemene parameter-ruimtes. Ons stel voor dat
stabiliteits-eienskappe gebruik moet word om geskikte a priori distribusies te identifiseer.
Die kombinase van omruilbare aanneemlikheids funksies en die ooreenkomstige a priori
verdelings lei ons tot nuwe toekennings van getuienis-verdelings. Hierdie nuwe getuienes-
verdelings is n veralgemening van Shannon se entropie na ander entropie-maatstawwe. Die
doel van hierdie entropie formalismes is om ’n raamwerk vir modelkonstruksie te verskaf.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
As most students in physics, my education regarding statistics was based on the view that
probability is the number of data points with a particular outcome b, divided by the total
number. While this demonstrably works in many cases, the difficulties for a small number
of measurements and/or many possible outcomes (such as highly differential measurement
quantities) eventually cannot be ignored. In my masters thesis de Kock (2009), such diffi-
culties occurred: we tried to construct a systematic expansion of nongaussian probability
distributions, and following textbook literature we tried to apply the Gram-Charlier and
Edgeworth expansions using different reference functions. While these do in fact work
under some circumstances, as e.g. shown in de Kock et al. (2011b) and de Kock et al.
(2011c), the fundamentally asymptotic character of such expansions led us to question
their foundations and in turn led us to Bayesian statistics.
This dissertation does not answer the original questions raised by such expansions.
Rather, the journey into the Bayesian world has proven to be a long and unsettling reor-
ganisation of many concepts and relations which are commonly taken for granted. Many
ideas commonly accepted, such as the above idea of probability as data ratio, were found
to be correct in some limit but only in that limit. Others needed to be placed in different
relations or reinterpreted. In time and with continued digging, the original goal turned
out to be less interesting than the reasons why such simple concepts fail and how the strict
thinking and careful accounting required by Bayesian reasoning resolves those failures.
We will not therefore concern ourselves mainly with correlations as originally intended,
nor with high energy physics, nor even with classical statistical mechanics, even though
it may look that way. The dissertation is about two things: firstly, the discovery that a
simple assumption underlying many calculations in physics, statistics and probably many
other fields may only be a special case, and that the general case is as yet not fully
understood, that “Independence” is a special case of “Exchangeability”. Secondly, the
thrust and contents of this dissertation are about bringing the ideas and mathematics of
Bayesian analysis to bear on this change in foundations.
The rigour and consistency of Bayes has resulted in many new insights. Especially
satisfying was that parameter estimation and choosing a model are two sides of the same
1
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2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
coin and use the same procedure. It is also gratifying to discover that statistical mechanics
and data analysis are also part of that same framework. In many cases this does not
contradict the orthodox methods but explains (at least to us) what they are really doing.
Also we could clarify the logical reasoning used in statistics.
Our immediate goal in this dissertation is to separate issues relating to physical ob-
jects and the laws governing them from that which is statistics, understood as inductive
logic. This makes it easier to generalise results. More importantly, it gives us a different
perspective on what is important and what is trivial.
One of the unexpected fruits of this endeavour is the Bayes Factor which shows which
model is preferred by the data. This is an exciting development for us since it might
provide a natural way of truncating series expansions. Among other things, we will also
extend the principle of maximum entropy in various directions but will not consider it as
a principle per se. It does not have the status of the sum and product rule which are far
more fundamental; in fact, we consider Maximum Entropy only a limited type of model,
namely a multinomial distribution in disguise. Correlations will appear sporadically in
different places in the dissertation because they do remain one of our long-term goals. For
the moment, we are concerned with sorting out the fundamentals and doing so as well as
possible.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we provide some mathematical background information as a basis for later
use. This is only a reasonable overview of the topics; for a more comprehensive review
see Johnson et al. (2005) for the binomial and factorial section, Whittaker and Watson
(1927) for asymptotic series, Cover and Thomas (2012) for convexity, Khinchin (1949) for
generating functions and Bleistein and Handelsman (1986) for saddlepoint approximations.
We shall try to use the following consistent notation:
Entry Symbol S Total T Ratio (S/T)
Logical Proposition A,B, . . . ,Z
Real number α, β, γ
Positive integers a, r, n A,R,N ρ, ρ′
Dual space t, µ, λ
Sum Index j, k, l, `
Real Part <[. . . ]
Small number or error 
Probability of ... p(...)
Bin index b, c, d B
2.1 Factorials and binomials
The Euler definition of a gamma function is
Γ[α] =
∞∫
0
tα−1e−t dt, <[α] > 0 (2.1.1)
and if we integrate by parts we find a recursion relation for the gamma function,
Γ[α+ 1] = αΓ[α], (2.1.2)
which allows us to extend the definition of the gamma function to negative and noninteger
α. If α is a positive integer n the gamma function is a factorial
(n− 1)! = Γ[n], (2.1.3)
3
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where
n! = n(n− 1)(n− 2) · · · 1 =
n−1∏
j=0
(n− j). (2.1.4)
The factorial is very useful because it is the number of different orderings of n elements.
Saying that we have an ordered sequence or unordered sequence is different from consid-
ering the elements of a set distinguishable or undistinguishable. An ordered or unordered
sequence is a matter of notation and our intent of keeping the information in the ordering.
There are n different choices for the first element, (n− 1) choices for the second element
and so forth giving us the total number of permutations of n elements. We shall also
need some asymptotic expansions of the gamma and factorial functions, the first being
Stirling’s expansion,
Γ[α+ 1] ∼
√
2pi αα+1/2e−α exp
(
1
12α
− 1
360α3
+ · · ·
)
. (2.1.5)
While the second which has no name but has a similar accuracy,
Γ[α+ j]
Γ[α+ k]
∼ α(j−k)
(
1 +
(j − k)(j + k − 1)
2α
+ · · ·
)
. (2.1.6)
It is useful to count how many times an element α occurs in a sequence A. So, defining
an indicator function as,
δ(α,A) =
1 if α ∈ A0 if α /∈ A, (2.1.7)
which is used to define an occupation number that counts the number of times, that α ∈ A
in N occurrences
nA =
N∑
j=1
δ(αj ,A). (2.1.8)
We next ask how many ways there are of choosing k ordered elements out of a n sized set.
For example, from the set {a, b, c, d} we can choose two elements in twelve ways,
{a, b}, {a, c}, {a, d}, {b, c}, {b, d}, {c, d}
{b, a}, {c, a}, {d, a}, {c, b}, {d, b}, {d, c}.
(2.1.9)
Assuming ordering is important, there are n choices for the first element, n − 1 choices
for the second element and n − k + 1 choices for the kth element. This gives us a falling
factorial
nk = n(n− 1) · · · (n− k + 1) =
k−1∏
j=0
(n− j) = n!
(n− k)! (2.1.10)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
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where we follow the notation from Graham et al. (1994). If we want the number of ways
of choosing k unordered elements out of n we divide with the number of permutations k!
to find the binomial coefficient(
n
k
)
=
n!
k!(n− k)! =
nk
k!
=
(
n
n− k
)
. (2.1.11)
In our example we get the six elements {a, b} . . . {c, d}, (42) = 6 and we read the binomial
coefficient as 4 choose 2 is equal to 6. When we expand the product (α+ β)n every term
is the product of n factors, each either an α or β. The number of terms with k factors of
α and n− k factors of β is the binomial coefficient; yielding the binomial theorem
(α+ β)n =
∞∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
αkβn−k, (2.1.12)
for a positive integer power n and real numbers α and β. Notice that it is a finite sum
since
(
n
k
)
= 0 if k < 0 or k > n. The equivalent of the binomial theorem for multiple
variables, is called the multinomial theorem(
B∑
b=1
αb
)N
=
N∑
U [n]
N !
B∏
b=1
anbb
nb!
, (2.1.13)
where n = {n1, . . . , nB} and
Universal set U [n]:
The set of all non-negative integers n1, n2, . . . nB that sum to N.
A Taylor expansion of (2.1.12) with β = 1
(1 + α)γ =
∞∑
k=0
γk
k!
αk, −1 < α < 1, (2.1.14)
may be used to generalise the binomial coefficient to arbitrary real γ,(
γ
k
)
=
γk
k!
. (2.1.15)
The Taylor expansion remains valid for negative values of γ implying that negative bi-
nomial coefficients and also negative falling factorials can be defined. A negative falling
factorial we will write in terms of a rising factorial
nk = n(n+ 1) · · · (n+ k − 1) =
k−1∏
j=0
(n+ j) =
Γ[n+ k]
Γ[n]
, (2.1.16)
by using
(−n)k = (−n)(−n− 1) . . . (−n− k + 1) = (−1)knk. (2.1.17)
A rising factorial nk is interpreted combinatorically in terms of partitions into sets, and
specifically as the number of ways to insert k ordered elements into n ordered sets. For
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example, let there be k=3 elements a, b and c which are to be inserted into n=2 ordered
sets, which in the table below are separated by the vertical line |. In the first step of
constructing all such possibilities, a is inserted into either Set 1 or Set 2. In the second
step, b is inserted into each of the three possible positions with regard to existing elements
a and |. Following the third step, we have 23 = 2(2+1)(2+2) = 24 possible orderings:
Step 1 a| |a
Step 2 ba| ab| a|b b|a |ba |ab
Step 3 cba| cab| ca|b cb|a c|ba c|ab
bca| acb| ac|b bc|a |cba |cab
bac| abc| a|cb b|ca |bca |acb
ba|c ab|c a|bc b|ac |bac |abc
Based on this, the negative binomial coefficient(−n
k
)
= (−1)kn
k
k!
= (−1)k
(
n+ k − 1
k
)
(2.1.18)
is interpreted as (−1)k times the number of ways k unordered elements can be inserted
into n ordered sets. In terms of the above example, making a=b=c yields the 23/3! = 4
distinct enumerations aaa|, aa|a, a|aa and |aaa or, in terms of occupation numbers, {3, 0},
{2, 1}, {1, 2} and {0, 3}.
Using the negative binomial coefficient the binomial theorem can be extended to the
negative integers,
(α+ β)−n =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)knk
k!
αkβ−n−k (2.1.19)
and the negative real numbers,
(1 + α)−γ =
∞∑
k=0
(−1)kγk
k!
αk − 1 < α < 1. (2.1.20)
2.2 Asymptotic series
As we shall be using the above asymptotic expansions of Stirling, a definition of an asymp-
totic series would be useful. We use the definition of Poincare´ (1896): A divergent series,
f [z] ∼ lim
n→∞Sn
Sn = A0 +
A1
z
+
A2
z2
+ · · ·+ An
zn
,
(2.2.1)
in which the sum of the first (n+1) terms is Sn[z], is said to be an asymptotic expansion of a
function f [z] for a given range of values of arg z, if the remainder Rn[z] = z
n (f [z]− Sn[z])
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satisfies the condition
lim
|z|→∞
Rn[z] = 0 (n fixed), (2.2.2)
even though
lim
n→∞ |Rn[z]| =∞ (z fixed). (2.2.3)
When this is the case, we can for a given small  make |z| large enough to let
|zn [f [z]− Sn[z]]| < . (2.2.4)
We denote the fact that the series is the asymptotic expansion of f [z] by writing
f [z] ∼
∞∑
n=0
Anz
−n. (2.2.5)
To illustrate the concept we will consider the function f [x] =
∫∞
x (e
x−t/t) dt, where x is
real and positive and the path of integration is the real axis, Whittaker and Watson (1927).
By repeated integration by parts, we obtain
f [x] =
1
x
− 1
x2
+
2!
x3
− · · ·+ (−1)
n−1(n− 1)!
xn
+ (−1)nn!
∞∫
x
ex−t
tn+1
dt. (2.2.6)
Naturally we consider the expansion,
Sn[x] =
1
x
− 1
x2
+
2!
x3
− · · ·+ (−1)
nn!
xn+1
(2.2.7)
in connection with the function f(x). The ratio test
∣∣∣Sn+1−SnSn−Sn−1 ∣∣∣ = nx shows that in the limit
as n becomes large, n/x also goes to ∞. The partial sum Sn(x) therefore diverges for all
values of x in the limit n→∞. Nevertheless, the series can be used to calculate f(x) for
large x in the following way. Take any fixed value of n and calculate the value of Sn. We
have
f [x]− Sn[x] = (−1)n+1(n+ 1)!
∞∫
x
ex−t
tn+2
dt, (2.2.8)
and therefore, since ex−t ≤ 1,
|f [x]− Sn[x]| = (n+ 1)!
∞∫
x
ex−t
tn+2
dt < (n+ 1)!
∞∫
x
1
tn+2
dt =
n!
xn+1
. (2.2.9)
For values of x which are sufficiently large, the right hand side of this equation is very
small. Thus, if we take x ≥ 2n, we have
|f [x]− Sn[x]| < 1
2n+1n2
, (2.2.10)
which can be made as small as we like by appropriate choice of n. Hence, the value of
the function f [x] can be calculated with great accuracy for large values of x by choosing a
suitable number n in the expression Sn[x].
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2.3 Convex functions
Here we will introduce some simple properties of quantities we will discuss later.
A function f [x] is said to be convex over an interval (a, b) if for
every x1, x2 ∈ (a, b) and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
f [λx1 + (1− λ)x2] ≤ λf [x1] + (1− λ)f [x2]. (2.3.1)
A function f is said to be strictly convex if equality holds only if λ = 0 or λ = 1.
A function f is concave if −f is convex.
A function is convex if it always lies below any chord connecting two points x1 and x2.
A function is concave if it always lies above any chord. Examples of convex functions:
x2, |x|, ex and x log x for x ≥ 0. While log x and √x are concave for x ≥ 0. The following
useful Lemma applies:
If the function f has a second derivative which is non-negative
(positive) everywhere, then the function is convex (strictly
convex).
We use the Taylor expansion of the function around x0 to prove this statement,
f [x] = f [x0] + f
′[x0](x− x0) + f
′′[x∗]
2
(x− x0)2, (2.3.2)
where x∗ lies between x0 and x. By convexity, f ′′(x0) ≥ 0, and thus the last term is always
non-negative for all x. Let x0 = λx1 + (1− λ)x2 and take x = x1 to obtain
f [x1] ≥ f [x0] + f ′[x0] [(1− λ)(x1 − x2)] . (2.3.3)
Similarly, take x = x2 to obtain,
f [x2] ≥ f [x0] + f ′[x0] [λ(x2 − x1)] . (2.3.4)
Multiplying (2.3.3) with λ and (2.3.4) with (1− λ) and adding them together, we obtain
(2.3.1). The proof for strict convexity proceeds along similar lines.
The next inequality is one of the most widely used and useful results:
Jensen’s inequality: If f is a convex function and p[x] is
non-negative for all x, then∫
f [x]p[x] dx ≥ f
[∫
xp[x] dx
]
or
∑
x
f [x]p[x] ≥ f
[∑
x
xp[x]
]
, (2.3.5)
in the continuous and discrete cases respectively. Moreover, if f
is strictly convex, then equality in (2.3.5) implies that p[x] is a
constant.
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We will prove this assertion for discrete distributions by induction. For a discrete function
with two-point support,
ρ[x] = ρ1δ(x− x1) + ρ2δ(x− x2) (2.3.6)
the inequality becomes,
ρ1f [x1] + ρ2f [x2] ≥ f [ρ1x1 + ρ2x2], (2.3.7)
which follows from the definition of a convex function. Suppose the assertion is true for
functions with k−1 points in its support. Then writing ρ′j = ρj(1−ρk) for j = 1, 2, . . . , k−1,
we have
k∑
j=1
ρjf [xj ] = ρkf [xk] + (1− ρk)
k−1∑
j=1
ρ′jf [xj ]
≥ ρkf [xk] + (1− ρk)f
k−1∑
j=1
ρ′jxj

≥ f
ρkxk + (1− ρk) k−1∑
j=1
ρ′jxj
 ,
(2.3.8)
where the first inequality follows from the induction hypotheses and the second from the
definition of convexity. So that finally
k∑
j=1
ρjf [xj ] ≥ f
 k∑
j=1
ρjxj
 . (2.3.9)
This can be extended to continuous functions by taking the appropriate limits.
2.4 Moment generating function
There are many different generating functions, with the probability generating function
(p.g.f.) most appropriate for discrete outcomes. Nevertheless, we shall concentrate on the
moment generating function (m.g.f.) because it ties up with the saddlepoint approximation
which we shall discuss subsequently. Let the outcomes of a particular system be A =
{0, 1, 2, . . . , B}. Let ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρB be a set of non-negative real numbers constrained by∑
b≥0 ρb = 1, and hence
∑
b≥0 ρbe
−λb converges for λ > 0, even if we let B → ∞. The
moment generating function of this set defined by
Φ [λ] =
∑
b≥0
ρbe
−λb, (2.4.1)
where Φ[λ] is the abbreviation of Φ[λ, b|ρ] and has the following useful properties:
(a) For λ > 0 the generating function Φ [λ] is a positive and monotonically decreasing
function starting from Φ [0] = 1. Note that we define 00 = 1.
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(b) For λ > 0, Φ [λ] has derivatives of all orders.
Φ(n) [λ] =
∑
b≥0
(−b)nρbe−bλ n = 1, 2, . . . , (2.4.2)
which converge uniformly because the sequence is bounded and can be compared to
a geometric sequence.
(c) The second logarithmic derivative is non-negative for λ > 0,
d
dλ
log Φ[λ] =
Φ′[λ]
Φ[λ]
= −
∑
bρbe
−λb∑
e−λb
≤ 0
d2
dλ2
log Φ[λ] =
Φ[λ]Φ′′[λ]− Φ′[λ]2
Φ[λ]2
=
1
Φ[λ]
∑
b≥0
(
b− Φ
′[λ]
Φ[λ]
)2
ρbe
−λb ≥ 0.
(2.4.3)
Consequently our generating function is a convex function for λ > 0.
(d) The m.g.f. of the convolution of two sequences is the product of the two individual
m.g.f.’s. Consider a convolution of two sequences {αj}Jj=0 and {βk}Kk=0. Extend the
sequences to arbitrary ranges by adding zeros, i.e. αj = 0 ∀j < 0 and j > J etc.
Then the product of m.g.f.’s is
Φα[λ]Φβ[λ] =
K∑
k=0
J∑
j=0
αjβke
−λ(j+k) =
K∑
k=0
J+k∑
`=k
α`−kβke−λ` =
J+K∑
k=0
J+K∑
`=k
α`−kβke−λ`
=
J+K∑
`=0
∑`
k=0
α`−kβke−λ` =
J+K∑
`=0
γ`e
−λ` = Φγ [λ]
(2.4.4)
where ` = j + k and we used the identity
J+K∑
k=0
J+K∑
`=k
[. . . ] =
∑
0≤k≤`≤J+K
[. . . ] =
J+K∑
`=0
∑`
k=0
[. . . ] . (2.4.5)
This is the important property of the generating function, where the convolution of
sequences is equivalent to the product of their generating functions. This property
also generalises to multiple convolutions which is easy to see if we add another
convolution to our sequences,
∑`
j=0
ρ`−jγj =
∑`
j=0
ρ`−j
j∑
k=0
αj−kβk (2.4.6)
and the corresponding generating functions are then clearly
Φγ [λ]Φη[λ] = Φγ [λ]Φα[λ]Φβ[λ]. (2.4.7)
When convolving the same sequence n times, we hence have Φn[λ] as the moment
generating function of the convolution, which we are usually interested in for large
n.
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(e) The inversion formula
ρb =
1
2pii
ipi∫
−ipi
Φ [λ] ebλ dλ. (2.4.8)
is easy to prove: Multiply both sides of (2.4.1) with exp [jλ], where j is an arbitrary
integer, and integrate the expression obtained with respect to λ from −ipi to ipi,
ipi∫
−ipi
Φ [λ] ejλ dt =
∑
b≥0
ρb
ipi∫
−ipi
e(j−b)λ dt, (2.4.9)
The series on the right hand side being uniformly convergent for λ > 0 can be
integrated term by term and since the right hand side is either equal to 2pii if j = b
or zero if j 6= b the inversion formula follows.
(f) We can also make the substitution λ = − log z and simply take derivatives in z at
z = 0 to find the inverse,
ρb = b!
db
dzb
Φ [− log z]
∣∣∣∣
z=0
. (2.4.10)
It may seem pointless to replace a simple operation like derivatives with something
more complicated like complex integration but is easier to approximate the complex
integration than the derivatives.
2.5 Moments and cumulants
Consider the convolution of two continuous distributions:
h(z) =
∫
f(x)g(y)δ(z − x− y)dydx. (2.5.1)
For continuous distributions it is usually easier to use the Fourier transform than the
moment generating function,
Φ[t, z|h(z)] =
∞∫
−∞
h(z)eitzdz, (2.5.2)
which we abbreviate as Φh[z]. Substituting in the convolution we have
Φh[t] =
∫
f(x)g(y)eitx+itydydx
= Φf [t]Φg[t]
(2.5.3)
which is the usual property of the generating functions that the product of the Fourier
transforms is the Fourier transform of the convolutions of the distributions. This allows
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us to define quantities of moments that are invariant under convolution which is a very
useful property to have. Remembering the definition of the moments,
µj =
〈
xj
〉
=
∫
zjh[z]dz, (2.5.4)
they can easily be found from the Fourier transform by taking the derivatives at zero,
dj
dtj
Φh[t]
∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
dj
dtj
∞∫
−∞
h[z]eitzdz
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
=
dj
dtj
∞∫
−∞
h[z]
[∑
k
(itz)k
k!
]
dx
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t=0
(2.5.5)
=
dj
dtj
∑
k
(it)k
〈
zk
〉
k!
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= ik
〈
zk
〉
. (2.5.6)
Taking the logarithm of the generating function changes the product structure of the
convolutions into an additive structure which is amenable to a Taylor expansion around
zero, and defines the cumulants κj ,
Φh[t] = 1 + µ1iλ+ µ2
(iλ)2
2!
+ µ3
(iλ)3
3!
+ µ4
(iλ)4
4!
+ . . .
= exp
[
κ1iλ+ κ2
(iλ)2
2!
+ κ3
(iλ)3
3!
+ κ4
(iλ)4
4!
+ . . .
]
.
(2.5.7)
On expanding the exponential, we find the relations
κ1 = µ1 κ2 = µ2 − µ21
κ3 = µ3 − 3µ1µ2 + 2µ31 κ4 = µ4 − 4µ1µ3 − 3µ22 + 12µ21µ2 − 6µ41
(2.5.8)
or
µ1 = κ1 µ2 = κ2 + κ
2
1
µ3 = κ3 + 3κ1κ2 + 2κ
3
1 µ4 = κ4 + 4κ1κ3 + 3κ
2
2 + 12κ
2
1κ2 + 6κ
4
1
(2.5.9)
and so forth. The first two cumulants are called the mean and the variance, while the third
and fourth are related to the skewness ( κ3
κ
3/2
2
) and kurtosis (κ4
κ22
) respectively. Skewness is
a measure of the asymmetry of the distribution and kurtosis indicates the strength of the
decay in the tails of the distribution.
2.6 Saddlepoint approximations
Following Bleistein and Handelsman (1986) we introduce the saddlepoint approximation
as we shall repeatedly need to invert the convolutions of discrete distributions in their
generating function form. From the inversion formula (2.4.8) if follows that the mean of
n convolutions of the same distribution is given by,
ρb =
1
2pii
ipi∫
−ipi
Φn[λ]ebλ dλ. (2.6.1)
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Taking x = b/n as the variable (which becomes continuous for large n) we assume n b
ρ [x] =
1
2pii
ipi∫
−ipi
Φn [λ] enxλ dλ. (2.6.2)
Visualise the behaviour of the integral as we move from zero to infinity on the real positive
axis. The first factor of the integrand, Φn [λ], starts at one and decreases monotonically.
The second factor, enλx, also starts at one when λ = 0 but increases monotonically to
infinity. In addition, the relative increase of the second factor,
d
dλ
log eλnx = nx, (2.6.3)
is constant and the relative decrease of the first factor,
d
dλ
log Φn [λ] = −n
∑
b bρbe
−bλ∑
b ρbe
−bλ (2.6.4)
decreases itself monotonically. Indeed we know from (2.4.3) that it is a convex function on
the real positive axis. Under these circumstances integrand Φn[λ]enxλ will have only one
minimum and no other maxima or minima on the positive real axis. This minimum will be
very steep because both exponents, n and nx, will be very large numbers for any constant
x. At this point on the real positive axis (which we will call the saddlepoint) the first
derivative of the integrand will disappear and the second derivative will be positive and
very large. We first determine the saddlepoint, where the first derivative of the integrand
vanishes. It is convenient to use the logarithm of the exponential generating function here,
K [λ] = log Φ[λ] + λb. (2.6.5)
Then λ∗ is defined by the equation,
K(1) [λ∗] =
d
dλ
log Φ [λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
+ b = 0 (2.6.6)
and we also know that K(2) [λ∗] > 0 from (2.4.3) and that there is only one solution to
this equation. Define the path of integration for (2.6.2) as a straight line segment through
λ∗ parallel to the imaginary axis terminating at λ∗ ± ipi. Since K[λ] has a minimum at
λ∗ for real λ, the modulus of the integrand must have a maximum at λ∗ on the chosen
path1. Consequently, for the particular path chosen only values near the neighbourhood
1It can be shown that for any such terminating straight line segment parallel to the imaginary axis
the integrand attains its maximum modulus only where the line crosses the real axis. For on the line
λ = µ+ iν, ∣∣∣eK[λ]∣∣∣ = eµb ∣∣∣∣∣∑
j
ρje
−(µ+iν)j
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ eK[µ]. (2.6.7)
Assume equality holds for some ν 6= 0, so that ∑ ρbe−(µ+iν)b = Φ[λ]eiα where α is some real constant,
which gives ∑
ρbe
−µb [1− cos(νb− α)] = 0. (2.6.8)
Implying cos(νb − α) = 1 for all integral b and some α, but v = 0 is the only possible solution in (−pi, pi)
and consequently equality can only hold on the real axis
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of λ∗ need be considered when n is large. Intuitively all the terms in (2.4.1) will reinforce
each other on the real axis but as we add an imaginary component the terms will start
to ‘rotate’ at different speeds according to the values of b and thus the integrand will in
general be considerably less as we move away from the real axis.
Making the substitution t =
√
n(λ − λ∗) and Taylor expanding around t = 0 changes
the integral (2.6.2) into
ρ [x] =
enK[λ
∗]
2pii
√
n
√
n(ipi−λ∗)∫
√
n(−ipi−λ∗)
exp
K(2)[λ∗] t2
2
+
∞∑
j=3
K(j)[λ∗]√
n
j−2
tj
j!
 dt. (2.6.9)
Expanding the exponential of higher order terms yields,
ρ [x] =
enK[λ
∗]
2pii
√
n
√
n(ipi−λ∗)∫
√
n(−ipi−λ∗)
exp
[
K(2)[λ∗]
2
t2
]∏
j≥3
1 + ∞∑
k=1
1
k!
(
K(j)[λ∗]tj√
n
j−2
j!
)k dt
=
enK[λ
∗]
2pii
√
n
√
n(ipi−λ∗)∫
√
n(−ipi−λ∗)
exp
[
K(2)[λ∗]
2
t2
]1 + ∞∑
j≥3
Ajt
j
 dt,
(2.6.10)
where Aj is a set of coefficients that are functions of the logarithmic derivatives of the
exponential generating function at the saddlepoint and Aj ∼ n1−j/2. Assuming n is large
we take the contour from minus infinity to infinity (the corrections are sub-exponential,
see Bender and Orszag (1999)) which we can then displace to the origin using the Cauchy
theorem (we know that there are no singularities on the real positive axis). Using the
standard integral true for a > 0 and j ≥ 0,
1
2pii
i∞∫
−i∞
eat
2
tj dt =

(−1)j/2
2pi
(
j−1
2
)
!a−
j+1
2 for even j
0 for odd j,
(2.6.11)
with a = K
(2)[λ∗]
2 .
Finally we have the saddlepoint approximation to the mean of n convolutions of a
distribution,
ρ [x] =
enK[λ
∗]√
2pinK(2)[λ∗]
1 + ∞∑
j=2
A2j
(K(2)[λ∗])j
(−1)j(2j − 1)!
2j(j − 1)!
 . (2.6.12)
The advantage that the saddlepoint has over a conventional Gaussian approximation is
that the saddlepoint ensures that all the odd coefficients do not contribute; thus the sad-
dlepoint approximation with no corrections is order O
(
1
n
)
while a Gaussian approximation
gives O
(
1√
n
)
, see Daniels (1954) and Stuart and Ord (1994). The first coefficient in the
expansion is,
A4 =
K(4)[λ∗]
24n
(2.6.13)
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and adding it would give us O
(
1
n2
)
accuracy.
It is not obvious from the above derivation that the saddlepoint approximation is a
proper asymptotic expansion. To prove the assertion requires the use of the method of
steepest descent: an account is given in Jeffreys and Jeffreys (1950) and uses the lemma
of Watson (1948).
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Chapter 3
Basics of Bayesian probability
They say that Understanding ought to work by the rules of right reason. These
rules are, or ought to be, contained in Logic; but the actual science of logic is
conversant at present only with things either certain, impossible, or entirely
doubtful, none of which (fortunately) we have to reason on. Therefore the true
logic for this world is the calculus of Probabilities, which takes account of the
magnitude of the probability which is, or ought to be, in a reasonable man’s
mind.
J. Clerk Maxwell
3.1 Introduction
The fundamental problem of science, and a fundamental problem of everyday life, is that of
learning from experience. Knowledge obtained in this way is in part a description of what
we have observed (past experiences) and in part a prediction of future experiences. The
prediction part is called induction or generalisation and is the part that we are interested
in. This is not to say that the description of unrelated things are not important as they
might lead to predictions in the future. Logic in its usual sense does not contain any
of these inferences. Formal logic only admits three attitudes true, false and ignorance.
Therefore as pointed out by Maxwell, we have to use probabilities as a degree of belief if
we want to formalise the thinking of a scientist. The discussion in this chapter is based
on Jeffreys (1961), Jaynes (2003) and Lindley (2006).
As we can draw an infinite number of functions through a finite number of fixed points,
generalisations or inductions are by definition subjective. In the same way probabilities are
predictions and thus theoretical quantities. So when Boltzmann (1974) says “the task of
theory consists in constructing a picture of the external world that exists purely internally”
and De Finetti (1974) says “probabilities do not exist”, they are in fact saying the same
thing. On the one hand we have the ontological world of experimental observation and on
the other hand we have an epistemological world which consists of theory and probabilities.
The ontological world is called objective and the epistemological world is called subjective.
16
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This is of course a trivial observation but it does seem to cause confusion. For example it
is impossible to measure a probability. If two observers measure a distance they can agree
on the length, but if two observers assign a probability to an event they do not have to
agree at all because they can have different background information. Take a black box and
place either a red or blue ball in it. Now place an observer inside the box and an observer
outside the box. The observer inside is absolutely sure which ball will be drawn and the
observer outside does not know, thus they assign different probabilities to the same event
and they are both correct. Also if the inside observer now tells the outside observer what
he knows the outside observer changes his prediction and assigns different probabilities,
and thus the changing of probabilities does not necessarily imply any physical change.
Each observer has his own information time line with the things he has learned in his
information past and things that he predicts in his information future. This information
time line does not correspond to physical time and can even work in the opposite direction.
For example, learning something new from a fossil changes the prediction we make of
something that has occurred physically a few million years in the past.
To use probabilities as an element of logic or a degree of belief in a logical proposition
places a certain burden on us. We have to be reasonable men. First we have to define
the logical propositions we are discussing. We will call propositions uncertain if we do not
know whether they are false or true. A typical example would be,
A ≡ It will rain tomorrow. (3.1.1)
Then we must describe the knowledge that we will use to assign a probability. This may
require an onerous process of identifying and specifying, relevant facts or issues such as
• Is tomorrow from midnight tonight to midnight tomorrow or from morning till
evening?
• How much water constitutes rain, a bit of dew or at least one millimetre in a cup
placed where exactly?
• What do we assume is known about the physical process of rain?
• Do historical observations of rain influence our probability assignment?
• Is there enough consistency in nature to permit such a prediction at all?
The set of answers and questions describes our knowledge base,
K ≡ The knowledge we consider relevant to the problem. (3.1.2)
Being reasonable men also implies that we must reason consistently: if two observers are
provided with the same knowledge base they should assign the same probabilities. All this
goes to show that every probability is a conditional probability,
ρ(A|K), (3.1.3)
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where A,B, . . . will be called Boolean propositions because we shall assume they obey
Boolean algebra (see Appendix B). Everything to the right of the vertical line is assumed
given and known and everything to the left is uncertain. As a matter of principle all
probabilities should have something to the right of the line. Before we can translate these
logical operations into mathematical rules, we have to translate our degrees of belief 1 onto
a mathematical scale and the traditional choice is to denote true with one and false with
zero and the rest with a number between zero and one depending on their uncertainty.
This leads to the
Convexity Rule: For any proposition A and knowledge base K, the
observer assigns the probability p(A|K) for A given K as a
rational number between zero and one. The observer only assigns
p(A|K) = 1 if K logically implies A and only assigns p(A|K) = 0
if A is logically false on K.
3.2 Sum rule and Product rule
We can write the four basic logical constructs algebraically or logically as
A|K ↔ A GIVEN K
A,B ↔ A AND B
A+ B ↔ A OR B
A ↔ NOT A.
(3.2.1)
It seems there should be an infinite number of mappings of these rules but consistency
forces all the different rules to be equivalent. The proof of this, known as Cox’s theorem,
and is set out in Appendix B. We could have chosen a different convention but we will
show later that different conventions will have exactly the same content i.e. that there is
a one to one mapping between the different conventions and we would gain nothing by
doing things differently.
The logical OR applied to proposition A and its contradiction A should give certainty
as we know from deductive logic, meaning that
p(A|K) + p(A|K) = 1 (Sum rule). (3.2.2)
From Cox’s theorem we know that all other choices are identical to this choice. Next
consider the logical AND operation: we have to think on how to combine logical propositions.
From Cox (1946), let proposition A denote an athlete can run from one place to another
and proposition B he can run back again without stopping. The knowledge base K is what
the observer knows about running from here to the distant place and what he knows about
the physical condition of the athlete. p(B|A,K) is the probability that the athlete will
1We use the term degree of belief strictly in the operational sense defined here. Matters of metaphysics
and ontology do not form part of our investigation in this dissertation.
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return assuming that he reached the distant place and p(A|K) is the probability that he
will reach the distant place. Common sense says the product of the two is the probability
p(AB|K) that he completes the race. Cox’s theorem shows that all other choices are
equivalent and that generally
p(A,B|K) = p(A|B,K)p(B|K) = p(B|A,K)p(A|K) (Product rule). (3.2.3)
3.2.1 Bayes’ Rule and its associates
We define logical independence as
p(A|B,K) = p(A|K). (3.2.4)
The uncertainty in the proposition A remains unaffected by observing or learning proposi-
tion B. Through the product rule, this is equivalent to the joint probability factorising,
p(A,B|K) = p(A|K)p(B|K). (3.2.5)
We will call probabilities that factorise a set of chances. It is also essential to realise that
logical independence is again not a property of an event or an object. Examine a bent
coin for example: If we are told that a bent coin has a 60% chance to land heads and
a 40% chance of landing tails, this information makes one throw of the coin a logically
independent event against all the other throws of the coin. But if we are told the coin
is bent but not towards which side it favours the throws of the coin are not logically
independent, but physically nothing has changed between the two scenarios. There is a
fundamental connection between ignorance and independence.
To proceed we need to refine the sum rule further: we seek a formula for the logical
sum A + B. Using De Morgan’s (B.2.5) law on A + B and repeatedly applying our rules
(see also Jaynes (2003)) gives
p(A+ B|K) = 1− p(A,B|K) = 1− p(A|K)p(B|A,K)
= 1− p(A|K) [1− p(B|A,K)] = p(A|K) + p(A,B|K)
= p(A|K) + p(B|K)p(A|B,K)
= p(A|K) + p(B|K) [1− p(A|B,K)]
(3.2.6)
and we end up with
p(A+ B|K) = p(A|K) + p(B|K)− p(A,B|K). (3.2.7)
The sum rule (3.2.2) is a special case B = A of this Extended Sum Rule. In view of
this rule it would be convenient to define a set of exclusive and exhaustive propositions.
Propositions A and B are exclusive when p(A,B|K) = 0 i.e. if one of them is true the
other is false. Propositions A and B are exhaustive when one of them must be true
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p(A + B|K) = 1. After constructing an exclusive and exhaustive set of propositions Fb,
we can partition any proposition A into this set,
p(F1 + · · ·+ FB|K) = 1
p(Fa,Fb|K) = 0 ∀ a 6= b
p(A|K) = p(AF1 + · · ·+AFB|K) =
∑
b
p(A,Fb|K),
(3.2.8)
which is much simpler than the B-fold extended sum rule. For an arbitrary parameter θ
we would for example take the propositions F as intervals on the support of the parameter
so that it forms an exhaustive set and non-overlapping intervals and thus an exclusive set
as well. Then on making each interval smaller while increasing the number of intervals,
the sum rule becomes,
p(D|K) =
∫
p(D,θ|K)dθ. (3.2.9)
Summing or integrating out a parameter is called marginalisation and gives the evi-
dence for that parameter.
If we divide the evidence (assuming p(D|K) 6= 0) into our joint probability distribution
p(D,θ|K) we derive Bayes Rule,
p(θ|D,K) = p(θ,D|K)
p(D|K) =
p(D|θ,K)p(θ|K)
p(D|K) (3.2.10)
or
posterior =
likelihood× prior
evidence
, (3.2.11)
where we also write L[θ] for the likelihood if we consider the data fixed and pi[θ] for the
prior. Bayes Rule is used when we want to invert the conditioning of the probabilities. Of
course in science we need this in all parameter estimation problems. We usually have a
model that predicts the data given a set of parameters, but what we need is the probability
for the parameters given the data that we have observed.
3.3 Example: straight line fitting
Let us illustrate these rules by applying them to a perennial problem: drawing the optimal
straight line through a scatter plot of data points, see Zellner (1971) and Jaynes (1990).
To make the example interesting we assume error in both x and y variables:
y = y∗ + y x = x∗ + x y∗ = βx∗ + α (3.3.1)
where α is the unknown intercept of our straight line, β the slope, and x∗ and y∗ are the
‘true’ values. The first logical proposition we make is what we observe (namely the data),
D ≡ {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xJ , yJ)} (3.3.2)
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and as part of our knowledge base we will assume that the errors are distributed like a
Gaussian distribution,
p(x|x∗, σx,K) = 1√
2piσx
exp
[
−(x− x
∗)2
2σ2x
]
. (3.3.3)
While we will derive from first principles later, usually nobody would object to this as-
sumption. The probability p(x|x∗, σx,K) is called a forward probability: our observations
are explained in terms of a set of parameters that are assumed known; in this case x∗ and
σx. The total list of parameters is of course,
θ = {α, β, x∗, y∗, σx, σy}. (3.3.4)
Next we have to assign a probability to the whole of the data set, p(D|θ,K). To do this
we will need to make some assumptions: First, that there is no time evolution in our data
set and hence that there is no preferred ordering of the data, implying exchangeability
i.e. we assign the same probability for all permutations of the data set,
p({x1, y1}, {x2, y2}, . . . , {xJ , yJ}|K) = p({xpi1 , ypi1}, {xpi2 , ypi2}, . . . , {xpiJ , ypiJ}|K), (3.3.5)
where {pij} is some reordering of the data. In terms of our physical/information time
picture we are assuming that our signal(data) is stationary in physical time. Secondly,
we will make the even stronger assumption of logical independence, which implies that
our the data is stationary in information time as well. Logical independence necessarily
implies that we cannot update the assigned probabilities dynamically as we learn new data
points, or in other words that the model is assumed fixed.
Notice that logical independence implies exchangeability but the converse is not true.
Exchangeability will become far more important than logical independence in the later
chapters. Applying logical independence to our data set gives us
p(D|θ,K) =
J∏
j
p(xj , yj |θ,K). (3.3.6)
Using our Gaussian error model and logical independence we find
p(x,y|θ,K) =
J∏
j
1
2piσxσy
exp
[
−(xj − x
∗
j )
2
2σx2
− (y
∗
j − yj)2
2σy2
]
(3.3.7)
our likelihood function, which we will also write as L[θ] when we consider our data fixed.
Using our straight line model: we can either write our likelihood function in terms of x∗j ,
p(D|θ,K) =
J∏
j
1√
2piσxσy
exp
[
−(xj − x
∗
j )
2
2σx2
− (βx
∗
j + α− yj)2
2σy2
]
(3.3.8)
or in terms of y∗,
p(D|θ,K) =
J∏
j
1√
2piσxσy
exp
[
−
(xj − y∗−αβ )2
2σx2
− (y
∗
j − yj)2
2σy2
]
, (3.3.9)
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which in both cases reduces our unknown parameters.
Our second logical proposition in this example is the prior which is supposed to capture
mathematically what we know of the parameters before we have seen the data. Looking
first at x∗j and y
∗
j , they are both locations and thus we consider the whole real line as
equally likely,
p(x∗|K) = p(y∗|K) ∝ 1, (3.3.10)
which is an improper prior meaning that it is not properly normalised. We will first discuss
only one parameter and then deal with the others as they arise. Using the product rule
we combine the two logical statements about parameters and data,
p(θ,D|K) = p(θ|K)p(D|θ,K) (3.3.11)
which as previously noted is called the joint probability distribution.
In this example the x∗j or y
∗
j are nuisance parameters as they are only used to set up
the model, are then integrated out and play no further role in the analyses. Marginalising
over all the x∗j ,
p(D|α, β, σx, σy,K) ∝
J∏
j=1
∫
p(D|θ,K)dx∗j
∝ [2pi(β2σ2x + σ2y)]−J2 exp [− JQ[x, y]2(β2σ2x + σ2y)
]
,
(3.3.12)
with
Q[x, y] =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(βxj + α− yj)2. (3.3.13)
There is also another nuisance parameter: Examining the likelihood function (3.3.12), σx
and σy only appear in the combination β
2σ2x+σ
2
y , thus we can transform from {σx, σy} →
{σ, λ} using
σ2 = β2σ2x + σ
2
y λ =
σx
σy
(3.3.14)
with the Jacobian
∂(σx, σy)
∂(σ, λ)
=
σ
β2λ2 + 1
. (3.3.15)
This illustrates an important point: change of parameters does not affect our likelihood
function but the Jacobian of the transformation does end up in our prior distribution.
The unknown error parameters σx and σy we view as unknown scales in our problem and
thus their prior distribution will be
p(σx, σy)dσxdσy ∝ dσx
σx
dσy
σy
, (3.3.16)
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which we will motivate later. Transforming to our new set of parameters,
p(σ, λ)dσdλ ∝
√
β2λ2 + 1
λσ
√
β2λ2 + 1
σ
σ
β2λ2 + 1
dσdλ ∝ dσ
σ
dλ
λ
, (3.3.17)
we conclude that our new parameters are also unknown scales. Also because the λ param-
eter does not appear in our likelihood function we can just marginalise it away, leaving us
with the simplified form,
L[α, β, σ] =
(√
2piσ
)−J
exp
[
−J Q[x, y]
2σ2
]
. (3.3.18)
It is a great advantage of Bayesian statistics that it can remove nuisance parameters
through marginalising, which is not always so simple. For example if we chose a more
complicated prior such as a Levy distribution for both σx and σy,
p(σx, σy|K) = 2
piσ2yσ
2
x
exp
[
− 1
2σ2x
− 1
2σ2y
]
(3.3.19)
transformed to the new variables,
p(λ, σ|K) = exp
[
−(1 + λ
2)(1 + β2λ2)
2λ2σ2
]
2
(
1 + β2λ2
)
piλ2σ2
, (3.3.20)
and integrated out the λ, we would obtain
p(σ|K) =
√
2
pi
(1 + β)
σ2
exp
[
−(1 + β)
2
2σ2
]
, (3.3.21)
which shows that the functional invariance we observed in (3.3.17) is a property of that
specific choice of prior distributions. In general marginalising over a nuisance parameter
that does not appear in our likelihood function can change the prior distributions of other
parameters.
Defining the sample moments,
x ≡
J∑
j
xj
J
y ≡
J∑
j
yj
J
x2 ≡
J∑
j
x2j
J
y2 ≡
J∑
j
y2j
J
xy ≡
J∑
j
xjyj
J
,
(3.3.22)
sample variances and a correlation coefficient,
s2yy ≡ y2 − y2 s2xx ≡ x2 − x2 s2xy ≡ xy − x y φ ≡ 1−
s4xy
s2xxs
2
yy
, (3.3.23)
we can rewrite after some algebra the quadratic function Q[x, y] as,
Q[x, y] = (α− α)2 + 2x (α− α) (β − β)+ x2 (β − β)2 + s2yyφ, (3.3.24)
with
β =
s2xy
s2xx
α = y − β x. (3.3.25)
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Hence the sample moments are sufficient statistics: according to our model they are the
only properties of the data on which our inferences are based. Choosing p(α|K) constant
allows us to marginalise out the α,
p(D|β, σ,K) ∝ (
√
2piσ)1−J√
J
exp
[
−J sxx
(
β − β)2 + syyφ
2σ2
]
, (3.3.26)
and for the slope β we also consider all values equally likely, p(β|K) ∝ 1, so that
p(D|σ,K) ∝ σ
(√
2piσ
)1−J
J
√
2pisxx
exp
[
−J syyφ
2sxxσ2
]
(3.3.27)
and finally with p(σ|K) ∝ 1σ our evidence is
P (D|K) ∝ Γ
[
J
2 − 1
]
pi1−
J
2 syyφ
2
√
sxx
(Jsyyφ)
−J
2 . (3.3.28)
Applying Bayes theorem (3.2.10) yields the posterior
p(α, β, σ|D,K) = 2
√
sxx
pisyyφΓ
[
j
2 − 1
] (Jsyyφ
2σ2
)J
2
exp
[
−J Q[x, y]
2σ2
]
. (3.3.29)
An observant reader would have noticed that we specified our prior distributions only
proportionally, but our posterior is suddenly normalised. The logic is that the posterior
is a ratio and our improper prior distribution contains a normalisation constant which
cancels.
3.4 Summarising the posterior
If the posterior can be found analytically for all values of θ, it represents the answer of
maximal information. Often, however it is easier to characterise the distribution in terms
of a small number of measures, say location, dispersion and skewness instead of describing
the whole posterior distribution. The problem of choosing a single measure of location is a
well-known problem in descriptive statistics. Defining expectation of any given parameter
θ as
〈θ〉 =
∑
b
θbp(θb|D,K)
and 〈θ〉 =
∫
θp(θ|D,K)dθ,
(3.4.1)
in the discrete case or continuous case respectively.
The single measure of location we will call a point estimate. Our first example of a
location measure is the posterior mean θˆ = 〈θ〉. We chose the point estimate θˆ to minimize
the expectation of a loss or risk function R[θˆ, θ]
min
θˆ
〈
R[θˆ, θ]
〉
= min
θˆ
∫
R[θˆ, θ]p(θ|D,K)dθ (3.4.2)
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and for the posterior mean we minimize the quadratic loss. Of course we are assuming〈
R[θˆ, θ]
〉
is finite and that the minimum exists. Since for a given p(θˆ|D,K) the variation
of θ in the second term of the expected loss is fixed,
R[θˆ, θ] = (θ − θˆ)2〈
(θ − θˆ)2
〉
=
〈
θ2
〉− 2θˆ 〈θ〉+ θˆ2 = (θˆ − 〈θ〉)2 + (〈θ2〉− 〈θ〉2) . (3.4.3)〈
(θ − θˆ)2
〉
is therefore minimized by setting,
θˆ = 〈θ〉 =
∫
θp(θ|D,K)dθ. (3.4.4)
The expected quadratic loss of the posterior mean is also called the variance of θ,
var(θ) =
〈
θ2
〉− 〈θ〉2 . (3.4.5)
But this may not be what we really want. There are valid arguments against using the
mean values as the squared error criterion considers errors twice as great as four times as
serious and thus focuses its attention on large but not very probable errors. We could also
have used Laplace’s original criterion namely minimizing the absolute loss,
R[θˆ, θ] =
∣∣∣θ − θˆ∣∣∣
〈∣∣∣θˆ − θ∣∣∣〉 = θˆ∫
−∞
(θˆ − θ)p(θ|D,K) dθ +
∞∫
θˆ
(θ − θˆ)p(θ|D,K) dθ
(3.4.6)
and upon setting the derivative to zero
d
dθˆ
〈∣∣∣θˆ − θ∣∣∣〉 = θˆ∫
−∞
p(θ|D,K) dθ −
∞∫
θˆ
p(θ|D,K) dθ = 0, (3.4.7)
results in θˆ being the median, for which
p(θ > θˆ|D,K) = 1/2. (3.4.8)
So for the absolute loss function θˆ is the median of the distribution. The median only
considers errors twice as great to be twice as serious and is less sensitive to the tails of
the distribution. Thus it is more robust against variation in the tails of the distribution,
which is generally held to be a desirable property. It also implies that our estimation
is less sensitive to outliers. Thus there is a trade-off between sensitivity and robustness.
If we make the non-linear transformation φ(θ) and suppose φ(θ) is a strictly monotonic
increasing function of θ, so that θ is a single-valued and invertible function of φ, then
clearly
φ(θˆ) = φˆ. (3.4.9)
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In fact all the percentiles have this invariance property, so we can give our point and
interval estimates as the median and the interquartile span of the distribution. This is
an especially good idea if we believe our parameter should be invariant under monotonic
transformations for example in the case of scale parameters.
The final loss function we will consider is,
R[θˆ, θ] =
0 θˆ = θ1 otherwise , (3.4.10)
which is basically a delta function δ(θ − θˆ) i.e. it is one for a specific value and zero for
the rest. This loss function is a minimum when we choose θˆ as the most probable value
or the mode of the posterior distribution.
Using the most probable value of the posterior distribution is intimately connected to
the method of maximum likelihood or the approximation of the posterior distribution with
a Gaussian distribution (Laplace’s method). The most probable set of parameters solves
the equations,
d
dθk
log
L[θ]pi[θ]
const.
∣∣∣∣
θk=θ
∗
k
= 0, ∀k (3.4.11)
or
1
L[θ]
dL[θ]
dθk
+
1
pi[θ]
dpi[θ]
dθk
∣∣∣∣
θk=θ
∗
k
= 0, ∀k. (3.4.12)
The prior pi(θ) is independent of the number of observations J and the logL[θ] in general
increases like J . Thus if we expand our parameters around the most probable value of the
likelihood function, θk = θ
∗
k + θ
′, the corrections will only be of order 1J . In the single
variate case, expanding the posterior around the mode of the likelihood function gives a
contribution from the prior distribution
pi[θ] = pi[θ∗]
(
1 + θ′
pi′(θ∗)
pi(θ∗)
+
θ′2
2
pi′′(θ∗)
pi(θ∗)
+ . . .
)
, (3.4.13)
and a contribution from the likelihood function
L[θ] = L[θ∗] exp
[
−θ
′2
2
d2
dθ∗2
logL[θ∗] +
θ′2
6
d3
dθ∗3
logL[θ∗] + . . .
]
∝ exp
[
−θ
′2
2
d2
dθ∗2
logL[θ∗]
](
1 +
θ′3
6
d3
dθ∗3
logL[θ∗] + . . .
)
,
(3.4.14)
and combining the two contributions we have
p(θ|D,K) ∝ exp
[
−1
2
(
d2
dθ2
logL[θ∗]
)
θ′2
]
×
(
1 + θ′
pi′(θ∗)
pi(θ∗)
+
θ′2
2
pi′′(θ∗)
pi(θ∗)
+
θ′3
6
d3
dθ3
logL[θ∗]
)
.
(3.4.15)
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The leading term of this approximation is called the normal form: It is a gaussian centered
at the maximum likelihood value with unit variance over the second derivative of the log
likelihood function at the maximum likelihood point
var (p) (θ|D,K) =
[
− d
2
dθ2
logL[θ]
]−1
θ=θ∗
. (3.4.16)
Similarly for the multivariate case we can also write the posterior in normal form
p(θ′|D,K) ∝ exp
[
θ′THθ′
2
]
, (3.4.17)
where H is the Hessian of the approximation,
H =

d2 logL[θ]
dθ21
d2 logL[θ]
dθ1dθ2
. . . d
2 logL[θ]
dθ1dθK
d2 logL[θ]
dθ2dθ1
d2 logL[θ]
dθ22
. . . d
2 logL[θ]
dθ2dθK
...
. . .
...
d2 logL[θ]
dθKdθ1
d2 logL[θ]
dθKdθ2
. . . d
2 logL[θ]
d2θK

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
θ=θ∗
, (3.4.18)
and upon normalising
p(θ|D,K) =
√
detH√
2pi
K
exp
[
(θ′ − θ∗)TH(θ′ − θ∗)
2
]
. (3.4.19)
Since log p(θ|D,K) ∼ J the variance decreases with growing J and thus the difference
(θ∗ − θ′) is of order J−1/2 . It follows that the corrections (θ′ − θ∗)pi′(θ∗k)pi(θ∗k) and
(θ′k−θ∗k)3
6
d3
dθ3k
logL[θ∗k] is of order J
−1/2 which gives the error of the overall approximation as J−1/2 .
This is the method of Maximum Likelihood, which has been advocated Fisher. It
entails approximating the posterior with a Gaussian distribution. It is also called Laplace’s
method and interestingly it is parametrisation dependent, see MacKay (1998). It is also
extensively used in Bayesian statistics, see Tierney et al. (1986).
In summary we have:
• The Maximum likelihood as a point estimate and the second derivative of the
log-likelihood as its error estimate has the virtue of being easy to calculate. The
point estimate is invariant under change of parameters but its error estimate is not
because to define an invariant interval requires a prior distribution, which is usually
ignored when using the maximum likelihood principal. Notice as well that in general
the mode of the posterior will not coincide with the maximum likelihood mode. The
point and dispersion estimate contains only local information and can thus be very
misleading.
• Percentiles: The percentiles are invariant under monotone transformations and
contain the prior. However if we are going through the effort of computing percentiles
we might as well have plotted the posterior and be done with it. It is usually too
much computational effort to provide the percentiles.
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• Posterior moments: The posterior moments are not naturally invariant under
change of parameters, but only invariant under those transformations that leave the
prior unchanged. Thus we can view the prior distribution as choosing a class of
transformations under which our inference should be invariant. We will explore this
idea in more detail later. We also know how to transform posterior moments. If we
convolve many posterior distributions together we know that〈
K∑
j=k
θk
〉
=
K∑
k=1
〈θk〉 (3.4.20)
and
var
(
K∑
k=1
θj
)
=
K∑
k=1
var (θk) +
∑
i6=k
cov (θi, θk) , (3.4.21)
where the covariance is defined by
cov (θi, θk) = 〈(θi − 〈θi〉)(θk − 〈θk〉)〉 . (3.4.22)
So that if we are given the mean and variance instead of the whole posterior we
still know how to compute different quantities that depend on our parameters. This
property is not shared by the other estimators so we will use the posterior moments
and cumulants.
j xj yj j xj yj j xj yj j xj yj
1 1.420 3.695 2 6.268 6.925 3 8.854 8.923 4 8.532 14.043
5 −5.398 −0.836 6 13.776 16.609 7 5.278 4.405 8 6.298 9.823
9 9.886 12.611 10 11.362 10.174 11 1.964 4.987 12 1.406 6.647
13 0.002 2.873 14 3.212 4.015 15 9.042 10.204 16 1.474 1.953
17 8.528 10.672 18 7.348 9.157 19 6.690 8.552 20 5.796 10.250
Table 3.1: Straight line data set, with x = 5.878, y = 7.784, sxx = 19.332, sxy = 17.945,
syy = 16.925
3.5 Straight line fitting: numerical
Let us show the difference between the point estimates by substituting in some numbers
in our straight line fitting example. Take the data set from Zellner (1971), shown in Table
3.1 and plotted in Figure 3.1. In Figure 3.2 we show an example comparing the different
summary statistics which for this data are as follows.
(a) The Maximum likelihood estimates and corresponding standard deviation are,
α∗ = 2.893
√
var(α∗) = 0.395
β∗ = 0.875
√
var(β∗) = 0.056
σ∗ = 1.768
√
var(σ∗) = 0.280.
(3.5.1)
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Figure 3.1: Plot of generated data from Zellner (1971), y = 2 + x with σx = 4 and σy = 1.
(b) Median plus percentiles, which we choose to be {0.1587, 0.5, 0.8414} in cumulative
probability values so that for a Gaussian distribution that is centered on zero with
unit variance would give {−1, 0, 1} thus making it easier to compare with the other
estimators. We obtain
α : {2.43, 2.89, 3.36}
β : {0.810, 0.875, 0.901}
σ : {1.70, 1.90, 2.14}.
(3.5.2)
(c) And finally the posterior mean and standard deviation,
〈α〉 = y − sxyx
sxx
= 2.89
√
var(α) = 0.715
〈β〉 = sxy
sxx
= 0.875
√
var(β) = 0.101
〈σ〉 =
√
J
2
(
syy − sxy
sxx
)
Γ
[
J−3
2
]
Γ
[
J
2 − 1
] = 1.95 √var(σ) = 0.347
(3.5.3)
From the Figure we can see that Maximum likelihood gives the worst estimate, the pos-
terior mean is in the middle and the percentiles is the best, but is arguable using three
values instead of two as the other estimators. Using a single point estimate is only useful
if the posterior is unimodel which will hold for all the posteriors in this dissertation, and
if the posterior is unimodal all the estimates are mostly the same.
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Maximum Likelihood:0.395
Posterior Mean:0.347
Percentiles:0.327
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of the point estimate of σ in the straight line example. Maximum
likelihood, Posterior mean and the percentiles are plotted with the width of their estimates.
3.6 Predictive distributions
In addition to parameter estimation, we also want to predict future events (in information
time). Estimating parameters is only the halfway stop on what we should be doing with
hypotheses, the other half being predicting events. So how do we use the posterior for
prediction? The answer is simply that the posterior becomes the prior for our prediction.
Defining the logical proposition R as ”the next data point“, then in general we would
have,
p(R|D,K) =
∫
p(R|θ,K)p(θ|D,K)dθ. (3.6.1)
In the straight line example let
R ≡ {x′, y′}, (3.6.2)
to which we assign the probability,
p(R|α, β, σ,K) = 1√
2piσ
exp
[
−(βx
′ + α− y′)2
2σ2
]
. (3.6.3)
The integral we have to perform is exactly the same as the first evidence integral but with
an added data point xJ+1 = x
′,yJ+1 = y′, so we define the updated sample moments as
x′ ≡ Jx+ x
′
1 + J
y′ ≡ Jy + y
′
1 + J
x′2 ≡ Jx
2 + x′2
1 + J
x′2 ≡ Jy
2 + y′2
1 + J
x′y′ ≡ Jxy + x
′y′
1 + J
,
(3.6.4)
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.7. MODEL COMPARISON 31
and the updated sample variances
s′yy ≡
J(J + 1)syy + J(y − y′)2
(J + 1)2
s′xx ≡
J(J + 1)sxx + J(x− x′)2
(J + 1)2
s′xy ≡
J(J + 1)sxy + J(x− x′)(y − y′)
(J + 1)2
φ′ ≡ 1− s
′
xy
2
s′xxs′yy
.
(3.6.5)
The predictive distribution given the data D is then the ratio of two evidence terms,
p(R|D,K) = p(R,D|K)
p(D|K) =
Γ[J+12 −1]pi1−
J+1
2 s′yyφ
2
√
s′xx
(
(J + 1)s′yyφ′
)−J+1
2
Γ[J2−1]pi1−
J
2 syyφ
2
√
sxx
(Jsyyφ)
−J
2
(3.6.6)
In Figure 3.3 the predictive distribution (3.6.6) is plotted together with the posterior
mean line. Interestingly, there are no parameters in the predictive distribution since we
have taken all possible parameter values and their respective probabilities into account in
the predictive distribution. For more about straight line fitting, see Gull (1989) and Press
et al. (1992).
3.7 Model comparison
How do we make the best predictions that we can? Obviously we find the best model
for the data. Intuitively the best model would be the model that assigns the highest
probability on average to the data. Bayes Rule in discrete form is simply,
p(Hm|D,K) = p(D|Hm,K)p(Hm|K)
p(D|K) =
p(D|Hm,K)p(Hm|K)∑
m p(D|Hm,K)p(Hm|K)
, (3.7.1)
where Hm refers to the mth model instead of a parameter value. Usually there is no reason
to prefer any model above any other a priori and thus we choose p(Hm|K) = 1/M and we
rewrite Bayes rule in its odds form by taking the ratio between two models m and m′,
p(Hm|D,K)
p(Hm′ |D,K) =
p(Hm|K)
p(Hm′ |K)
p(D|Hm,K)
p(D|Hm′ ,K) . (3.7.2)
As the evidence for the set of models are equivalent they cancel out in the ratio. And
because it is very rare to compare models that are indexed continuously we can write,
p(Hm|D,K)
p(Hm′ |D,K) =
p(D|Hm,K)
p(D|Hm′ ,K) . (3.7.3)
So to find the best model all we need to find is the model with the highest evidence in our
set of models. This ratio of evidence terms is called the Bayes Factor. Also what we learn
from this is that two hypotheses with the same evidence for all data sets D are in fact the
same hypotheses, because they make exactly the same predictions. This has interesting
consequences, for example a model with seven parameters that has highly informative
prior information available can be equivalent to a model with six parameters but with less
prior information available. In section (6.2) below we will show how Bayes factors play
out for a concrete example from High Energy Physics.
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Figure 3.3: A plot of the line y∗ = αx∗ + β with the posterior mean estimates through the
data from the straight line together with a contour plot of the logarithm of the probability of the
predictive distribution of the next data point.
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3.8 Asymptotic Behaviour
The evidence and predictive distributions are the goal in our data analysis. Assuming
that we have accumulated lots of logically independent data and that our models are
well-conditioned so that the maximum likelihood approximation is valid, our likelihood
function tends asymptotically towards a product of delta functions:
lim
J→∞
p(D|θ,K) LI=
∏
k
δ(θk − θ∗k), (3.8.1)
where θ is a set of parameters and θ∗ is the set of ‘true’ parameters that best describes
the data set that we have observed if our model is appropriate. Under this large data limit
the evidence is then just an evaluation of the prior for a specific value of θ,
lim
J→∞
p(D|K) LI= p(θ∗|K). (3.8.2)
The posterior also tends towards a product of normalised delta functions and the predictive
distribution becoming equal to the likelihood function with these “best” parameters,
lim
J→∞
p(R|D,K) LI= p(R|θ∗,K). (3.8.3)
The point of this discussion is that the prior and the likelihood functions are asymptotic
forms of the evidence and predictive distributions respectively, which is why we place
our focus on the finite forms instead of the asymptotic forms. Next we discuss how we
assign probabilities in the first place. As we shall see, our guiding principal is to reason
consistently.
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Chapter 4
Assigning probabilities using
logical independence
The Probability for an event is the ratio of the number of cases favourable to
it, to the number of all cases possible when nothing leads us to expect that
any one of these cases should occur more than any other, which renders them,
for us, equally possible.
Pierre-Simon, marquis de Laplace
How should a logical proposition be translated into a prediction for future data? In other
words, how do we assign probabilities to events? We will take the classical view that the
“randomness” in a physical system is caused by our lack of knowledge or control of the
system. Thus following Jaynes (2003) and d’Agostini (2003) we prefer to replace “random”
with “uncertain” or “uncontrolled”. Consequently we will exclude quantum mechanics
from the discussion in this dissertation as it might require a physical “randomness”. In
this picture, classical physics is composed of systematic or controllable effects which are
to be modelled, and uncontrollable effects that are not reproducible by the experimental
technique and apparatus in use. Often the controllable effects are macroscopic while
the uncontrollable ones are microscopic. What is uncontrolled depends on our current
scientific expertise and the quality of the apparatus. If one or both improve, previously
uncontrollable variables may become controllable and therefore “nonrandom”.
In a slightly more mathematical formulation, we may say that the systematic effects
may be adequately represented by a small number of macroscopic variables while the rest
of the variables, usually the large majority, do not matter individually but only through
their collective contribution to these few macroscopic variables. The classic example for
this situation is, of course, that of statistical physics, where the 6N variables of N particles
are relevant only insofar as they determine or modify the macroscopic variables of average
energy (temperature), heat capacity, susceptibilities etc.
In this chapter, we shall construct a mathematical framework which strongly resembles
that of traditional statistical mechanics and indeed encompasses it. Classical statistical
34
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mechanics is the easiest example where all the randomness in a system is caused by our
ignorance of the initial conditions of the system. We shall be more careful than most
books in doing so, because the building blocks and results that appear in this chapter will
form the point of departure or baseline from which later developments in this dissertation
will be developed.
There is essentially only one problem in statistical thermodynamics: the distribution
of energy E over N particles. In this chapter the number of particles N will be replaced by
the number of trials R, the energy of a system E will be replaced by a generalised constraint
G, the volume of the system V will play no role in this chapter and the thermodynamic
limit (N → ∞, while E/N is kept constant) will be called the large data limit or large
prediction limit as in Section (3.8) depending on the context. The remarkable thing
about this translation is that it changes nothing of the formalism of classical statistical
mechanics, which we can then view as a procedure of constructing hypotheses or assigning
probabilities.
There is one exception where we encounter conceptual difficulties and that is the idea
of distinguishable and indistinguishable particles. We will derive Maxwell-Boltzmann
statistics by using Logical Independence, which is usually associated with classical particles
that have definite trajectories and are thus called distinguishable particles. Interestingly,
Maxwell-Boltzmann and Bose-Einstein statistics can be derived for both distinguishable
and indistinguishable particles, see Constantini (1987). Thus instead of using the physics
definition we will define indistinguishable as exchangeable, which implies that there is
no ordering of the trials and thus no trajectories. Obviously as we are discussing logical
propositions and not particles it would be difficult to introduce trajectories in the first
place. We hence assume our system is in “equilibrium” and that we are dealing with
indistinguishable classical particles. We will use Chapter 9 of Jaynes (2003) as a basis
for this chapter, but we hope to improve on that discussion. The real purpose of this
chapter, however, is to show that all of the formalism flows from the logical independence
assumption, which is philosophically problematic and which we wish to replace with a
more solid foundation.
An important point that we will repeat many times: the framework below is contin-
uous refinement of assigned probabilities; nowhere does data play a role here. All the
assignments are based on logical propositions. The remainder of this chapter is structured
as follows:
• In Section 4.1, the very high-dimensional “primordial” outcome space SR is intro-
duced, where each vector x ∈ SR represents R distinguishable outcomes and the
probability of any x is the same due to the Principle of Indifference.
• Section 4.2 explains the Principle of Indifference as a group invariance argument.
We also point out that the concept of repetition plays no role when we apply the
principle directly to the sample space.
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• Section 4.3 traces a first projection from the R-dimensional SR hypercube space
to a one- dimensional partition {A1,A2, . . . ,AB} and corresponding probabilities
ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρB}.
• Section 4.4 in turn projects this onto the set of occupation numbers r = {r1, . . . , rB}
with outcome space the universal set U(r) and multinomial probability of (4.4.5).
• Section 4.5 will discuss how these concepts relate to physics.
• In Section 4.6 we develop the concept of waiting-time distributions which indicate
that we could have used a different but equivalent normalisation of the sample space.
The waiting-time identity itself will be used again later in the development.
• Section 4.7 develops the formalism of updating the probability from ρ to ρ′ when
we introduce a constraint like a fixed “energy” G.
• Section 4.8 computes the exact predictions from state of knowledge constructed in
the previous section.
• Section 4.9 uses the saddlepoint approximation to compute an approximation to the
exact formulas of the previous section.
• Section 4.11 introduces the principle of Maximum Entropy which is justified by our
saddlepoint approximation.
• Section 4.12 solves three example using the methods developed.
• Section 4.13 connects the Grand Canonical Ensemble with the Principle of Minimum
Relative Entropy.
• Section 4.14 discuss the problems with this formalism and what we will do next.
4.1 Primordial sample space
The strategy to formulating a prediction is to enumerate all the possibilities. A trial is
a measurement or observation of a logical proposition. Each trial by definition will have
one of M elementary outcomes, which are listed in the sample space S. This enumeration
of the possible results is a theoretical construction: no event comes labelled with the
sample space that should be used. By assumption these elementary outcomes will form
an exclusive and exhaustive set of possibilities. Before the data is seen M would also be a
prediction, but in the calculation below it is assumed a fixed number, for example M = 6
for the rolling of a die and M = 2 for the tossing of a coin. If the data contradicts this
number our state of knowledge is updated and we redo the calculation.
An experiment is defined as R trials where every trial is a question or a measurement
that can give the same M possible distinguishable answers, which is a point in a sample
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space S. The extended sample space for the whole experiment consists of the direct
product of R such spaces,
SR = S ⊗ S ⊗ · · · ⊗ S. (4.1.1)
A single trial in the space S is an outcome and the combination of R outcomes in the space
SR, an result. Importantly, “result” and “trial” here do not refer to any data obtained,
but to the possible data that could occur in a given SR. Denote the outcome of the rth
trial by the integer xr with 0 ≤ xr ≤ M − 1 and 1 ≤ r ≤ R. Any result can be specified
by giving the vector x = {x1, . . . , xR} and because these outcomes are mutually exclusive
and exhaustive, based on our knowledge base K we need to assign the probability,
p(x|K) = p(x1, . . . , xR|K), (4.1.2)
which is normalised according to
∑
x
p(x|K) =
M−1∑
x1=0
· · ·
M−1∑
xR=0
p(x|K) = 1. (4.1.3)
Note that we have “standardised” our outcome space to the integers S = {0, 1, . . . ,M−1}.
In summary we have defined,
M ≡ Number of possible elementary results of one trial
R ≡ Total number of trials
xr ≡ The outcome of trial r.
(4.1.4)
To use the sample space to translate logical statements into probability assignments, how-
ever we still need an essential ingredient.
4.2 Principle of indifference
Each of these results x in the sampling space SR (which is equivalent to the ensemble in
statistical mechanics), we will call a microstate and each of these states can be labelled
uniquely by assigning a unique number to each vector x. The number we assign to each
vector is in base M and is a combination of the results at each trial. For example if there
are 16 elementary results, which are labelled {0, . . . , 9, A, . . . , F} and we observe the vector
{A, 1, 3, F} after four trials. The number we assign α[x] could have been anything between
0 and 164 and in base 16, between 0000 and FFFF . For this specific x we assign α[x]
as A13F , which is just the natural mapping from a vector to a number. The Principle
of Insufficient Reason then states that the observer has insufficient information to
distinguish between the probability for different numbers he sees. If the observer sees α[x]
and α[x′] he learns exactly the same amount, so that
p(α[x]|I) = p(α[x′]|I), (4.2.1)
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which will serve as an appropriate starting point for our calculation. The principle was
introduced and named by Bernoulli (1713), but according to Keynes (1921), it would have
made more sense to call it the ‘principle of indifference’: The observer is indifferent to the
different labellings of the vectors and we would argue that the information available to
the observer is invariant under the different numbers or permutation of the labels. Note
that this is a basic invariance argument for a group transformation which is in this case
permutation. The reason why we used the mapping of vectors to unique numbers is to
show that there is no need for the concept of repetition in the sampling space when we
use the principle of indifference; every number α[x] is an unique object which is given its
own probability assignment.
In counting we start from zero and similarly in probability theory we start from ig-
norance. In other words this describes our initial position of ignorance and our simplest
knowledge base,
I: Each result in the sample space SR is equally likely.
Since we have a set of elementary propositions or microstates that are exclusive and ex-
haustive, ∑
α
p(α[x]|I) = 1. (4.2.2)
Consequently there are MR propositions each with the same probability,
p(x|I) = 1
MR
∀x ∈ SR. (4.2.3)
4.3 Combining outcomes
Any compound proposition can be defined as a set of these elementary propositions on
which it is true and a complementary set on which it is false. Consider a more complicated
proposition where one of B different colours is associated with every elementary outcome.
For example outcomes zero, one and two are labelled as red, three, four and five are labelled
green and six, seven, eight and nine are labelled blue. Let red correspond to b = 1, green
to b = 2 and blue to b = 3. Then by the Principle of Insufficient Reason we have to assign
to the result of the first trial,
p(x1|I) = 1
10
, ∀x1 ∈ {0, . . . , 9} M = 10, R = 1. (4.3.1)
The probability for seeing a red result is then captured in the projection onto variable b
p(b = 1|I) = p(x1 = 1|I) + p(x1 = 2|I) + p(x1 = 3|I)
=
3
10
(4.3.2)
as intuition had told us already.
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In general for a total of M outcomes of one trial: if A is the set of elementary propo-
sition with MA elements on which proposition A is true and false on the rest, then
MA =
∑
x1
δ(x1 ∈ A) p(A|I) = MA
M
. (4.3.3)
In general the probability we assign to the vector x, where the results are divided into
B classes (S = A1 ∪ A2 ∪ · · · ∪ AB and Ai ∩ Aj = δi,jAi) and each class contains mb
elementary results (
∑
bmb = M) is
p(x|I) =
R∏
r=1
mbr
M
, (4.3.4)
where br is the compound result of the rth trial and mbr is the number of elementary
results that corresponds to it. This statement is so intuitive that this was the original
definition of probability used by James Bernoulli and by most writers for the next 150
years as we have seen from the quotation of Laplace. Again note that the sample space does
not represent any actual data; we are counting all possibilities (hypothetical/theoretical)
when we use the principle of indifference and predicting ratio’s of sampling spaces based
on our information.
The immediate goal of this construction is to build models, but what are the limitations
of this methodology?
• Applying the principle to the sample space requires us to identify a set of elementary
propositions that would be applicable to our results. In the case of flipping a coin it is
easy to justify the use of two elementary equally likely outcomes, but if we measure
particles in a complicated physics experiment we know that the results are compound
and we do not know how many elementary propositions the results are made out of,
only that the compound ones are not equally likely.
• We also assume permutation invariance of the results; thus if time symmetry is
broken our models will fail. In other words we are only considering exchangeable
data measurements and we cannot model any time evolution with this assumption.
4.4 Occupation numbers
Applying the principle of indifference assumes exchangeable events. Realising this can
lead to considerable simplification if we recognise the fact that only the number of results
xr ∈ Ab is essential information while the order is trivial. Defining the general indicator
function,
δ(xr,Ab) =
1 if xr ∈ Ab0 if xr /∈ Ab , (4.4.1)
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then occupation numbers rb count the number of times we predict a certain outcome b in
a R trials,
rb =
R∑
r=1
δ(xr,Ab). (4.4.2)
The assumption is that the ordering of the data is unimportant, so we can discard that
information. Applying it to our representation of the equally likely microstates, removes
the ordering of the vector and as we know this introduces factorials for all the permutations,
leading to
p(r|R, I) =
∑
x
p(x|R, I)
∏
b
δ
[
rb −
∑
δ(xr,Ab)
]
= R!
∏
b
1
rb!
(mb
M
)rb
,
(4.4.3)
where r = {rb}Bb=1. Defining ρb as the ratio of the outcome space associated with the
compound result b,
ρb =
mb
M
, 0 ≤ ρb ≤ 1,
∑
b
ρb = 1, (4.4.4)
the probability assignment on our sample space is a multinomial distribution,
p(r|ρ, R, I) = R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
. (4.4.5)
Importantly we consider the set ρ = {ρb} to be both a probability and a parameter set of
I. Of course if we change our sampling space we must change the ratios ρb. Also notice
that the ρ is a vector of chances, the probability assignment p(r|ρ, R, I) factorises and the
Principle of Indifference applied directly to the sample space is thus equivalent to Logical
Independence.
4.5 Discussion
Consider (4.4.4) again,
ρb =
mb
M
, (4.5.1)
which is what the principle of indifference boils down to. This is our answer to the question
of how to assign probabilities, but remember that this is a certain state of knowledge
indicated by our knowledge base I. Historically, according to Jeffreys (1961), there have
been three different attempts to answer this question,
• If there are M possible alternatives, for m of which A is true, then the probability
of A is defined to be mM .
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• If a proposition is true a large number of times, then the probability of A is the
limit of the ratio of the number of times when A will be true to the whole number
of trials, when the number of trials tends to infinity.
• An actual infinite number of trials is assumed. Then the probability of A is defined
as the ratio of the number of cases where A is true to the whole number.
The first definition is from de Moivre (1718) and is used by Laplace (1812) (as in our
opening quotation) and in modern works such as Neyman (1937). In these works it is
usually introduced as a definition of a probability for an event. Introducing this statement
as an additional axiom is unnecessary because it is a Logical proposition which identifies
the set of elementary propositions. It is not a definition but a consequence of using
probability as a degree of belief. As we have derived this definition from first principles we
will not criticize its use too heavily. It has the definite advantage that it gives a numerical
answer, but it might not be what we want at all.
At the very least, the sample spaces need to be constructed carefully, with different
situations resulting in different spaces. Consider for example two boxes, one filled with
a black ball and a white ball and the other with two black balls and a white ball. A
box is chosen at random and then a ball is randomly drawn from that box. What is the
probability of seeing a white ball? Simply lumping all five balls into a single outcome space
would yield the easy and wrong answer, p(A|K) = 25 , but it is allowed if we think of the first
statement as a definition. The correct approach would be to interpret that ‘at random’
implies that our state of knowledge is indifferent at that point thus applying the product
rule twice and then the sum rule. In this case we find p(A|I) = 12 · 12 + 12 · 13 = 1024 . Also if we
have a biased dice this definition would be impossible to use as there is no equally likely
elementary case. Here we have to point out that ‘at random’ is not a physical process
but that we do not know which box or which ball will be chosen and is thus part of the
information we have available. Some definition is written down and then never actually
used. When it is applied probability is used as a degree of belief. There are only different
assignments based on different knowledge bases, but the definition of probability stays
the same. Thus we disagree with most of the literature (see James (2006)) that there are
different definitions of probabilities.
The second proposal is the Venn limit or relative frequency used by von Mises (1939)
and the third is the infinite population associated with Fisher (1922b). These proposals we
will also not criticize too heavily as we will introduce an infinite population later as a limit
of a finite one. But we have to point out that no probability has ever been assigned by
counting an infinite number of trials or finding the limiting ratio of two infinite series, thus
instead of giving a wrong answer, they give no answer at all. These are extraneous axioms
that add nothing to the theory. All three these statements are different prior distributions
and making any one of them a definition limits the applications of probability theory.
We believe that we can associate a fixed probability to each outcome and thus that the
observation of a trial (or particle) does not teach us anything about future or past trials(or
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other particles). In a sense we believe that the system we observe is an ordered system,
and that these probabilities are fixed and varying initial conditions leads to the same
probabilities. This is just the assumption of logical independence in different words, but
this assumption is the major weakness of this analysis. So for every system to we apply this
formalism we have to check this assumption as well as the absence of time evolution. To
check the assumption of Logical Independence we obviously need a alternative hypotheses
so that we can work out a Bayes Factor and see which assumption is preferred.
Summarising what we have done so far:
• Translating our logical statements into probabilities required the construction of a
sampling space and applying the principle of indifference to it. The result is a multi-
nomial distribution (Maxwell-Boltzmann statistics) for any prediction of discrete
compound events.
• The sample space is a theoretical construct that describes the information available to
the observer. The physical system itself is not part of a “random” process, because
the random effects are caused by the lack of knowledge of the observer. Even if
the future results are completely deterministic, the observer must still interpret the
process as random if he is unable to predict these results in full. Unknown processes
are thus synonymous with a random process.
• The sample space does not require the concept of repetition if we apply the principle
of insufficient reason to it, because we consider every outcome as an unique event
and even if the sample space leads us to a multinomial this is only a compression of
the labelling of the sample space.
• The multinomial does not change its probabilities based upon previous results, be-
cause it represents a fixed set of chances on the sample space that counts result ratios
as defined by the set {Ab} and is thus not connected to the data that we observe.
4.6 Stopping rules
We also have to mention that it is not necessary to condition the sample space on R, the
total number of trials. There is an equivalent formulation where we condition on k, the
number of occurrences of a specific outcome b. In the literature this is called a stopping
rule: we usually stopped after conducting R trials, now we stop when we see k occurrences
of a specific outcome. Notice that this marks a specific outcome as special and different
from the others and we lose the symmetry that a multinomial has. Consider a binomial
distribution (multinomial with only two outcomes) with probability ρ for success and r
successes in R trials,
p(r|R, ρ, I) =
(
R
r
)
ρr(1− ρ)R−r. (4.6.1)
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The probability that we will see fewer than k successes in R trials is equal to the probability
that it would take more than R trials to achieve k successes, thus∑
r<k
p(r|R, ρ, I) =
∑
r>R
p(r|k, ρ, I), (4.6.2)
where R, k, ρ are fixed on both sides. Substituting our binomial distribution gives
∑
r<k
p(r|R, ρ, I) =
k−1∑
r=0
(
R
r
)
ρr(1− ρ)R−r
=
(
R
k − 1
)
ρk−1(1− ρ)R−k+1 +
(
R
k − 2
)
ρk−2(1− ρ)R−k+2 + · · ·
=
(
R
k − 1
)
ρk−1(1− ρ)R−k+1
k−1∑
j=0
(k − 1)j
(R− k + 2)j
(
1− ρ
ρ
)j
.
(4.6.3)
Using the properties of falling factorials (2.1.10)
k−1∑
j=0
(k − 1)j =
∞∑
j=0
(k − 1)j (4.6.4)
the definition of a Gaussian Hypergeometric function (A.0.1) and remembering 1k = k!,
we have
∞∑
j=0
(k − 1)j
(R− k + 2)j
(
1− 1
ρ
)j
=
∞∑
j=0
(1− k)j
(R− k + 2)j
(
1− 1
ρ
)j
= 2F1
[
1, 1− k
R− k + 2
∣∣∣∣ 1− 1ρ
] (4.6.5)
and taking the first Euler transformation (A.0.5),
2F1
[
1, 1− k
R− k + 2
∣∣∣∣ 1− 1ρ
]
= ρ · 2F1
[
1, R+ 1
R− k + 2
∣∣∣∣ 1− ρ
]
= ρ
∞∑
j=0
(R+ 1)j
(R− k + 2)j (1− ρ)
j .
(4.6.6)
Using (4.6.2) and after some manipulation, we find
∞∑
r=R+1
p(r|k, ρ, I) =
∞∑
r=R+1
(r − 1)!ρk(1− ρ)r−k
(k − 1)!(r − k)! . (4.6.7)
which yields the negative binomial distribution,
p(r|k, ρ, I) = (r − 1)!ρ
k(1− ρ)r−k
(k − 1)!(r − k)! =
(
r − 1
k − 1
)
ρk(1− ρ)r−k, (4.6.8)
which is the probability of requiring r independent trials for k successes, where r runs
from k to infinity. With r′ = r − k the negative binomial can also be written as,
p(r′|k, ρ, I) =
(
r′ + k − 1
k − 1
)
ρk(1− ρ)r′ = (−1)k−1
( −r′
k − 1
)
ρk(1− ρ)r′ . (4.6.9)
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4.7 Constraints for independent trials
Consider what happens if we add information to our multinomial state of knowledge de-
scribed so far. The information that a scientist must translate into a model can come in
many different forms. Traditionally scientists are interested in using symmetries (conser-
vation) for model construction. These symmetries are constraints: they exclude certain
cases from happening. Using our multinomial sampling space, we will try to build models
with some linear function of the occupation numbers constrained. While there are many
possible ways we could have constrained the sampling space, we will consider one mathe-
matically similar to the microcanonical ensemble with a generalised energy; see for example
Schro¨dinger (1952) and Jaynes (2003). We will use the method of average means to prove
our results also called the Darwin-Fowler method, see Darwin and Fowler (1922a) and
Darwin and Fowler (1922b) combined with the approach of Khinchin (1949). The method
is basically to take the generating function of the constraints and then apply the saddle-
point approximation to it i.e. the bread and butter calculation in statistical mechanics.
The genius of Khinchin is to work out analytically as evidence ratios the predictions in
which we are interested. Then we only need to apply the approximation once to find the
solutions.
There are also two alternative methods for computing the same formulas, namely the
method of most probable distributions due to Boltzmann and the method of Maximum
Entropy used by Jaynes. The reason why we use the Darwin-Fowler method is that it
also gives us an error estimate in the same calculation, which constitutes in this case a
proof of the theorem of large numbers. The other two methods must be supplemented by
additional calculations to supply the same result. After we have derived the main result
we will discuss the other two methods and some additional results that we need later on.
Associate a fixed number gb with every result xr falling into Ab. The set of numbers gb
is given by the physical model; privately we imagine this to be an energy, but formally it
can be any linear functional of the results. If we demand that the average of this physical
quantity remain the same in every trial then the total is also constrained. Defining the
total value of the experiment as
G =
R∑
r=1
gbr =
B∑
b=1
gbrb. (4.7.1)
This constraint of a fixed G, encoded as δ(G−∑b gbrb) restricts our sampling space and
changes the occupation numbers that we expect to observe. We shall use the notation of ρ
as the vector of prior probabilities, that represent a state of ignorance without constraint
and the posterior vector ρ′ as the posterior probabilities that incorporates constraint G.
Working out the average occupation number of a multinomial without the G-constraint
gives,
〈rc〉 =
∑
U(r)
rcR!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
= Rρc, (4.7.2)
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While for our posterior probabilities we will use,
ρ′c =
〈rc|G〉
R
. (4.7.3)
We now compute the new average occupation number 〈rb|G〉 in every bin given that
our constraint G is known. Starting from the joint probability of our restriction and
microscopic states (4.4.5),
p(G, r|R, g,ρ, I) = p(G|r, g, I)p(r|R,ρ, I) = δ
(
G−
∑
b
gbrb
)
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
, (4.7.4)
where we used the fact that p(G|r, I) = δ (G−∑b gbrb) i.e. knowing all the occupation
numbers implies that we know exactly the value of G. To keep the notation sane we will
consider the vector g to be part of the knowledge base I. Starting with the evidence for
G,
p(G|R,ρ, I) =
∑
U(r)
p(G, r|R,ρ, I) =
∑
U(r)
δ
(
G−
∑
b
gbrb
)
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
, (4.7.5)
we find the posterior (3.2.10),
p(r|G,R,ρ, I) = p(G, r|R,ρ, I)
p(G|R,ρ, I) . (4.7.6)
and estimate the mean occupation from it,
〈rc|G〉 =
∑
U(r)
rc p(r|G,ρ, R, I). (4.7.7)
The goal is then to take the limit R→∞, which will then give ρ′ as our prior distribution
for the multinomial. We also need to show that the variance in ρ′ goes to zero in this limit
so that eq. (3.8.1) holds. This large prediction limit is called the “Thermodynamic” limit
and we will keep our parameter,
γ =
G
R
, (4.7.8)
which is defined as a ratio fixed. The evidence for this constraint,
Ω(R,G) = p(G|R,ρ, I) (4.7.9)
is called the structure function by Khinchin (1949); below, we will show how ρ′c and its
variance can be written as ratios of the structure function. Taking our joint probabilities
(4.7.4) and computing the joint moment generating function of G as in Section 2.4,
Φ [λ,G|p(G, r|R,ρ, I)] =
∑
G
p(G, r|R,ρ, I)e−λG = R!
∏
b
ρrbb e
−λgbrb
rb!
. (4.7.10)
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Using the multinomial theorem (2.1.13) to sum over the universal set U(r) i.e. over all
rb ≥ 0 that add up to R, we find the moment generating function for p(G|R,ρ, I)
Φ [λ,G|p(G|R,ρ, I)] =
∑
U(r)
Φ [λ,G|p(G, r|R,ρ, I)]
=
∑
U(r)
R!
∏
b
ρrbb e
−λgbrb
rb!
=
(∑
b
ρbe
−λgb
)R (4.7.11)
and so we can rewrite (4.7.9) in the form(∑
b
ρbe
−λgb
)R
=
∑
G
Ω [G,R] e−λG. (4.7.12)
In general, Ω (G,R) can be found by inverting this equation using (2.4.8) but in some
simple cases it may be possible to read it off as the coefficient of e−λG. It is customary to
define the canonical partition function as,
Z[λ] =
∑
b
ρbe
−λgb . (4.7.13)
The structure function Ω(G,R) gives the probability for finding a certain value of G in
R trials. The partition function Z[λ] on the other hand is the generating function for
the probability that a single result contributed to that G and the R fold convolution of
the partition function partitions the total G into the individual results i.e. result b = 1
happened rb times and so forth, hence the name partition function. The contributions
of every trial is logically independent from every other trial and thus we end up with a
product of a single trial distribution. To see the individual trial contributions we can for
R = 1 invert the partition function
p(G|R = 1, I) =
∑
b
ρb δ(G− gb), (4.7.14)
and for R > 1, we convolve R such distributions, recursively
p(G|R, I) =
∑
b
ρb p(G− gb|R− 1, I). (4.7.15)
For small values of R we can use a computer to evaluate this sum directly but for our
model construction we are more interested in the large R limit.
4.8 Predictions using the structure function
Starting from the definition of the occupation number moments
〈rc|G〉 =
R∑
U(r)
rc
p(r, G|R,ρ, I)
p(G|R,ρ, I)
=
1
Ω(R,G)
R∑
U(r)
rcR!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
δ
[
G−
B∑
b=1
gbrb
]
,
(4.8.1)
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we absorb the rc factor into the factorial, to get
〈rc|G〉 = Rρc
Ω(R,G)
R−1∑
U(r)
(R− 1)!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
δ
[
G− gc −
B∑
b=1
gbrb
]
= Rρc
Ω(R− 1, G− gc)
Ω(R,G)
(4.8.2)
or
ρ′c =
〈rc|G〉
R
= ρc
Ω(R− 1, G− gc)
Ω(R,G)
. (4.8.3)
From (4.7.15) we can see that ρ′c is correctly normalised, since∑
c
ρcΩ(R− 1, G− gc) = Ω(R,G). (4.8.4)
Using a similar construction we can prove the following collection of formulas:
〈rc|G〉 = RρcΩ(R− 1, G− gc)
Ω(R,G)
〈rcrd|G〉 = R2ρcρdΩ(R− 2, G− gc − gd)
Ω(R,G)
c 6= d
〈
r2c − rc|G
〉
= R(R− 1)ρ2c
Ω(R− 2, G− 2gc)
Ω(R,G)
.
(4.8.5)
and hence the width in any given component rb of p(r|G, I) divided by its mean
[〈r2b |G〉 − 〈rb|G〉2]1/2
〈rb|G〉 =
(
Ω(R,G) Ω(R− 2, G− 2gb)
Ω2(R− 1, G− gb) − 1
)1/2
+O(R−1/2) (4.8.6)
is small compared to R. The width of p(r|G, I) around its peak at 〈rb|G〉/R for large R
is also so narrow that we can reasonably approximate it by
p(r|ρ, G, I) =
∏
b
δ(rb −Rρ′b). (4.8.7)
where from (4.8.2)
ρ′b = ρb
Ω(R−1, G−gb)
Ω(R,G)
(4.8.8)
also becomes asymptotically independent of R and G. In textbooks, this formula normally
reads, Band (1955) and Grandy (1987):
〈rc|G〉 = − 1
λ
d
dgc
logZ[λ]. (4.8.9)
To show that these formulae are equivalent we first have to apply the saddlepoint approx-
imation to the former.
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4.9 Saddlepoint approximation for independent trials
For large R it is not feasible to take λ derivatives of the Rth power of the partition function
that (4.7.12) requires. Luckily we can replace the derivatives with complex integration,
(2.4.8), which is much easier to approximate using the saddlepoint approximation as shown
in section 2.6. First we define the saddlepoint of λ, the dual variable of the constraint, to
be at λ∗ the point where the logarithmic derivative of the generating function is equal to
the parameter γ,
d
dλ
logZ[λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
= −G
R
= −γ. (4.9.1)
From the properties of the generating function we know that this equation has one unique
solution. The approximate solution is given by (2.6.12) with n = R, x = γ and K[λ∗] =
logZ [λ∗] + γλ∗,
Ω(G,R) ≈ Z
R [λ∗] eGλ∗√
R2piV [λ∗]
, (4.9.2)
where
K ′′[λ∗] = V [λ∗] =
d2 logZ [λ]
dλ2
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
Z ′′[λ∗]
Z[λ∗]
− Z
′[λ∗]2
Z[λ∗]2
. (4.9.3)
Generally the saddlepoint approximation will destroy the normalisation of our structure
function but this does not matter as the mean occupation number (4.8.2),
〈rc|G〉 = RρcΩ(R− 1, G− gc)
Ω(R,G)
, (4.9.4)
will be unaffected. Applying our saddlepoint approximation to the structure function we
find,
ρ′c =
〈rc|G〉
R
=
ρce
−gcλ∗
Z[λ∗]
(4.9.5)
and 〈
r2c |G
〉− 〈rc|G〉2 = R [e−gcλ∗
Z[λ∗]
− e
−2gcλ∗
Z2[λ∗]
]
(4.9.6)
or 〈
ρ′c
2
〉
− 〈ρ′c〉2 = 1R
[
e−gcλ∗
Z[λ∗]
− e
−2gcλ∗
Z2[λ∗]
]
, (4.9.7)
which tends to 0 as R → ∞, which indicates that the fluctuations do indeed vanish
in the thermodynamic limit and we have a well defined likelihood function. The same
answer (4.9.5) results from the gc-derivative prescription (4.8.9), so we conclude that
textbooks usually derive the asymptotic version of the prediction formula and not the exact
version. This is the standard method for constructing models given a single parameter G.
Obviously this method can easily be generalised to deal with a set of parameters θ. In
statistical mechanics this method is called the Darwin-Fowler method or the method of
mean values. Its primary advantage is that it gives both the prediction and the accuracy
of that prediction as embodied by (4.9.7).
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4.10 Method of most probable distribution
There is also a simpler method for deriving exactly the same solution, namely the method
of the most probable distribution. It is a more direct method but it yields less than the
method of mean values as it provides only the most probable value but not its accuracy.
Considering again our partition function∑
U(r)
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
e−λgbrb = Z[λ]R, (4.10.1)
we know from the method of mean values that the fluctuations die down in the limit
R → ∞ and thus there is a single term that contributes almost all the probability. Thus
we replace the sum with the single most probable set of r which we label r∗. This most
probable set will also be identical with the set of expectation values 〈rc|G〉 because in the
limit the most probable and the average will coincide and both will obey the constraint,
G =
∑
b gbr
∗
b =
∑
b gb 〈rb|G〉. Furthermore, all this will be true for a single value of λ,
which with a moments thought we realise is the saddlepoint. We hence find directly
R!
∏
b
ρ
r∗b
b
r∗b !
e−λ
∗gbr∗b = Z[λ∗]R. (4.10.2)
We cannot however, vary the set {rb} independently as the sum may not add up to R. We
must incorporate an extra Lagrange multiplier µ to enforce the extra constraint, following
which we can vary each to find the most probable rc
∇rc log
[∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
e−µrb−λgbrb
]
= 0 ∀c, (4.10.3)
where ∇rcf [rc] = f [rc]− f [rc − 1]. The resulting set of formulas,
log
(
ρc
r∗c
)
− µ− gcλ = 0, ∀c (4.10.4)
has the solution
r∗c = ρc exp[−µ∗ − gcλ∗], (4.10.5)
where µ∗ and λ∗ are determined by the constraint equation∑
c
r∗c =
∑
c
ρc exp[−µ∗ − gcλ∗] = R (4.10.6)
or
Z[λ∗] =
∑
c
ρc exp[−gcλ∗] = R exp[µ∗], (4.10.7)
giving
ρ′∗c =
r∗c
R
=
ρc exp[−gcλ∗]
Z[λ∗]
(4.10.8)
while λ∗ is determined from γ = GR =
∑
c gcρ
′
c∑
c
gc
ρc exp[−gcλ∗]
Z[λ∗]
= γ. (4.10.9)
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4.11 Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy
A third derivation is based on a generalisation of the well-known Principle of Maximum
Entropy: for a general set {ρ′b}, the Shannon Entropy H[ρ′] = −
∑
b ρ
′
b log ρ
′
b is maximised
with undetermined Lagrange multipliers λ0 for the normalisation constraint and λ for any
other constraint formulated as I(ρ′),
δ
[
−
∑
b
ρ′b log ρ
′
b − λ0
∑
b
ρ′b − λI(ρ′)
]
= 0 (4.11.1)
thereby determining ρ′∗ = {ρ′∗b } = {r∗b/R}. Starting from the fixed-G constraint p(G|r, I) =
δ(G−∑b gbrb), many textbooks derive from this the Boltzmann probability ρ′b = e−λgb/Z[λ]
which corresponds to (4.9.5) for the special case of constant ρb = 1/B. In this section,
we show how the above Principle of Maximum Entropy is a special case of a more general
“Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy”
The principle of minimum relative entropy is equivalent to the method of most probable
distribution when it is realised that the most probable distribution is contingent on the
limit R→∞. Applying the limit first on the multinomial yields,
lim
R→∞
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
= exp
[
−R
∑
b
ρ′b log
ρ′b
ρb
]
, (4.11.2)
with ρ′b =
rb
R . So instead of trying to find the set of {rb} that has the maximum probability
we can look for the set of ρ′b that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence or relative
entropy,
H[ρ′‖ρ] ≡
∑
b
ρ′b log
ρ′b
ρb
, (4.11.3)
while satisfying the constraints. Let us first show that the Kullback-Leibler divergence can
be used as a distance function: For an arbitrary probability distribution ub, the relation∑
b
ρ′b log
ub
ρb
≤
∑
b
ρ′b
(
ub
ρ′b
− 1
)
= 0, (4.11.4)
follows from the general inequality log(x) ≤ (x − 1) and x = ub/ρ′b and summing over b,
with equality only and only if x = 1; thus the relative entropy is zero if and only if ub = ρ
′
b.
This gives us
H[ρ′‖ρ] ≥ 0, (4.11.5)
so that we can use the relative entropy as a variational principle:
δ
[
H[ρ′‖ρ]− µ
∑
b
ρ′b −
∑
b
λgbρ
′
b
]
=
∑
b
[
1 + log
ρ′b
ρb
− µρ′b − λgb
]
δρ′b, (4.11.6)
with solution
ρ′b = ρb exp [µ
∗ + gbλ∗ − 1] , (4.11.7)
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which is equivalent to the previous solution (4.10.5). We can also show that the variational
argument always works by separating the expression (4.11.5) into∑
b
ρ′b log ρ
′
b ≥
∑
b
ρ′b log ub (4.11.8)
and choosing for ub (4.11.7) the inequality reduces to,∑
b
ρ′b log ρ
′
b ≥
∑
b
ρ′b log ρb +
∑
b
ρ′bµ
∗ +
∑
b
gbρ
′
bλ
∗ − 1 (4.11.9)
or
H[ρ′||ρ] ≥ µ∗ + λ∗
∑
b
gbρ
′
b − 1. (4.11.10)
Varying over all possible ρ′ that satisfies the constraint
∑
b gbρ
′
b = γ we see that the right
hand side will remain constant. So to reach the minimum on the left hand side all the ρ′b
must equal ub, in which case
Hmin[ρ
′||ρ] = µ∗ + λ∗γ − 1, (4.11.11)
showing that the minimum relative entropy solution is also the most probable and the mean
value solution in turn. We must emphasise that the justification of the most probable and
minimum relative entropy solution is that they coincide with the mean value solution and
that all three solutions rely heavily on the assumption of logical independence. For the
special case ρb = 1/B and multiplying with (−1) we can reduce the minimum relative
entropy principle to the maximum entropy principle.
4.12 Examples
Sometimes we have to deal with a large number of possible outcomes (limB →∞). The
difficulty that this creates is that our model then becomes dependent on the specific details
on how the limit is taken. The first approach to this problem is to assume equal prior
probabilities (ρb = 1/B) and compute the partition function only up to a constant.
Consider for example Planck’s oscillator: gb = b and b = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where the
average G =
∑∞
b=0 brb is kept fixed. The partition function is,
Z[λ] ∝
∞∑
b=0
e−bλ =
1
1− e−λ (4.12.1)
and using the negative binomial theorem (2.1.19) on the moment generating function, we
find the structure function as the coefficient of e−λG of ZR,
ZR[λ] ∝ (1− e−λ)−R =
∞∑
G=0
(−R
G
)
(−e−λ)G (4.12.2)
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So that
Ω(R,G) ∝
(
R+G− 1
G
)
. (4.12.3)
Applying (4.8.2), we find the exact answer to be a negative hypergeometric distribu-
tion,
ρ′b =
(R− 1)Gb
(G+R− 1)b+1 =
(−1
b
)(−(R−1)
G−b
)(−R
G
) . (4.12.4)
The negative hypergeometric distribution will play a very prominent role in the future
chapters; thus it is very interesting that it appears here.
The saddlepoint for the same partition function is,
d
dλ
log
1
1− e−λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
= −γ γ = 1
eλ∗ − 1 λ
∗ = log
1 + γ
γ
(4.12.5)
and the approximate model is using (4.9.5)
ρ′b =
1
1 + γ
(
1 +
1
γ
)−b
(4.12.6)
a geometric distribution.
A second approach is to assume that we are examining an interval that can be sub-
divided into sub-intervals in each of which only one event can occur independently of the
interval size and other intervals. The result b is then that b such events occurred in the
interval, so that the prior probability should be proportional to
(
B
b
)
. If we make B large,
ρb ∝ 1b! . The resulting partition function and structure function are
Z[λ] ∝
∞∑
b=0
e−λb
b!
= ee
−λ
Ω(R,G) ∝ R
G
G!
(4.12.7)
and applying (4.8.2) again,
ρ′b =
(
G
b
)(
1
R
)G(
1− 1
R
)G−b
(4.12.8)
is a binomial distribution with 1/R acting as a probability. The saddlepoint approximation
is
d
dλ
e−λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
= −γ λ∗ = − log γ (4.12.9)
and the approximate model using (4.9.5) again yields
ρ′b = e
−γ γb
b!
, (4.12.10)
which is a Poisson Distribution.
An observant reader would have noticed that there is a factor ρb that has seemingly
disappeared from (4.11.4), (4.12.6), (4.11.7) and (4.12.10). So let us do a more elaborate
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calculation under the heading of a Generalized Planck Oscillator: Let gb = b = 1, 2, . . .
and let the prior probability be negative binomial distributed with parameters k and
0 < θ < 1,
ρb =
(
b+ k − 1
b
)
θk(1− θ)b b = 0, 1, 2, . . . , (4.12.11)
so that we introduce a stopping rule for the prior probability of our states. From the
partition function
Z[λ] =
∞∑
b=0
(
k + b− 1
b
)
θk(1− θ)be−bλ = θ
k
[1− e−λ(1− θ)]k
(4.12.12)
we can again read off our structure function as the coefficient of e−λG, with the help of
the negative binomial theorem (2.1.20)
Ω[R,G] =
(
Rk +G− 1
G
)
θRk(1− θ)G. (4.12.13)
Using (4.8.2) our exact model is
ρ′b =
(−k
b
)(−(R−1)k
G−b
)(−Rk
G
) , (4.12.14)
which is the negative hypergeometric distribution again. Our saddlepoint solution
is,
k(1− θ)
eλ∗ + θ − 1 = γ λ
∗ = log
[
(γ − k)(1− θ)
γ
]
(4.12.15)
and from (4.9.5)
ρ′b =
(
k + b− 1
b
)(
k
k + γ
)k ( γ
k + γ
)b
. (4.12.16)
Importantly the value of θ is immaterial to our solution, thus the information contained
in our gb has in fact replaced it. Checking our calculation: we take the limit of our exact
model using (2.1.6) and G = γR,(−k
b
)(−(R−1)k
G−b
)(−Rk
G
) = (k + b− 1
b
)
(Rγ)!
(Rγ − b)!
(Rk)!
(Rk − k)!
(Rk − k +Rγ − b− 1)!
(Rk +Rγ − 1)!
≈
(
k + b− 1
b
)
(Rγ)b(Rk)k(Rk +Rγ)−k−b
=
(
k + b− 1
b
)(
k
k + γ
)k ( γ
k + γ
)b
.
(4.12.17)
Choosing k = 1 reduces this answer to the geometric distribution (4.12.6) while the large
k →∞ asymptotic approximation is, using (2.1.6),
log ρ′b = log
(
k + b− 1
b
)
+ b log
(
γ
k + γ
)
+ k log
(
k
k + γ
)
∼ log k
b
b!
+ b log
(
γ
k + γ
)
− γ
(4.12.18)
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so we end up with a Poisson Distribution,
ρ′b = e
−γ γb
b!
. (4.12.19)
Another example where we can do all the calculations explicitly is the Fermi Oscil-
lator, see Jaynes (1968). We have two states; one contributes one energy unit and the
other nothing. The state that contributes is labelled a success and the state that does
not contribute a failure. G is then interpreted as the total number of successes and the
partition function becomes,
Z[λ] = ρf + ρse
−λ. (4.12.20)
The generating function is
Φ[Ω(R,G), G, λ] =
(
ρf + ρse
−λ
)R
=
R∑
G=0
(
R
G
)
ρGs ρ
R−G
f e
−λG.
(4.12.21)
So the structure function is simply
Ω(R,G) =
(
R
G
)
ρGs (1− ρs)R−G, (4.12.22)
which is easy to understand. Applying (4.8.2) we find the model assignment is
ρ′s =
G
R
ρ′f = 1−
G
R
, (4.12.23)
for a specific trial. So splitting the sample space in two gives us a Bernoulli trial and the
model assignment is again independent of the prior ρb. The saddlepoint equation is
d
dλ
logZ [λ] =
d
dλ
log
[
ρf + ρse
−λ
]
= − ρs
ρs + ρfeλ
= −γ, (4.12.24)
with solution
λ∗ = log
[
ρs(1− γ)
ρfγ
]
, Z[λ∗] =
ρf
1− γ (4.12.25)
which we substitute in (4.9.5) to find
ρs = γ ρf = 1− γ. (4.12.26)
In this case the saddle point equation gives the exact answer.
The third example is traditionally used to illustrate the principle of maximum entropy
and is called the Kangaroo example taken from Gull and Skilling (1984): the information
is that a third of all kangaroos have blue eyes and one-third of all kangaroos are left-
handed. The question is: what is the probability of a kangaroo being both left-handed
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and blue-eyed? Of course we do not have enough information to give the correct answer
but we should still be able to give a consistent reply. Let
B ≡ Kangaroo is blue-eyed.
L ≡ Kangaroo is left-handed.
x ≡ p(B,L|I)
(4.12.27)
then the set of all possible solutions are, with x = p(B,L|I)
Feasible Solutions Left-handed
L L
Blue-eyed
B x 13 − x
B 13 − x 13 + x
,
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 13 . Assuming the prior where all cases are equally likely ρB,L = ρB,L =
ρB,L = ρB,L =
1
4 we calculate the different entropies for varying values of x seeking the
maximum,
−δ
[∑
b
ρ′b log
ρ′b
ρb
]
= −δ [x log 4x+ 2 (13 − x) log 4 (13 − x)+ (x+ 13) log 4 (13 + x)]
= − [log 4x− 2 log 4 (13 − x)+ log 4 (13 + x)] δx = 0.
(4.12.28)
The maximum is attained at x = 19 , giving
Maximum Entropy Solution Left-handed
L L
Blue-eyed
B 19 29
B 29 49
,
The remarkable property of this answer is that this is the logical independent solution:
The conditional probability a kangaroo being blue-eyed if we know it is left-handed is,
p(B|L, I) = p(B,L|I)
p(L|I) =
1
3
= p(B|I), (4.12.29)
exactly the same as if we did not know it was left-handed. The principle of Minimum
Relative Entropy was derived from a multinomial distribution, thus we should not be
surprised that it should pick out the answer closest to the logical independent solution in
any specific problem. Is this however the correct inference to make in this situation? Is it
justified to pick out the logical independent answer if we are in a state of ignorance? We
will try to answer this question later, but for now we know that the Principle of Minimum
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Relative Entropy is in fact an approximation to the Darwin-Fowler method and after a
moment’s thought we realise that the Kangaroo example is just a two-dimensional Fermi
oscillator. Write G1 for the total number of left-handed kangaroos and G2 for the total
number of blue-eyed kangaroos and R for the total number of kangaroos. The partition
function is,
Z[λ1, λ2]
R =
(
1
4
+
e−λ1
4
+
e−λ2
4
+
e−λ1−λ2
4
)R
(4.12.30)
=
(
1
4
)R (
1 + e−λ1
)R (
1 + e−λ2
)R
(4.12.31)
the structure function,
Ω [R,G1, G2] =
(
R
G1
)(
R
G2
)
1
4R
(4.12.32)
and the exact solution is,
ρ′B,L =
G1
R
G2
R
(4.12.33)
and with G1R =
G2
R =
1
3 this gives exactly the same answer as the maximum entropy
principle. But we can also give an error estimate by using (4.8.5),
var(ρ′B,L) =
G1G2 (G1G2 −G1 −G2 −R+ 2)
R(R− 1) , (4.12.34)
which is not always appreciated in the literature of information theory.
4.13 Grand canonical ensemble
In the derivation of the principle of minimum relative entropy, we made a subtle switch
at one point: Instead of considering the number of trials R to be fixed and conditioning
on R, it was instead considered as an extra explicit constraint that must be enforced. We
switched from an implicit constraint to an explicit constraint implying that there should
be a framework without the number of trials fixed beforehand. Here we will derive such a
framework based on a completely different assumption. Later we will show that in fact the
formalism for minimum relative entropy is the same as for the grand canonical ensemble
where the number of trials is not fixed. Let us start from a different knowledge base:
Knowledge base T :
There exists a positive real number λ dt, namely the probability
that an event or count will occur in the time interval (t, t+ dt).
The knowledge of λ makes any information about the occurrence or
non-occurrence in any other time interval irrelevant.
The motivation for this assumption is that we would require information to connect two
different counts in time and we assume that this information is unavailable. We also
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prominently assume logical independence of the counts in the intervals. Let p(∆t|λ, T ) be
the probability that no event occurred in the interval (0,∆t) and E the proposition that
no event occurred in the interval (∆t,∆t+ dt); the probability that no event occurred in
the interval (0,∆t+ dt) is,
p(∆t+ dt|λ, T ) = p(∆t, dt|λ, T ) = p(∆t|λ, T )p(dt|∆t, λ, T ) = p(∆t|λ, T )(1− λdt)
(4.13.1)
or after a Taylor expansion and taking the limit dt→ 0,
d
dt
p(∆t|λ, T ) = −λp(∆t|λ, T ). (4.13.2)
Using the obvious initial condition p(∆t = 0|λ, T ) = 1, we find,
p(∆t|λ, T ) = λe−λ∆t λ > 0, ∆t ≥ 0. (4.13.3)
Assuming that a distribution is memoryless i.e. the probability of an event in any given
interval is independent of the probability in any other interval is a strong enough property
to characterise the exponential distribution as the unique solution for continuous intervals.
Defining the logical proposition with the parameter n as the nth event in the time
interval ∆t and τn as the time we waited for that event, then using the waiting-time
identity (4.6.2) again,
n−1∑
r=0
p(r|λ,∆t, T ) =
∞∫
∆t
p(τn|λ, n, T )dτn, (4.13.4)
which reads that the probability of seeing fewer than n counts in the time interval ∆t is
the same as the probability that the nth event τn took longer than the interval ∆t. The
distribution for τn is, using independence and (4.13.3),
p(τn = t1 + · · ·+ tn|λ, n, T ) =
n∏
j=1
p(tj |λ, T )δ
τn −∑
j
tj
 , (4.13.5)
where each tj is the time interval between the jth and (j − 1)st event, which is unknown,
but is distributed like an exponential distribution. Taking the Laplace transform in τn,
L [s, τn|p(τn, t|λ, n, T )] =
∞∫
0
n∏
j=1
p(tj |λ, T )δ
τn −∑
j
tj
 e−sτndτn (4.13.6)
and integrating out the tj intervals, we obtain
L [s, τn|p(τn|λ, n, T )] =
n∏
j=1
∞∫
0
λe−λtj−stjdtj =
(
λ
s+ λ
)n
(4.13.7)
which is the Laplace Transform for the combined measurements τn. Inverting the Laplace
transform gives us a Gamma Distribution for τn which follows directly from (4.13.5)
p(τn|λ, n, T ) = λe−λτn (λτn)
n−1
(n− 1)! , (4.13.8)
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that is the distribution for taking n consecutive measurements is distributed like a Gamma
distribution or n convolutions of an exponential distribution. Integrating the right hand
side of (4.13.4) repeatedly by parts we have
∞∫
∆t
λe−λτn
(λτn)
n−1
(n− 1)! dτn = − e
−λτn (λτn)
n−1
(n− 1)!
∣∣∣∣∞
τ=∆t
+
∞∫
∆t
λe−λτn
(λτn)
n−2
(n− 2)! dτn
= e−λ∆t
(λ∆t)n−1
(n− 1)! + e
−λ∆t (λ∆t)n−2
(n− 2)! + · · ·+ λ∆te
−λ∆t + e−λ∆t =
n−1∑
r=0
e−λ∆t
(λ∆t)r
r!
,
(4.13.9)
which shows that the probability of seeing exactly r counts in an interval ∆t with rate λ
is a Poisson Distribution,
p(r|λ,∆t, I) = e−λ∆t (λ∆t)
r
r!
. (4.13.10)
To show how the Poisson distribution connects with maximum entropy formalism we em-
ploy an artifice, introduced by Fisher (1922a), that a conditional distribution of indepen-
dent Poisson distributions gives a multinomial distribution. Take a set of B independent
processes one for each bin with their own rate parameter λb and ask what is the probability
for seeing a total of R events in all the bins together during the time interval ∆t
p(R|λ, T ) = p(R = r0 + · · ·+ rB|∆t,λ, T )
= e−
∑
b λb∆t
(
∑
b λb∆t)
R
R!
,
(4.13.11)
because the convolution of Poisson Distributions is again a Poisson Distribution. Assuming
that we count events until we have a total of R, the posterior is
p(r|R,λ,∆t, T ) = p(r|λ,∆t, T )p(R|r,λ,∆t, T )
p(R|λ,∆t, T ) =
∏
b e
−λb∆t (λb∆t)rb
rb!
δ (R−∑b rb)
e−
∑
b λb∆t
(
∑
b λb∆t)
R
R!
,
(4.13.12)
and defining a probability for seeing a event as the ratio of its rate towards the total rate,
ρb =
λb∑
b λb
, (4.13.13)
gives us
p(r|R,λ,∆t, T ) = R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
= p(r|ρ, R, T ), (4.13.14)
from which we learn that fixing R makes the time interval ∆t redundant and changes our
rate parameters into probabilities. Thus we could have derived exactly the same formalism
by starting from a product of Poisson distributions.
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We now derive the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy in its Grand Canonical
form: Taking a product of Poisson Distribution
p(r|s, T ) =
∏
b
e−sb
srbb
rb!
(4.13.15)
the large prediction limit is
− log p(r|s,K) =
∑
b
sb −
∑
b
rb
(
1 + log
sb
rb
)
. (4.13.16)
Now recall that the generic relative entropy for ρ′ and ρ is
H[ρ′||ρ] =
∑
b
ρ′b log
ρ′b
ρb
. (4.13.17)
The above strongly suggests a “generalised divergence” for any nonnegative s, r without
normalisation constraints should be
H[r||s] = −
∑
b
rb
(
1 + log
sb
rb
)
. (4.13.18)
Adding a constraint and varying the r we find,
∇rc
[
H[r||s]−
∑
b
λrbgb
]
= [log rc − log sc − rcgc] = 0 ∀c. (4.13.19)
with solution
rc = sce
−λgc . (4.13.20)
4.14 From Logical Independence to Exchangeability
We end this chapter by pointing out the weaknesses of Logical Independence, which has
played a fundamental role so far. The remedy for these weaknesses lies in the replace-
ment of Logical Independence with Exchangeability, which will likewise be central for the
remainder of this dissertation.
While there are probably many ways to illustrate the issue, let us concentrate on the
incompatibility of Logical Independence with what we would call “learning” or, technically
speaking, the updating of the evidence as data becomes available. As defined in (3.2.5),
Logical Independence of two logical statements can be defined as the factorisation
p(A,B|I) = p(A|I)p(B|I). (4.14.1)
For N data points x = {xi}Ni=1 assumed to be logically independent, this translates into
the factorisation of the joint likelihood
p(x|I) =
N∏
i=1
p(xi|I) (4.14.2)
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and therefore obviously also
p(xN+1,x|I) =
N+1∏
i=1
p(xi|I) (4.14.3)
from which follows, catastrophically, that
p(xN+1|x, I) = p(xN+1,x|I)
p(x|I) = p(xN+1|I). (4.14.4)
Using Logical Independence therefore is inescapably equivalent to ignoring existing data
x for the purposes of predicting xN+1. Put differently, Logical Independence means that
no learning can occur.
The example used by Jaynes (2003) is a simple illustation of the point. Throw a six
sided die twice. The probability of seeing result x1=1 on the first trial is, using (4.3.3),
p(x1 = 1|I) =
6∑
x2=1
p(x1 = 1, x2|R = 2)
=
6
36
=
1
6
,
(4.14.5)
where we summed all the vectors that start with a one. So what probability will we assign
to the second trial if we know the first result? The conditional probability is
p(x2 = b|x1 = 1, I) = p(x1 = 1, x2 = b|I)
p(x1 = 1|I)
=
1/36
1/6
=
1
6
.
(4.14.6)
Knowing the first result does not change the probability assignment for the second trial. If
we throw a dice ten thousand times and it shows the same face every time our assumption
of Logical Independence absurdly forces us to assign a probability of 1/6 to the next trial
xN+1, while any rational observer would have realised the trials are not independent and
abandoned his assumption of Logical Independence. Of course, the same rational observer
would then have to admit that his assumption of Logical Independence had been wrong
from the start, and redo all his calculations. You cannot change assumptions mid-way
during a calculation.
Logical Independence is demonstrably a very restrictive assumption which only applies
to special cases. Clearly, we need an alternative assumption or hypothesis which differs
minimally from Logical Independence in the sense that we can construct a formalism
similar to that developed in this chapter, but which does have a mechanism to update
evidence with data.
A clue to finding such a new assumption lies in the fact that Logical Independence
is a factorisation of the joint likelihood, which ignores priors and their role. Indeed, it is
quite possible to construct self-updating evidences based on factorising likelihoods simply
by introducting a nontrivial prior; generically
(updating evidence) =
∫
(logically independent likelihood)× (nontrivial prior) dθ .
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The “trivial prior” that leads to conventional Logical Independence calculations is one
where the entire set of parameters θ is assumed perfectly known, i.e. the prior is a product of
delta functions, in which case the likelihood and evidence are identical and no learning can
occur. The moment we use a nontrivial prior, however, the evidence no longer factorises
and updating of the evidence is possible. This would seem to be one of the strongest
arguments in favour of priors in general.
The destruction of the property of Logical Independence by means of a nontrivial prior
is clearly necessary and desirable for nontrivial model building. One can, however, now
ask: If Logical Independence does not and should not survive in the construction of the
evidence, is there a property which does? The answer lies in the concept of Exchangeability,
the property that a probability remains unchanged under permutation of the data points.
Indeed, we have a “conservation law for exchangeability”
(exchangeable evidence) =
∫
(exchangeable likelihood)× (prior) dθ .
In the second part of this dissertation, starting with Chapter 5, we shall explore the math-
ematical and conceptual consequences of replacing Logical Independence by Exchange-
ability. Very briefly, what we will show is the following:
• All exchangeable evidences can be written in terms of a hypergeometric likelihood
and a prior. The central role played by the multinomial distribution in the logically
independent case will now be played by the hypergeometric.
• While the hypergeometric distribution is not unique in satisfying “conservation of
exchangeability”, the other known exchangeable distributions are all limiting cases
of the hypergeometric.
• The theory developed in the remainder of this dissertation, based on the hypergeo-
metric likelihood, therefore forms a universal basis for all exchangeable evidences.
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Likelihoods and priors for
exchangeable sequences
Here and below, we shall endeavour to progress from the traditional assumption of logical
independence to the wider and, in our view, more appropriate concept of exchangeability.
The former is defined as
Logical independence:
A sequence of results x = {x1, . . . , xN} is called logically independent
if the joint probability of x fully factorises,
p(x|I) =
N∏
i=1
p(xi|I). (5.0.1)
Indeed, there are many instances where logical independence is justified, for example if
no causes are shared by the events or in the information-based view if we are certain of
our model. However, as shown by the example of the hypergeometric distribution below,
there are situations and cases where individual trials are fully exchangeable and occupation
numbers fully appropriate, but where these trials are not independent. Hence we define
Exchangeability:
A sequence of results x = {x1, . . . , xN} is called exchangeable if the
probability of every possibly permutation xpi of x is the same,
p(xpi|H) = p(x|H). (5.0.2)
The occurrence and utility of occupation numbers (or binning in the language of experi-
mentalists) is thus not a proof of independence at all. It should hence be no surprise if the
wider scope of exchangeability were to result in important new insights and applications.
5.1 Overview
Throughout this dissertation the assumption of exchangeability is fundamental. All the
systems we look at are based on exchangeable variables, so all the relevant calculations
62
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can be reduced from ordered variables to occupation numbers. As a reminder of our
notation: the sample space of one trial S with M elementary outcomes is partitioned such
that there are m = {mb}Bb=1 elementary outcomes in the partition {Ab}Bb=1 of S, which
common properties are mapped onto1 b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B− 1}. Further, n = {nb}Bb=1 denotes
the set of occupation numbers of N real measured data points {xi}Ni=1, while r = {rb}Bb=1
is the set of predicted occupation numbers for R future measurements {xi}N+Ri=N+1. We
shall also make use of the normalised ρ = m/M for large M .
As mentioned in Section 3.8 the aim is to calculate the posterior distribution and
subsequently the predictive distribution once the posteriors are known. Both rely on the
calculation of the evidence
p(n|K) =
∑
U(m)
p(n|m,K) p(m|K) (5.1.1)
with
∑
U(m) the sum or integral over all possible configurations of m, in terms of which
the posterior for m is determined by
p(m|n,K) = p(n,m|K)
p(n|K) =
p(n|m,K) p(m|K)
p(n|K) (5.1.2)
which then enters into the prediction
p(r|n,K) =
∑
U(m)
p(r|n,m,K) p(m|n,K)
=
∑
U(m)
p(r|n,m,K) p(n|m,K) p(m|K)
p(n|K) ,
(5.1.3)
which can be written as the ratio of “two evidences”
p(r|n,K) = p(r,n|K)
p(n|K) =
∑
U(m) p(r,n|m,K) p(m|K)∑
U(m) p(n|m,K) p(m|K)
. (5.1.4)
Both posteriors and final predictions are based on knowledge or information, captured in
constructing a specific model consisting of
(a) one or more priors p(m|K) or p(ρ|K) with ρb = mb/M possible becoming continuous,
and
(b) one or more likelihoods p(r|m,K) or p(r|ρ,K), in which exact knowledge of m or
equivalently ρ is hypothesised.
Later in this chapter we will turn to assigning prior distributions and in a later chapter
will focus on constructing likelihood functions for exchangeable sequences.
1While mapping to {0, 1, . . . , B − 1} rather than to {1, 2, . . . , B} may seem inconvenient, it yields the
standard formulae for moments and cumulants of the binomial. In our convention, result b is therefore
associated with occupation numbers rb+1,mb+1 etc.
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We use the same functional form or model for both likelihoods p(r|m,K) and p(n|m,K),
so that all mathematical results apply to both. Conceptually, however, they differ radi-
cally: p(r|m,K) is a prediction of r, where r can be any vector in U(r), while p(n|m,K)
should strictly speaking be written as
p(n|m,K) ≡ p(r=n |m,K) (5.1.5)
i.e. the probability as predicted by the knowledge base K, by our model and within that
model by a particular hypothetical value of m, that one of the results r which are possible
within the model is exactly our measured data n.2 As p(r|m,K) and p(n|m,K) are math-
ematically identical, we shall do most of our calculations using the notation of p(r|m,K),
substituting n for r only when needed e.g. in (5.1.2) and (5.1.3). The major points in
this chapter are:
(a) We will replace Logical Independence with Exchangeability, which is a much more
natural assumption to make.
(b) The hypergeometric distribution will consequently replace the multinomial we used
before.
(c) The prior that assumes the least is the negative hypergeometric distribution and
correspondingly should be used in most circumstances.
(d) We will explore the use of symmetries to assign prior probabilities.
The sections can be summarised as follows:
• In Section 5.2 we illustrate the concepts of exchangeability and independence with
a simple example.
• Section 5.3 derives the general hypergeometric distribution.
• Section 5.4 introduces the Heath-Sudderth and De-Finetti Representations, which
connects the concepts of Logical Independence and Exchangeability.
• Section 5.5 we assume Johnson’s postulate for our primordial sample space which
implies that we should make linear predictions for future trials. This is equivalent
to stating that we should choose the Po´lya urn distribution as our prior. The most
general Po´lya urn is the negative hypergeometric distribution, which casts new light
on the Laplace-De Finetti representation theorem.
• In Section 5.6 we then try to address the topic of choosing priors in general parameter
spaces.
2The special status of p(n|m,K) is also indicated by the fact that we never sum over n since it is a
single unchangeable vector.
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5.2 Urn example
One important likelihood for discrete m is the multivariate hypergeometric distribution.
To introduce it and the crucial concept of exchangeability, we first look at the following
simple example:
Example knowledge base H:
Let there be an urn with five balls (M=5) of two different physical
characteristics (B=2). Two of the balls are blue (m1=2) and three
are red (m2=3). We have mapped the physical characteristics onto
integers b ∈ {0, 1}. Apart from their colour, the balls cannot be
distinguished. Any ball drawn will not be placed back into the urn,
so that a maximum of 5 draws can be performed.
Consider an experiment under H where three balls are drawn (R=3) at times j ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Since we cannot tell balls of the same colour apart, there are 5 different balls to be drawn
on the first trial, four on the second and three on the last. Also there are six different ways
to permute this sequences thus a total of 53/3! = 10 different sequences could be drawn.
Denote Bj as the result that a blue ball was drawn on the jth draw, and Rj that a red
ball was drawn. By successive use of the product rule, the probability of typical sequence
{R3,B2,R1} is
p(R3,B2,R1|H) = p(R3|B2,R1H) p(B2|R1,H) p(R1|H)
=
(
2
3
)(
2
4
)(
3
5
)
=
(
m2 − 1
M − 2
)(
m1
M − 1
)(m2
M
)
,
(5.2.1)
The sequence {R3,R2,B1} has probability
p(R3,R2,B1|H) =
(
2
3
)(
3
4
)(
2
5
)
=
(
m2 − 1
M − 2
)(
m2
M − 1
)(m1
M
)
. (5.2.2)
The two sequences {R3,B2,R1} and {R3,R2,B1} are exchangeable under H since they
result in the same probability
p(R3,B2,R1|H) = p(R3,R2,B1|H) = m1m2(m2−1)
M3
, (5.2.3)
even though the individual draws are far from independent. A draw with replacement
(knowledge base H′) would imply that each draw’s result has a probability independent
of the previous results, yielding the factorisation of probability which defines logical inde-
pendence; the two probabilities
p(R3,B2,R1|H′) = p(R3|B2,R1H′) p(B2|R1,H′) p(R1|H′)
= p(R3|H′) p(B2|H′) p(R1|H′)
p(R3,R2,B1|H) = p(R3|H′) p(R2|H′) p(B1|H′)
(5.2.4)
are obviously equal to each other and to m1m
2
2/M
3. Sequences from H and from H′
are hence both exchangeable, giving the same probabilities independent of the order of
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the individual results but knowledge base H yields logically dependent sequences with
correspondingly different probability assignments
p(R3,B2,R1|H) = 1
M3
2∏
b=1
m
rb
b =
1
5
,
p(R3,B2,R1|H′) = 1
M3
2∏
b=1
mrbb =
18
125
.
(5.2.5)
In order to project from ordered results x = (x1, x2, x3) onto occupation numbers {r1, r2},
as in Chapter 2, we must add the probabilities for all possible orderings. In our little
example there are three possible orderings of two red and one blue draw corresponding to
the multinomial coefficient 3!/(1! 2!), so the probability of drawing one blue and two red
balls in any order is
p(r1=1, r2=2|H) = 3 p(R3,B2,R1|H) = 3!
1!2!
m
1
1m
2
2
M3
(5.2.6)
which can be written in the form of a hypergeometric distribution
p(r1, r2|H) = R!
MR
2∏
b=1
m
rb
b
rb!
=
(
M
R
)−1 2∏
b=1
(
mb
rb
)
. (5.2.7)
5.3 Hypergeometric distribution
The knowledge base for the generalised case is
Knowledge base H:
Let there be an urn with M balls exhibiting B different physical
characteristics labelled by b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , B−1}. Let {mb}Bb=1 be the
set of known numbers of balls with characteristic b summing to∑
bmb = M. Balls once drawn are not replaced.
The multivariate hypergeometric distribution follows directly from H. Let Sb,i be the
logical statement “xi = b”. By the principle of indifference, the probability of seeing an
outcome c on the first trial is
p(Sc,1|H) = mc
M
. (5.3.1)
Once Sc,1 is known, the size of the outcome space decreases from M to M−1 and mb
decreases to mb − δb,c, so that on the second trial the principle of indifference yields
p(Sb,2|Sc,1,H) = mb − δb,c
M−1 . (5.3.2)
Given that individual outcomes xi, i ∈ {1, . . . , R} can be re-ordered at will, we place all
the xi = 0 outcomes first, followed by the xi = 1 outcomes and so on, yielding occupation
numbers r = {r1, r2, . . . , rB} with
∑
b rb = R. Again iteratively expanding the joint
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probability p(x1, . . . , xR|H) in terms of the product rule, the first subset of r1 draws all
with xi = 0 yield
p(S0,1, . . . ,S0,r1 |H) =
m
r1
1
M r1
, (5.3.3)
while the second subset of draws all with xi = 1 starts with an urn containing M−m1
balls, so that
p(S1,r1+1, . . . ,S1,r1+r2 |S0,1, . . . ,S0,r1H) =
m
r2
2
(M −m1)r2 , (5.3.4)
and p(S2,r1+r2+1, . . . ,S2,r1+r2+r3 |S1,r1+1, . . . ,S1,r1+r2 ,S0,1, . . . ,S0,r1H) follows in the same
way. This process is continued for all outcomes up to b = (B − 1). The joint probability
for all draws is hence, for the ordered sequence x = {x1, . . . , xR}
p(x|m,M,R,H) =
(
m
r1
1
M r1
)(
m
r2
2
(M −m1)r2
)
· · ·
(
m
rB−1
B−1
(M −∑B−2b=0 mb)rB−1
)
(5.3.5)
and, projecting onto occupation numbers r, we again add the probabilities of the R!/
∏
b rb!
possible orderings of x to obtain the multivariate hypergeometric likelihood
p(r|m,M,R,H) = R!
MR
∏
b
m
rb
b
rb!
=
(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)
(5.3.6)
where we have now made explicit the dependencies on R, M and m.
5.4 Heath-Suddert and Laplace-de-Finetti representations
As indicated in (5.1.2) and (5.1.3), we need to calculate the evidence p(n|K). For the
sake of generality and since they are mathematically the same, we shall calculate the
prediction evidence p(r|K), or more accurately p(r|R,M,H) for the class of models we are
treating, and substitute n for r when real data needs to be processed. For the multivariate
hypergeometric likelihood (5.3.6), this evidence is
p(r|R,H) =
M∑
U(m)
p(r,m|R,M,H) =
M∑
U(m)
p(r|m, R,M,H) p(m|R,M,H)
=
M∑
U(m)
(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)
p(m|M,H)
(5.4.1)
This is de Finetti’s theorem for finite sequences, which we wil call the Heath-Sudderth rep-
resentation (HS) after Heath and Sudderth (1976). The theorem part consists of pointing
out that we can use the HS representation for any finite exchangeable sequence, which
was De Finetti’s insight i.e. exchangeability is strong enough to characterise the hyperge-
ometric distribution.
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The de Finetti theorem proper follows on taking the urn populations to infinity with
the outcome fractions ρb = mb/M tending to a constant limit. For M  R and mb  rb,
the hypergeometric reduces to the multinomial,
p(r|m,M,R,H) = R!
MR
∏
b
m
rb
b
rb!
' R!
MR
∏
b
mrbb
rb!
= R!
∏
b
1
rb!
(mb
M
)rb
, (5.4.2)
in which case the above can be written as an weighted integral over multinomials
p(r|R,H) =
∫
R!
∏
b
1
rb!
(mb
M
)rb
dFM (ρ) (5.4.3)
where FM (ρ) is the finite-M cumulative frequency distribution of ρ which increases by
p(m|H) at the points ρ = m/M (for more about taking such limit see Feller (1974)). The
sequence of FM (ρ) is shown to tend uniformly to F (ρ) and one obtains
p(r|R,H) =
∫
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
dF (ρ) =
∫
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
p(ρ|H) dρ (5.4.4)
which is De Finetti’s theorem for infinite exchangeable sequences and which we shall call
the Laplace-de-Finetti (LdF) representation.
In the literature, the de Finetti theorem is considered significant as showing that
every exchangeable sequence (as represented by p(r|R,H)) that is part of an infinitely
long sequence can be written as a mixture of multinomial distributions weighted by an
arbitrary normalised function (as represented by the prior p(ρ|H)). The HS representation
is similarly viewed as saying that every exchangeable sequence can be represented as a
mixture of hypergeometric distributions weighted by a probability p(m|H). Indeed, it
may be of interest to infer the priors p(ρ|H) or p(m|H) from known likelihoods p(r|ρ,H)
or p(r|m,H). These theorems are usually celebrated because they ensure the existence of
a prior distribution which was a historical criticism of Bayesian methods.
For our purposes, however, the HS and LdF representations are of practical interest
in calculating the evidence by summing/integrating over all possible configurations of m
or ρ. We will return to the de Finetti theorem later in connection with the negative
hypergeometric distribution.
5.5 Priors for exchangeable sequences
5.5.1 Johnson’s postulate
Having made at least a preliminary determination of the likelihood p(r|m,H), we now
must tackle the huge topic of finding the priors p(m|H) and p(ρ|H). In this and the next
section, we proceed to construct a prior and a primordial sample space for exchangeable
trials in contrast to the prior and sample space for logically independent trials. Naturally,
there will be not a single best prior but rather as many different priors as accurately reflect
different states of knowledge.
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A first step at constructing priors based on knowledge is to understand priors based on
ignorance, the lack of knowledge. Historically, for his one-dimensional binomial likelihood
p(r|ρ) = (Rr)ρr(1 − ρ)R−r, Bayes (1763) as quoted by Stigler (1982) argued that the
evidence should be uniform and thus the prior distribution should also be uniform p(ρ) =
1, while Laplace (1774) again as quoted by Stigler (1986) used the same uniform prior
invoking the principle of insufficient reason directly on the parameter space. The set
ρ = {ρ1, . . . , ρB} entering the multinomial and multivariate hypergeometric lives in the
(B−1)-dimensional simplex 0 < ρb < 1,
∑
b ρb = 1 which can be shown to have a volume
1/Γ[B], so the uniform prior for a B-dimensional ρ is p(ρ|H) = Γ[B]. We will call the
prior uniform on the simplex the Bayes-Laplace prior.
Uniformity does not, however, necessarily represent complete ignorance, as already
pointed out by Edgeworth (1884) and Pearson (1907), who adopted the view that unifor-
mity already contains knowledge of the limits of the parameter space. Jaynes (2003) and
before him Jeffreys (1961), Haldane (1931) and others readily adopted and utilised this
standpoint to define different sets of ignorance priors.
First, however, we must discuss the more general Johnson’s sufficiency postulate as
published by Johnson (1932) which states that the probability for a given trial to have a
result b can depend only on the total existing occupation number for that result. For a
state of ignorance this assumption is easy to motivate; for us to connect different bins to
each other requires some information which for the primordial sample space is unavailable.
If we have R data points x = {x1, . . . , xR} with occupation number rb =
∑R
i=1 δ(xi,Ab),
then the probability for the (R+1)st result must obey
p(xR+1=b|x) = fb(rb), (5.5.1)
where the {fb} can be any set of functions as long as they obey 0 ≤ fb(rb) and, due to the
normalisation condition for
∑
b p(xR+1=b|x),∑
b
fb(rb) = 1. (5.5.2)
It is easy to show that the fb must be linear functions of the respective rb: for a given
occupation number define first
r = {r1, . . . , rb, . . . , rc, . . . , rd, . . . , rB}, (5.5.3)
where b, c and d are arbitrary but fixed indices, and then
r(1) = {r1, . . . , rb+1, . . . , rc−1, . . . , rd, . . . , rB},
r(2) = {r1, . . . , rb, . . . , rc−1, . . . , rd+1, . . . , rB},
r(3) = {r1, . . . , rb−1, . . . , rc, . . . , rd+1, . . . , rB},
(5.5.4)
so that
∑
b rb = R for each. Subtracting the sum of predictions of r from each of the other
vectors in turn yields
fb(rb+1)− fb(rb) = fc(rc)− fc(rc−1) = fd(rd+1)− fd(rd) = fb(rb)− fb(rb−1), (5.5.5)
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meaning that
fb(rb) = α
∗
b + β
∗rb, (5.5.6)
where α∗b = fb(0) ≥ 0 as fb is a probability and β∗ = fb(rb+1)−fb(rb) must be independent
of b.
5.5.2 Po´lya urn distributions and their properties
Below, we shall use Po´lya urn distributions in various forms and guises for priors, and
hence briefly review their properties. In generic notation, the Po´lya urn is filled with K
balls where kb balls have property b, and the Po´lya urn distribution then specifies the
probability for drawing n = {n1, . . . , nB} balls,
p(n|k, c,H) =
(−A/c
N
)−1 B∏
b=1
(−ab/c
nb
)
. (5.5.7)
The parameter c controls the method of sampling and sets the type of distribution, namely
c Algorithm Resulting distribution
-1 do not replace ball hypergeometric
0 replace ball multinomial
+1 replace ball and add another of the same b negative hypergeometric
The multinomial is recovered as the limit c→ 0 while setting ρb = ab/A,
lim
c→0
p(n|a, c,H) = lim
c→0
N !
n1! . . . nB!
(a1/c)
n1 . . . (aB/c)
nB
(A/c)N
= N !
∏
b
ρnbb
nb!
. (5.5.8)
The respective outcome space for the Po´lya urn is U(n), which for c = −1 implies that
all the ab ≥ nb.
5.5.3 Po´lya urns and Johnson’s postulate
We now show that a Po´lya urn prior together with a hypergeometric likelihood satisfy
Johnson’s postulate. We must show that the prediction for xR+1, given ordered outcomes
x,
p(xR+1=d |x,a, c,H) = p(xR+1=d,x|a, c,H)
p(x|a, c,H) (5.5.9)
for a hypergeometric likelihood p(r|m,H) and Po´lya prior (5.5.7) for occupation number
r is a linear function of rd, for all c. Rearranging and using the normalisation condition
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in the second step, we obtain for the evidence another Po´lya distribution
p(r|a, c,H) =
∑
U(m)
p(r|m,H) p(m|a, c,H)
=
∑
U(m)
[(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)][(−A/c
M
)−1∏
b
(−ab/c
mb
)]
=
∑
U(m)
(−A/c
R
)−1(−A/c−R
M −R
)−1∏
b
(−ab/c
rb
)(−ab/c− rb
mb − rb
)
=
(−A/c
R
)−1∏
b
(−ab/c
rb
)
(5.5.10)
The corresponding evidence for ordered outcomes x in the denominator of (5.5.10) is
p(r|a, c,H) divided by the multinomial coefficient R!/∏b rb! or, using (2.1.18) and (2.1.16),
p(x|a, c,H) = 1
(A/c)R
∏
b
(ab/c)
rb . (5.5.11)
Since the numerator in (5.5.10) is just the same evidence with a lengthened vector x′ =
{xR+1,x}, the prediction for the next trial is,
fd(rd) =
(A/c)R
(A/c)R+1
· (ad/c)
rd+1
(ad/c)rd
=
(ad/c) + rd
(A/c) +R
, (5.5.12)
and hence Johnson’s postulate (5.5.6) is satisfied with α∗b = ab/(A+ cR) and β
∗ = c/(A+
cR).
The Po´lya urn is thus an appropriate prior for multivariate hypergeometric likelihoods
and hence for exchangeable distribution likelihoods. The status of Po´lya urn distributions
in relation to exchangeability does not contradict cases of logical independence but includes
them, in the form of the c→ 0 limit taken in (5.5.8). Of course the assumption of Logical
Independence is not wrong but it is not the general case, as we have already demonstrated.
The generic posterior is
p(m|r,a, c,H) = p(r,m|a, c,H)
p(r|a, c,H)
=
(−A/c−R
M −R
)−1∏
b
(−ab/c− rb
mb − rb
)
.
(5.5.13)
5.5.4 Po´lya urn as conjugate prior for hypergeometric sampling
A further remarkable property of the Po´lya urn is that it is closed under hypergeometric
sampling; in other words, the posterior and prior have the same functional form. A
prior closed under sampling is called a conjugate prior, see Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961).
(This invariance may be called a “symmetry” under the transformation specified by Bayes
theorem. For more about conjugate prior distributions see also O’Hagan and Forster
(2004).) Usually a conjugate prior would lead to linear posterior mean estimates, see
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Diaconis and Ylvisaker (1979), and thus Johnson’s postulate also implies that we should
pick a conjugate prior for hypergeometric sampling.
According to Hald (1960), there are three conjugate prior distributions for hypergeo-
metric sampling, namely Hypergeometric, Negative Hypergeometric and the Multinomial.
As we have seen, the Po´lya Urn parametrises all three cases.
5.5.4.1 Case c = −1: hypergeometric prior and posterior
A hypergeometric prior with hypergeometric sampling
p(m|a,H) =
(
A
M
)−1∏
b
(
ab
mb
)
p(r|m,H) =
(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)
, (5.5.14)
leads to a hypergeometric evidence and a hypergeometric posterior,
p(r|a,H) =
(
A
R
)−1∏
b
(
ab
rb
)
p(m|r,a,H) =
(
A−R
M −R
)−1∏
b
(
ab − rb
mb − rb
)
. (5.5.15)
The defining property of the Hypergeometric distribution is that the population is finite.
If we try to take more trials than the population the hypergeometric distribution will
start to assign zero probability to those trials. Consequently the hypergeometric prior
represents a very specific state of knowledge where we know the population sizes and is
hence a special case and not the general formulation that we are seeking at the moment.
5.5.4.2 Case c = +1: negative hypergeometric prior and posterior
A negative hypergeometric prior with hypergeometric sampling
p(m|a,H) =
(−A
M
)−1∏
b
(−ab
mb
)
p(r|m,H) =
(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)
, (5.5.16)
leads to a negative hypergeometric evidence and negative hypergeometric posterior
p(r|a,H) =
(−A
R
)−1∏
b
(−ab
rb
)
p(m|r,a,H) =
(−A−R
M
)−1∏
b
(−ab −mb
rb
)
.
(5.5.17)
The negative hypergeometric prior distribution also has the remarkable property that we
can decompose it into a Multinomial-Dirichlet mixture,
p(r|a,H) =
∫ [
R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
][
Γ[A]
∏
b
ρab−1b
Γ[ab]
]∏
b
dρb =
(−A
R
)−1∏
b
(−ab
rb
)
. (5.5.18)
Comparison with (5.4.3) shows that this equation is just the Laplace-de-Finetti representa-
tion with a Dirichlet prior distribution for ρ. Choosing a distribution for ρ implies that we
are uncertain about the values of ρ. Contrast this with the multinomial choice where we
specify a fixed ρ indicating certainty and the hypergeometric evidence where the popula-
tions numbers from which are m are drawn is known and fixed. Consequently the negative
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hypergeometric distribution corresponds to greater uncertainty and thus greater general-
ity than the other two choices of prior distributions. It also shows that the Laplace-De
Finetti representation is more general than we would suppose. We do not need to assume
that our sequences are subsets from an infinite sequence but only that we do not know
whether they originate from a finite population. Operationally if we think the number of
trials R can be extended to an arbitrarily large number then we can use the Laplace-De
Finetti representation with a Dirichlet prior.
This still leaves us with the question of choosing the metaparameters a in the Dirichlet
prior distribution,
p(ρ|a,H) = Γ[∑bab]∏
b
ρab−1b
Γ[ab]
, ab > 0 ∀ b. (5.5.19)
This will be addressed in Section 5.6.
5.6 Priors for metaparameters
Let us recap: The previous chapter concerned the specification of forward probabilities of
our theory. As we have seen, exchangeability allows us to always pick the likelihood or
sampling to be a hypergeometric distribution. In the second part of the chapter, we then
sought a general prior distribution with maximal ignorance, resulting in the choice of a
negative hypergeometric prior. Equivalently, the Multinomial-Dirichlet mixture could be
used to assign probabilities.
While we have thus chosen to fix c = 1 for the prior, we are still left with the unspecified
metaparameters a which we can view in the LdF representation as initial counts for the
multinomial distribution. Either way, the chain of reasoning of general formulae (5.1.1)–
(5.1.3) forces us to choose a specific set of a as our initial values
p(n|a,H) =
∑
U(m)
p(n|m,a,H) p(m|a,H), (5.6.1)
likewise the posterior and the prediction
p(m|n,a,H) = 1
p(n|a,H)p(n|m,a,K) p(m|a,H), (5.6.2)
p(r|n,a,H) =
∑
U(m)
p(r|m,H) p(m|n,a,H). (5.6.3)
The process of finding priors can be a very mollusc-like argument: We analyse a param-
eter space in terms of metaparameters and can then in turn analyse these metaparameters
in terms of metametaparameters and so forth, thereby creating a potentially infinite hier-
archy of unknowns. As usual, we have to make choices at some point that stops the infinite
recursion. In this section, we draw on the powerful principle of invariance or symmetry to
provide such a basis. We define invariance and symmetry in information theoretic terms
as conservation of ignorance under change, i.e. a change in parameter under some trans-
formation leaves us none the wiser or the information invariant. We cannot distinguish
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between one situation and the other. We attempt to provide a partial list of possible
metaparameter priors based on some situations of ignorance or information symmetries
that may occur in various applications.
Ignorance is, of course, not the only game in town. If pertinent information is available
for constructing a parameter prior distribution then obviously that information should be
used.
In the context of this chapter, all the variables used below such as angles, ρ’s, location
and scale parameters etc are special cases of a. The symmetry arguments used below
can, however, be used whenever a prior in any situation needs to be specified from first
principles.
5.6.1 Unknown Probabilities or Chances
The first class of symmetries concerns ignorance of elementary probabilities ρ as used
from the start of probability theory. Traditionally, four choices have been advocated in
the literature:
The first choice is actually the baseline which assumes not ignorance but perfect knowl-
edge,
p(ρ|I) dρ =
∏
b
δ(ρb − Cb)dρb, (5.6.4)
where {Cb} are fixed numbers, assumed known. Most elementary statistics books naively
assume this to be self-evident — to the degree that the rather ridiculous assumptions
underlying this choice, namely infinitely accurate knowledge even before any data is avail-
able, are never even discussed. This assumption of exactly known ρ formed the basis of
Chapter 4, which is exactly why the present chapter and the next needed to be written.3
The second and superior choice is the Bayes-Laplace or uniform prior which is based
on arguing that the evidence should be invariant under permutation; see Stigler (1982),
p(ρ|I) dρ = (B − 1)! dρ,
which is the special ab = 1 ∀ b case of the Dirichlet prior (5.5.19).
The third choice is the Jaynes-Haldane prior, introduced by Haldane (1931) and moti-
vated by Jaynes (1968). It is based on assumed invariance of odds under Bayes’ theorem
on going from prior to posterior (3.7.2),
p(H|D,K)
p(H|D,K) =
p(D|H,K)
p(D|H,K)
p(H|K)
p(H|K) , (5.6.5)
whereH is the hypothesis and D is the data. Writing o for the prior odds for the hypothesis
and o′ for the posterior odds and ` for the likelihood ratio, this becomes
o′ = ` · o. (5.6.6)
3Of course traditional fitting algorithms and methods soften this assumption and even lead to good
results in many cases. It is not the purpose of this dissertation, however, to repeat these conventional
methods.
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.6. PRIORS FOR METAPARAMETERS 75
We start with the odds o for our hypothesis which is then updated with the likelihood
ratio ` after seeing the data D, giving the posterior odds o′. This gives us a transformation
rule for invariance of odds. Transforming back into probabilities ρ ≡ p(H|K) and ρ′ =
p(H|D,K),
ρ′
1− ρ′ = `
ρ
1− ρ, (5.6.7)
and solving, we obtain
ρ′ =
`ρ
1− ρ+ `ρ. (5.6.8)
Now imagine the same data D is considered by many individuals, all of whom indepen-
dently assign a prior ρ and initial odds o and all consistently update their new odds o′
according to the same mechanism (5.6.6). There is thus a “metaprobability” distribution
f(ρ) dρ of individuals assigning a particular ρ. Total ignorance (or confusion) is then de-
fined as saying that the information given to these individuals in the form of ` contains
no consistent learning value for the population as a whole, leaving the distribution of in-
dividual knowledge the same state f as before. The distribution of priors f [ρ]dρ and of
posteriors f [ρ′]dρ′ thus by hypothesis of ignorance have the same functional form f ,
f [ρ] dρ = f [ρ′] dρ′. (5.6.9)
Combining this with the ρ-transformation results in
f [ρ](1 + `ρ− ρ)2 dρ = f
[
`ρ
1− ρ+ `ρ
]
`dρ (5.6.10)
and taking the derivative in ` and setting ` = 1, we obtain
2ρ = f [ρ] + (1− ρ)ρf ′[ρ], (5.6.11)
and so
f [ρ] =
const.
ρ(1− ρ) . (5.6.12)
These arguments are similar to the geometric arguments as in Kendall and Moran (1963):
we define a transformation and assert that our state of knowledge (in this case the odds)
is invariant under that transformation. This leads to a functional equation which we
then solve to find our prior distribution. This type of prior we will call an invariance
prior. The arguments that lead to such priors are usually quite convincing but they do
contain a serious flaw in that they can lead to improper priors, as in (5.6.12) above, in
which the normalising constant cannot be evaluated. Fortunately, we already know from
Eqs. (5.1.2)–(5.1.3) that the constant will cancel and that improper priors can, therefore,
be used to good effect.
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5.6.2 Unknown Angles
The fourth choice, which we will call the Jeffreys-Perks prior, is based on invariance on
the circle or sphere i.e. ignorance of angles; see Jeffreys (1961) and Perks (1947). Consider
assigning a probability to a binomial distribution with parameters ρ and 1−ρ. Transform
these to an angle
ρ = cos2
(
φ
2
)
1− ρ = sin2
(
φ
2
)
. (5.6.13)
The motivation for this transformation is that it is much easier to specify a prior on a
circle, because rotational invariance is such an obvious transformation. Invariance on the
circle translates into
f [φ] = f [φ+ θ], (5.6.14)
for arbitrary angle θ. Taking the derivative in θ immediately results in the uniform-angle
prior
f ′[θ] = 0 ⇒ f [θ] = constant, (5.6.15)
but unlike the Jeffreys-Haldane prior this can be normalised so that
f [φ] =
1
2pi
. (5.6.16)
Transforming back to our probabilities yields
f [ρ] =
1
pi
√
ρ(1− ρ) , (5.6.17)
which is the Jeffreys-Perks prior. It also represents a useful compromise with the invariant
Jaynes-Haldane prior, but with the advantage that it is normalisable.
For the trinomial case, we parametrise on the 3-sphere to automatically fulfil the
normalisation condition ρ3 = 1− ρ1 − ρ2,
ρ1 = cos
2
(
φ
2
)
sin2
(
θ
2
)
ρ2 = sin
2
(
φ
2
)
sin2
(
θ
2
)
ρ3 = cos
2
(
θ
2
)
(5.6.18)
where 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ ≤ 2pi. Transforming the rotational invariant prior distribution
on a sphere,
p(θ, φ) =
1
2pi
sin
(
θ
2
)
, (5.6.19)
to probabilities we find,
p(ρ1, ρ2) =
1
2pi
√
ρ1ρ2(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
. (5.6.20)
For the general multinomial case, again define each ρb in the simplex as the square of the
b-component of the B-dimensional unit sphere and invert to get
p(ρ|H) = Γ
[
B
2
]∏
b
ρ
−1/2
b
Γ[1/2]
. (5.6.21)
From here on we shall always choose the metaparameters of the Dirichlet prior distribution
to be ab =
1/2 for all b.
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5.6.3 Unknown location
The next class of situations concern scale and location. When we are ignorant of location,
the appropriate prior should be unchanged under arbitrary translation of the location
parameter µ,
f [µ] = f [µ+ c]. (5.6.22)
Taking the derivative in c as in the case of angle invariance and setting c to zero, we see
that f ′[µ] = 0 and the only possible assignment is a constant function,
f [µ] ∝ constant. (5.6.23)
In many cases this assignment works beautifully, but if we need a prior on the entire real
line (−∞,∞) or any other unbounded outcome space, the uniform prior is improper. Let
us try a different tack for such cases: Consider a population of experts k = 1, . . . ,K,
each of whom voices an independent opinion µk on what the value for µ should be. Since
location parameters are additive, we combine the expert opinions by taking the additive
mean,
µ =
µ1 + µ2 + · · ·+ µK
K
. (5.6.24)
The corresponding distribution for µ would be
p(µ|H) =
∫
p(µ1|H)p(µ2|H) · · · p(µK |H) δ
(
K−1
∑
kµk − µ
)∏
k
dµk. (5.6.25)
Taking the Fourier transform on both sides in µ we get the characteristic function relation,
Φ[t] =
∏
k
Φk
[
t
K
]
. (5.6.26)
Using our consistency argument again, we now argue that every expert’s opinion was based
on exactly the same information and that every characteristic function must therefore be
the same,
Φ[t] = Φk[t]. (5.6.27)
Combining the arguments we have the functional equation,
log Φ[Kt] = K log Φ[t] −∞ < t <∞, K > 0. (5.6.28)
Evidently, this requires a linear relation on the real line, and, because of the normalisation
of the distribution there is no constant term. Hence
log Φ[t] = Ct, (5.6.29)
where C is some complex number. Examining the definition of a Fourier transform we see
that the characteristic function must obey the existence condition Φ[−t] = Φ∗[t] giving us
log Φ[t] = iαt− β|t|, −∞ < α <∞, β > 0. (5.6.30)
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The restriction on β ensures that we have a proper distribution. Inverting the Fourier
transform gives
p(µ|H) = 1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
exp [iαt− β|t| − itµ] dt = 1
pi
β
β2 + (α− µ)2 , (5.6.31)
a Cauchy distribution, with median α and interquartile α± β. This is our reference prior
for locations with unknown variance, as we will see below, and we will call it a stable
prior.
To connect our Cauchy prior with the Jeffreys-Perks prior distribution, we make the
observation that an unknown angle is the ratio of two unknown lengths. If we take the
first length fixed and equal to β, then we can make the transformation
φ = β tan
φ
2
, (5.6.32)
which transforms our unknown angle into an unknown location. This is a purely heuristic
argument, but operationally as shown in Jeffreys and Jeffreys (1950) all we need for a
location prior is a symmetrical distribution which need not have any moments. Intuitively
the moments represent information on the properties of the location parameter thus by
choosing a distribution whose moments diverge we refuse to provide such information.
The stable argument then provides additional support for our choice.
5.6.4 Unknown location with known variance
The second transformation we will consider for location parameters is commonly called
standardisation. The appropriate transformation
µ =
µ1 + µ2 + · · ·+ µK√
K
. (5.6.33)
preserves the second cumulant or variance, κ2(µ) = κ2(µk). The underlying motivation is
that every distribution has a variance κ2(µk) = σ
2
k and combining them gives a variance of
roughly Kσ2 which then needs to be standardised and dividing gives a quadratic change
in the second cumulant. Again using the consistency argument gives us the new functional
equation,
√
K log Φ[t] = K log Φ [t] , (5.6.34)
yielding a quadratic relation on the real line,
log Φ[t] = Ct2 −∞ < t <∞, (5.6.35)
with C a complex number. Using the existence condition Φ[−t] = Φ∗[t] again, we find
log Φ[t] = −β t
2
2
0 < β <∞. (5.6.36)
Inverting the Fourier transform gives,
p(µ|H) = 1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e−β
t2
2
−itµdt =
1√
piβ
exp
[
−µ
2
2β
]
, (5.6.37)
a Gaussian distribution located at zero with variance β.
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5.6.5 Unknown variance
The third case is to assign a variance to an unknown location. We are given opinions on
a location µk on which all experts agree but with different variances σ
2
k e.g. in the form of
a product of symmetric Gaussian that we combine,
p(σk|µk,K) =
∏
k
1√
2piσk
exp
[
−µ
2
k
σ2k
]
→ 1√
2piσ
exp
[
−µ
2
k
σ2
]
, (5.6.38)
implying the composition rule,
σ2 =
σ21 + σ
2
2 + . . . σ
2
K
K2
. (5.6.39)
The consistency argument then gives the functional equation as
log Φ
[
K2t
]
= K log Φ [t] , (5.6.40)
which gives a square root relation on the real axis,
log Φ = C
√
t, (5.6.41)
where C is a complex number. Applying the existence condition Φ[−t] = Φ∗[t] gives in
this case
log Φ = −β√−i2t 0 < β <∞, (5.6.42)
and inverting the Fourier transform gives
p(σ2|H) = 1
2pi
∞∫
−∞
e−β
√−i2t−itσ2dt =
β√
2piσ3
exp
[
− β
2
2σ2
]
, (5.6.43)
a Levy distribution. The reason that we know the composition rule is that if we combine
the Levy prior with the Gaussian likelihood, we get back the Cauchy distribution (5.6.31)
p(µ|H) =
∫
p(µ|σ2,H)p(σ2|H)dσ2
=
∫ [
1√
2piσ
exp
[
− µ
2
2σ2
]] [
β√
2piσ3
exp
[
− β
2
2σ2
]]
dσ2
=
1
pi
β
β2 + µ2
,
(5.6.44)
but with α equal to zero. We could have also argued from symmetry that α must be zero
because any other value would have preferred positive or negative values.
5.6.6 Unknown scale
Since scale transformations are always multiplicative,
σ → cσ c, σ > 0, (5.6.45)
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the invariant prior should be
f [σ]dσ = f [cσ]cdσ. (5.6.46)
Taking the derivative in c and setting c = 1 gives
σf ′[σ] + f [σ] = 0 f [σ] =
const.
σ
. (5.6.47)
This, too, is an improper prior on the interval [0,∞), so let us try to find a proper pre-limit
prior for scale. Intuitively we think of a radius as specifying a scale in an experiment; thus
we try to add up the squares of location parameters to form a squared radius. We also
need a spherically symmetric construction if we wish to define a radius and therefore start
with multivariate extension of the Cauchy distribution,
p(µ|H) = βΓ
[
1+K
2
]
pi
K+1
2
(
1
β2 + µ21 + · · ·+ µ2K
) 1+K
2
. (5.6.48)
This specific generalisation of the Cauchy distribution is rotationally invariant and all its
marginal distribution are Cauchy as well. Projecting onto one variable via r2 = µ21 + · · ·+
µ2K gives us
p(r2|H) = βΓ
[
1+K
2
]
√
piΓ
[
K
2
] ( r2
β2 + r2
) 1+K
2
r−3 (5.6.49)
and in one dimension,
p(r2|H) = β
pi
1
r(β2 + r2)
, (5.6.50)
which is a folded Cauchy distribution which we will use as a prior for unknown scale.
A different perspective on the scale prior is to consider the odds as a scale parameter.
Transforming our arcsine law (5.6.17) to odds gives
ρ =
o
1 + o
dρ =
1
(1 + o)2
do
p(o|H)do = 1
pi
√
o(1 + o)
do,
(5.6.51)
which is equivalent to our scale invariant prior if we choose r2 = o. We can also decompose
the scale prior into an informative scale prior with an uninformative prior,
p(o|H) =
∞∫
0
[
e−o/α√
pioα
][
e−β/α√
βpi
α−
3
2
]
dα
=
√
β√
o(β + o)
.
(5.6.52)
Additionally we observe that if a prior represents ignorance of scale then it should also hold
for the inverse of that scale. In fact our prior should be invariant under the transformation
o→ 1/o′ and thus,
p(o′|H) =
√
β
pi
√
o′(1 + o′β)
, (5.6.53)
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which implies that β indicates a preference for either o or o′ depending if it is larger or
smaller than 1. For this reason, we choose β = 1. The transformation from the stable
scale prior distribution to the unknown angle prior is simply the square of the location
transform,
o = tan2
φ
2
. (5.6.54)
5.6.7 Summary
We start from a fundamental prior choice, which in our case is the uniform distribution
for an unknown angle,
p(φ|H) = 1
2pi
. (5.6.55)
Then we use a set of transformations to change into different classes of priors,
Location: µ = tan
φ
2
Probability: ρ =
1− cosφ
2
Scale: o = tan2
[
φ
2
]
,
(5.6.56)
which leads to the class of stable prior distributions,
Location: p(µ|H) = 1
pi(1 + µ2)
Probability: p(ρ|H) = 1
pi
√
ρ(1− ρ)
Scale: p(o|H) = 1
pi
√
o(1 + o)
.
(5.6.57)
Each of these distributions are stable under a certain type of convolution and can be
decomposed into a mixture,
Location: p(µ|H) =
∞∫
0
[
1√
2piσ
exp
[
− µ
2
2σ2
]] [
1√
2piσ3
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
]]
dσ2
Probability: p(ρ|H) =
∞∑
a,b=1/2
[
Γ[a+ b]
Γ[a]Γ[b]
ρa−1(1− ρ)b−1
] [
δ(a− 1)δ(b) + δ(a)δ(b− 1)
2
]
Scale: p(o|H) =
∞∫
0
[
e−o/α√
pioα
][
e−1/α√
pi
α−
3
2
]
dα.
(5.6.58)
This provides us with a set of reference priors to use in most situations that occur in
this dissertation. Operationally for prior distributions with unbounded support we prefer
proper prior distributions with undefined moments.
This completes our knowledge base H, which assumes exchangeability combined with
stable prior distributions.
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Examples and applications
6.1 Poisson source strengths
To illustrate the use of our set of prior distributions we apply them to some simple prob-
lems.
6.1.1 Poisson Source Strength
Our first example is to estimate a set of source strengths s = {sb} from a data count vector
n, basically a histogram. Starting from a product of unknown scale prior distributions,
p(s|H) =
∏
b
1
pi
√
sb(1 + sb)
. (6.1.1)
we assume that dataset n follows a poissonian likelihood
p(n|s,H) =
∏
b
e−sb
snbb
nb!
, (6.1.2)
so that the joint distribution is
p(s,n|H) =
∏
b
e−sb
pi(1 + sb)
s
nb−1/2
b
nb!
. (6.1.3)
Integrating out s, we find the evidence and the posterior,
p(n|H) =
∏
b
Γ[nb +
1/2]
pinb!
U
[
nb +
1/2
nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣1
]
p(s|n,H) = p(s,n|H)
p(n|H) =
∏
b
e−sb snb−
1/2
b
{
(1 + sb) Γ[nb +
1/2] U
[
nb +
1/2
nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣1
]}−1
(6.1.4)
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where U [. . . ] is a Confluent Hypergeometric function; see Appendix A. The mean and
variance for p(s|n,H) are easily found from the generic posterior moments, of order j
〈
sjb
〉
=
Γ[nb + j +
1/2]
Γ[nb + 1/2]
U
[
j + nb +
1/2
j + nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣1
]
U
[
nb +
1/2
nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣1
] . (6.1.5)
6.1.2 Poisson Source Strength with detector efficiency
In this example, taken Jaynes (2003), let us add an additional source of error to the data
so that it is over-dispersed with greater variance than the Poisson distribution:
s n c
The above diagram illustrates the logical chain of our model: A source strength s generates
a set of counts n but due to limited efficiency our detector sees only c of these counts. What
can we infer about s from c? Modelling measured counts with a binomial distribution with
φ the detector efficiency, assumed known in our example,
p(c|n,φ,H) =
∏
b
(
nb
cb
)
φcbb (1− φb)nb−cb (6.1.6)
and combining it with our Poissonian likelihood yields
p(c|s,φ,H) =
∏
b
∞∑
nb=cb
p(n|s,H)p(c|n,φ,H) =
∏
b
e−sbφb
(sbφb)
cb
cb!
. (6.1.7)
Adding the prior (6.1.1) gives the corresponding evidence and posterior
p(c|φ,H) =
∏
b
Γ[cb +
1/2]φ
cb
b
picb!
U
[
cb +
1/2
cb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣φb
]
p(s|c,φ,H) =
∏
b
e−φbsb scb−
1/2
b
{
(1 + sb) Γ[cb +
1/2] U
[
cb +
1/2
cb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣φb
]}−1 (6.1.8)
and posterior moments
〈
sjb
〉
=
Γ[nb + j +
1/2]
Γ[nb + 1/2]
U
[
j + nb +
1/2
j + nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣φb
]
U
[
nb +
1/2
nb +
1/2
∣∣∣∣φb
] . (6.1.9)
6.2 Bayes Factors in high energy physics
In this section, we apply some of our results to data, taken in this case from a high-
energy physics experiment. The L3 Collaboration was one of the four major experimental
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Q (GeV) R2(Q) Error Q (GeV) R2(Q) Error Q (GeV) R2(Q) Error Q (GeV) R2(Q) Error
0.030 1.362 0.051 1.020 0.962 0.005 2.020 0.995 0.008 3.020 0.993 0.011
0.064 1.424 0.021 1.060 0.967 0.005 2.060 0.998 0.008 3.060 0.990 0.011
0.102 1.362 0.013 1.100 0.965 0.005 2.100 0.993 0.008 3.100 1.005 0.011
0.141 1.270 0.009 1.140 0.962 0.005 2.140 0.990 0.008 3.140 0.983 0.011
0.181 1.210 0.007 1.180 0.969 0.005 2.180 0.998 0.008 3.180 0.991 0.011
0.221 1.154 0.006 1.220 0.962 0.005 2.220 0.985 0.008 3.220 0.998 0.011
0.260 1.118 0.005 1.260 0.988 0.006 2.260 1.000 0.009 3.260 1.001 0.011
0.300 1.091 0.005 1.300 0.982 0.006 2.300 0.975 0.008 3.300 0.994 0.011
0.340 1.062 0.005 1.340 0.985 0.006 2.340 0.998 0.009 3.340 0.981 0.011
0.380 1.028 0.004 1.380 0.979 0.006 2.380 0.998 0.009 3.380 0.980 0.011
0.420 1.023 0.004 1.420 0.979 0.006 2.420 0.978 0.009 3.420 0.983 0.012
0.460 1.005 0.004 1.460 0.992 0.006 2.460 0.986 0.009 3.460 0.982 0.012
0.500 0.991 0.004 1.500 0.975 0.006 2.500 0.985 0.009 3.500 0.989 0.012
0.540 0.979 0.004 1.540 0.988 0.007 2.540 1.000 0.009 3.540 0.990 0.012
0.580 0.968 0.004 1.580 0.990 0.007 2.580 0.989 0.009 3.580 0.996 0.012
0.620 0.965 0.004 1.620 0.983 0.007 2.620 0.988 0.009 3.620 1.001 0.012
0.660 0.962 0.004 1.660 0.991 0.007 2.660 0.999 0.010 3.660 0.999 0.012
0.700 0.959 0.004 1.700 0.995 0.007 2.700 0.981 0.010 3.700 0.992 0.012
0.740 0.959 0.004 1.740 0.984 0.007 2.740 0.983 0.010 3.740 0.988 0.012
0.780 0.959 0.004 1.780 0.990 0.007 2.780 1.001 0.010 3.780 0.999 0.013
0.820 0.958 0.004 1.820 0.982 0.007 2.820 1.003 0.010 3.820 0.986 0.013
0.860 0.957 0.005 1.860 0.993 0.007 2.860 1.006 0.010 3.860 0.997 0.013
0.900 0.963 0.005 1.900 0.979 0.007 2.900 0.981 0.010 3.900 0.979 0.013
0.940 0.958 0.005 1.940 0.986 0.008 2.940 1.010 0.011 3.940 0.992 0.013
0.980 0.965 0.005 1.980 0.991 0.008 2.980 1.018 0.011 3.980 1.009 0.010
Table 6.1: Table of data for the normalised Bose-Einstein correlation R2(Q) as a function of
binned four-momentum difference Q for two-jet events, as published in Achard et al. (2011) by the
L3 Collaboration. Standard errors quoted are statistical only. See text for details.
collaborations at the Large Electron-Positron (LEP) Collider at CERN in Geneva. While
LEP has long since made way for the Large Hadron Collider, L3 and other collaborations
have continued to analyse their data and publish results. For details on CERN, L3 and
its many publications see the L3 homepage at http://l3.web.cern.ch/l3/
The data shown in Table 6.1 and displayed in Fig. 6.1 was published by L3 in 2011
in tabular form; see Fig. 6 and Table 8 of Achard et al. (2011). It was used by us in a
preliminary analysis in the conference proceedings of de Kock et al. (2011a).
The focus in this dissertation falls not on L3 analysis, results or interpretation of the
underlying physics; it is merely an exercise and a tool to assess in a realistic environment
how Bayesian analysis might work. We therefore outline the underlying physics only very
briefly. When electrons and positrons collide at very high energies (as measured in the
standard high-energy physics unit of energy of GigaelectronVolts (GeV) also displayed
in Table 6.1), they can form a Z-particle which then decays into many lighter particles.
Among the most common decay products are pions, which, being bosonic quantum par-
ticles, obey quantum statistics and therefore tend to clump together, an effect variously
termed quantum correlations, Bose-Einstein correlations or femtoscopy. The x-axis of
Fig. 6.1 represents the invariant four-momentum differenceQ =
√
(p1 − p2)2 − (E1 − E2)2
between pion 1 and pion 2, while the y-axis quantifies the correlations in terms of R2(Q)
which is a ratio of the number of pion pairs with given Q resulting from a single Z decay
to similar calculation made for pion pairs which, being taken from different Z-decays, are
uncorrelated. The error bars displayed are the standard way to show how widely these
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Figure 6.1: Plot of the normalised Bose-Einstein correlation R2(Q) as a function of binned
four-momentum difference Q for two-jet events, as published in Achard et al. (2011) by the L3
Collaboration. See text for details. Also plotted in the figure is the worst fit namely the Gaussian
Parametrisation HG together with the best fit, the second derivative parametrisation HD3.
ratios fluctuate from Z-event to event.
In this section, R is literally the dataset of R2(Q) values of Table 6.1 and Fig. 6.1
listed as binned values {Qb, Rb(Qb), σb(Qb)}Bb=1, while the generic parameter notation θ
will translate into various lists of parameters depending on the parametrisation or model
H, which could therefore be written in cumbersome notation as Hm(θm).
Many experimental analyses of such data concern themselves with finding the best
parametrisation, i.e. both a choice or selection of theoretical parametrisations containing
free parameters θ, as well as finding the particular set of parameter values θ∗ which
supposedly best reproduces the measured data. This is often done in terms of minimising a
χ2 criterion, p-values etc. Comparison of different models is then carried out by comparing
respective χ2 divided by the “degrees of freedom”, usually taken as the number of data
points minus the number of free parameters.
The Bayesian approach has a ready and more rigorous answer for both model compar-
ison and for finding “best” parameter values given a particular model choice. As shown
in Section 3.7, Bayesian model comparison would be comparison of posteriors
p(Hm|R) =
∫
dθm p(R|θm,Hm) p(θm|Hm) p(Hm)∑
m p(R|Hm) p(Hm)
(6.2.1)
for different models Hm, Hm′ , . . .. The denominator requires evaluation of all competing
models simultaneously. As already shown in Section 3.7, a shorter but less complete
analysis can be done with Bayes Factors, since taking ratios p(Hm|R)/p(Hm′ |R) cancels
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out the denominators
∑
m p(R|Hm) p(Hm). In the notation of the present section, the
Bayes Factor comparing model hypotheses Hm and Hm′ reads
Bmm′ = log
p(R|Hm)
p(R|Hm′) = log
∫
dθm p(R|θm,Hm) p(θm|Hm)∫
dθm′ p(R|θm′ ,Hm′) p(θm′ |Hm′)
= hm′ − hm
(6.2.2)
with hm = − log p(R|Hm) the negative log evidence. A Bayes factor larger than 0 favours
Hm over Hm′ and vice versa. Put differently, the “better” model will have the smaller h.
The integrals in (6.2.2) may be hard or impossible to calculate analytically, but for-
tunately accurate answers can be found in many cases with the help of the method of
Maximum Likelihood or Laplace’s Method as set out in Section 3.4. Below, we present
two related methods both based on this. Method A, published in de Kock et al. (2011a), is
based on gaussians for both the likelihood and the prior, while Method B assigns Cauchy
distributions to parameter priors. For the sake of readability, we shorten the notation for
the likelihood p(R |θm,Hm) to L(θm) or even L(θ).
6.2.1 Method A: Gaussian likelihoods, gaussian priors
Assuming independence of measurements (in this case the pion pair relative momenta),
the integrand (likelihood)×(prior) becomes strongly peaked at a particular point θ˜m in
the model parameter space, so that it can be expanded locally around the maximum
L(θm) p(θm |Hm) ' L(θ˜m) p(θ˜m |Hm) exp
[
−1
2
(θm − θ˜m)A−1m (θm − θ˜m)
]
(6.2.3)
where A−1m is the Hessian of the expansion
(A−1m )ij = −
∂2 log[L(θm) p(θm |Hm)]
∂θmi ∂θmj
∣∣∣∣
θm=θ˜m
(6.2.4)
and Am is the parameter covariance matrix. As more data is accumulated, the peak
narrows so that we can neglect the fact that parameters may have finite ranges and take
the limits to infinity. Integrating (6.2.3) over R, one obtains Laplace’s result see Tierney
et al. (1986) and Bleistein and Handelsman (1986),
p(R|Hm) =
+∞∫
−∞
dθm L(θm) p(θm |Hm) ' L(θ˜m) p(θ˜m |Hm)
√
(2pi)Nm detAm , (6.2.5)
with Nm the number of parameters in θm. The negative log evidence for model Hm
therefore neatly splits into
hm = − log p(R|Hm) = L+ F + P,
L = − logL(θ˜m) the maximum likelihood contribution,
F = −12 log[(2pi)Nm detAm] the determinant’s contribution,
P = − log p(θ˜m|Hm) the prior contribution,
(6.2.6)
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whereby the difference with the usual maximum likelihood methods is also immediately ap-
parent: the P - and F -contributions are not part of the non-Bayesian Maximum Likelihood
repertoire. As we will see below, the contributions of P and F are, in fact, comparatively
small for the specific L3 data set at hand, but of course this does not imply it will always
be so.
6.2.2 Method B: Gaussian likelihoods, Cauchy priors
Method A as published in de Kock et al. (2011a) in our view already represents progress
towards an approximation that is consistent with the Bayesian approach in that priors
are taken seriously while still permitting analytical calculations. However, this requires
us to specify these priors, which is far from easy. If we have pertinent information which
determines the prior form and numerical values for its metaparameters, that is fine, but it
may be hard to translate into mathematical form. The approach hence taken in de Kock
et al. (2011a) was to assign Gaussians to p(θ˜m|Hm) with width parameters determined
from one of the available L3 data points and using the rest for the likelihood. While
consistent, this hardly represents a full and final answer to the question of assigning or
determining priors.
Method B is an attempt to improve on this situation in two ways, namely in setting
priors that are as uninformative as possible, and secondly in doing a linear transform,
where possible, to a parameter set with smaller correlations.
We deal first with the linear transform, starting again with the Laplace approximation
but for the likelihood only. As in Section 3.4, we maximise only the likelihood
∂
∂θb
logL(θ) = 0 ∀ b, (6.2.7)
and label the solution as θ∗. The likelihood is then approximately
L(θm) ' L(θ∗m) exp
[
−1
2
(θm − θ∗m)H−1m (θm − θ∗m)
]
, (6.2.8)
with the Hessian
(H−1m )ij = −
∂2 logL(θm)
∂θmi ∂θmj
∣∣∣∣
θm=θ∗m
. (6.2.9)
Assuming our Hessian matrix is non-negative definite (part of our well-conditioned as-
sumption), we make the orthogonal transformation,
θm − θ∗m = Bθ′m, (6.2.10)
so that
L[θm] = L[θ
∗
m] exp
[
−1
2
θ′m I θ
′
m
]
|B| (6.2.11)
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where H−1m = BBT , I is the identity matrix and |B| is the absolute value of the deter-
minant of the matrix. Using the fact that,
|B| =
√
|BBT | =
√
H−1m = |Hm|−1/2 , (6.2.12)
we get
L[θ] ' L[θ
∗]√|Hm| exp
[
−1
2
θ′mθ
′
m
]
. (6.2.13)
Next, we consider again the question of priors. Barring any width-reducing information,
the most satisfactory prior would be one which least prejudices the results i.e. is as wide
as possible, and so the use of improper priors of the type suggested in Section 5.6 seems
the obvious answer. We cannot, however, use improper priors in calculating p(R|Hm) and
p(R|Hm′) in (6.2.2) since they represent different models with different parameter sets
and therefore different evidence constants which therefore do not cancel.
Use of Laplace’s method above has reduced our model to that of a Gaussian with known
variance, which is determined directly by the parametrisation, but unknown location. We
can therefore view all our parameters as unknown locations which, as shown in Section
5.6, motivates the use of the Cauchy prior1
p(θb|β,H) = β
pi
(
β2 + θ2b
) , (6.2.14)
and since we have standardised the likelihood gaussian in (6.2.11), we should also pick the
standardised prior distribution. Hence we choose
p(θ′|H) =
Nm∏
j=1
1
pi(1 + θ′j
2)
. (6.2.15)
Putting together all the pieces, the evidence for model Hm in the Laplace approximation
becomes
p(R|Hm) =
+∞∫
−∞
dθ′m L(θ
′
m) p(θ
′
m |Hm)
' L(θ
∗
m)√|Hm|
(
1√
pi
U
[
1/2
1/2
∣∣∣∣1/2
])Nm
.
(6.2.16)
This is a very general result as it is applicable any time the maximum likelihood solution,
is well conditioned and is usually presented as the negative logarithm of the evidence,
hm = − log p(R|Hm) = − logL(θ∗) + 12 log |Hm|+Nm · (0.647874 . . . )
= L+D + C
(6.2.17)
with L again the maximum likelihood contribution as before, D the determinant, and C
a linear function of the number of parameters Nm.
1One could argue in the reverse direction, saying that the motivation for approximating likelihoods
with Gaussian distributions is the fact that this eases the burden of choosing prior distributions!
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6.2.3 Parametrisations
If raw data in the form of the complete sample of pion pair four-momentum differences
would be available, it would be possible to derive relations between this sample and
parametrisations. For the moment, we limit ourselves to the typical case where only
binned data of the above form is provided which we treat as a histogram n = {nb}Bb=1
with
∑
b nb = n over bin midpoints Q = {Qb}. The most general “parametrisation” of
the histogram contents is then the multinomial
p(n |ρ, n) = n!
B∏
b=1
ρnbb
nb!
, (6.2.18)
which on use of the Stirling approximation becomes, up to a normalisation constant,
p(n |ρ, n) = c · exp
[
−
∑
b
nb ln
nb
nρb
]
. (6.2.19)
Expanding the free parameters ρ around the measured data n and truncating
p(n |ρ, n) = c · exp
[
−
∑
b
(
(nρb − nb)2
2nb
− (nρb − nb)
3
3n2b
+ . . .
)]
' c · exp
[
−1
2
∑
b
(nρb − nb)2
nb
]
,
(6.2.20)
we can identify the multinomial quantities with the measured correlation functions at mid-
bin points Qb by setting
2 nb → I R2(Qb), C =
∑
bR2(Qb), and n → I C. The nb in the
denominator is almost equal to the measured bin variances nb ' σ2(nb) = I2 σ2(R2(Qb))
so that the quadratic term is
(nρb − nb)2
2nb
' [R2(Qb)− f(Qb |θm)]
2
2σ(R2(Qb))2
, (6.2.21)
where nρb/I → f(Qb |θm), which includes all the constants, is the unnormalised parametri-
sation for R2(Q) in common use, sampled at bin midpoints Qb, and σb = σ(R2(Qb)) are the
standard errors provided by L3. On normalising, the likelihood is therefore the Gaussian
L(θm) = p(R|θm,Q,σ,Hm) =
∏
b
1√
2piσb
exp
[
− [Rb − f(Qb|θ)]2
2σ2b
]
. (6.2.22)
This particular form of the likelihood unquestioningly assumes that the statistical errors
σ = {σb} experimentally specified in Column 3 of the table are given; a more sophisticated
analysis would consider these errors too.
6.2.4 Preliminary results for L3 data
The parametrisations f(Q|θ), shown in Table 6.2 that we are going to investigate are
rather simple and not intended to exhaust the possibilities but only to illustrate the issues
that we raised above. This is the same list as can be found in de Kock et al. (2011a).
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 list the negative log evidences hm as calculated with Method A
2I is an arbitrary large integer to ensure that I R2(Qb) is an integer. As it eventually cancels out, its
size is immaterial.
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Model Name Nm Parametrisation f(Q|θ)
HG Gaussian 4 γ(1 + Q)
(
1 + λe−(rQ)2
)
HSE Stretched Exponential 5 γ(1 + Q)
(
1 + λe−(rQ)α
)
HT Simplified τ Model 5 γ(1 + Q)
(
1 + λe−(rQ)2α cos
[
tan(αpi/2)(rQ)2α
])
HL1 1st-order Le´vy poly. 5 γ
(
1 + λe−(rQ)α [1 + c1L1(Q|α, r)]
)
HL3 3rd-order Le´vy poly. 6 γ
(
1 + λe−(rQ)α [1 + c1L1(Q|α, r) + c3L3(Q|α, r)]
)
HD1 1st-order Derivative 5 γ
(
1 + λe−(rQ)α + c1 ddQe
−(rQ)α
)
HD3 3rd-order Derivative 6 γ
(
1 + λe−(rQ)α + c1 ddQe
−(rQ)α + c3 d
3
dQ3
e−(rQ)α
)
Table 6.2: List of parametrisations applied to L3 data.
and Method B respectively. The contributions L = − logL(θ∗m) are the same for both
methods. The determinant part D = −12 log |Hm| is affected by the prior distribution as
we can see by comparing the methods: the greater width of the Cauchy prior increases
the contribution of the determinant for all the models. The prior part P in Method A
obviously also depends on the prior. Because the results of the two methods are similar,
it increases our confidence in the stability of our answer and indicates that the results are
not that sensitive to the specific procedure of constructing the priors as long as it treats
all models fairly.
The idea, as stated in (6.2.2), is to compare any two models by taking the difference
in negative log likelihoods Bmm′ = hm′ − hm, so that HD3 “wins” in the present contest.
From Table 6.4 we can conclude that the odds for HD3 over HD1 is e2 ≈ 7 : 1. Unlike
the conventional χ2, which was shown by Jaynes (2003) and others to be very inaccu-
rate for “bad” parametrisations with large χ2, the numbers can be trusted even for bad
parametrisations.
The main conclusion of this exercise is that the log likelihood L dominates the overall
hm, but since all L values are large but similar in size, the determinant contributions may
actually determine the final ranking.
Comparing our gauss-Cauchy Method B to similar information criteria in the literature
by Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978),
Akaike: log p(R|H) ≈ logL[θ∗]−B
Schwarz: log p(R|H) ≈ logL[θ∗]− 1/2B logN
(6.2.23)
we see that these can be understood as approximations to the evidence that we have com-
puted. If all the models have roughly the same parameter space size then the determinants
would be the same and choosing the highest evidence would be equivalent to using the
Akaike Information Criterion. The diagonal entries in the Hessian matrix will all be of
order N (the sample size) thus the determinant will be roughly NB and so the Schwarz
criterion will be asymptotically equivalent. For more information about Bayes Factors see
Kass and Raftery (1995).
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Model L F P Total hm
HG 516.0 22.3 2.5 540.8
HSE 488.7 23.6 -0.3 511.9
HT 440.0 25.6 -2.4 463.3
HL1 438.6 21.0 1.5 461.1
HL3 438.4 28.8 2.6 469.9
HD1 439.4 20.2 2.9 462.4
HD3 434.6 22.0 3.4 459.9
Table 6.3: Negative log likelihoods hm as the sum of contributions L, F and P as defined in
(6.2.6) using Method A.
Model L D C Total hm
HG 516.0 26.0 2.6 544.6
HSE 488.7 28.2 3.2 520.1
HT 440.0 30.3 3.2 473.5
HL1 438.6 25.6 3.2 467.4
HL3 438.4 34.4 3.9 476.7
HD1 440.3 24.5 3.2 468
HD3 434.6 27.5 3.9 466
Table 6.4: Negative log likelihoods hm as the sum of contributions L, D and C as defined in
(6.2.17) using Method B.
6.3 Correlations
Using the Laplace-De Finetti theorem has some consequences, as we now illustrate with
a simple example from Jaynes (1982). Consider the binary case again (4.12.22) and ask
what two trial data (R = 2) can be represented by the LdF form? Setting,
A =
1∫
0
ρ2 f(ρ)dρ C =
1∫
0
(1− ρ)2 f(ρ)dρ. (6.3.1)
we obtain after some algebra
(A− C)2 =
1∫
0
1∫
0
[
ρ21 − (1− ρ1)2
] [
ρ22 − (1− ρ2)2
]
f(ρ1)f(ρ2)dρ1dρ2
=
1∫
0
1∫
0
(4ρ1ρ2 − 2ρ1 − 2ρ2 + 1) f(ρ1)f(ρ2)dρ1dρ2
(6.3.2)
2(A+ C) =
1∫
0
1∫
0
[
ρ21 + (1− ρ1)2 + ρ22 + (1− ρ2)2
]
f(ρ1)f(ρ2)dρ1dρ2
=
1∫
0
1∫
0
[
2ρ21 + 2ρ
2
2 − 2ρ1 − 2ρ2 + 2
]
f(ρ1)f(ρ2)dρ1dρ2,
(6.3.3)
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to find
2(A+ C)− (A− C)2 − 1 = 2
1∫
0
1∫
0
(ρ1 − ρ2)2f(ρ1)f(ρ2)dρ1dρ2 ≥ 0, (6.3.4)
because f(ρ) ≥ 0. Hence we can only generate data sets for which (6.3.4) is non-negative.
In Fig. 6.2 any infinite exchangeable data set must fall into the region between the
parabola and the straight line. Intuitively the right-hand side of (6.3.4) is the correlation
between the outcomes of the first x1 and second trial x2; thus we can only represent non-
negative correlated data sets with the LdF representation. Negative correlation between
trials is thus a sign of finite data sequences.
It is worth making this distinction more vivid: Associate gb with the outcome b and
use the labels gbr for the outcome on trial r as previously. Consider the sum,[
R∑
r=1
(gbr − µ)
]2
=
R∑
r=1
(gbr − µ)2 +
R∑
s,r=1
(gbs − µ)(gbr − µ), (6.3.5)
where µ is the average contribution of a single trial. Summing over all possible gbr we
find the variance of G, in terms of the variance of the single trials σ and the covariance
between single trails φ to be
var(G) = Rσ2 +R(R− 1)φ. (6.3.6)
Since the variance is positive we must have,
φ ≥ − σ
2
R− 1 . (6.3.7)
A correlation coefficient can then be defined as the ratio φσ which in general can vary
between minus one and one, but for infinite exchangeable sequences as this result shows
some of the negative values are excluded. This result can also be interpreted geometrically,
see Diaconis (1977).
6.3.1 Estimation of a correlation parameter
The final example will serve as additional motivation for the Jeffreys-Perks prior. Consider
a data sample given in terms of occupation numbers {n1, n2, n3, n4} in a 2x2 table as in
the Kangaroo Example, where B and L are some arbitrary properties,
L L
B n1 n2
B n3 n4,
which we translate into a Dirichlet posterior with the use of our Jeffrey-Perks prior,
p(ρ|n,H) = (N + 1)! ρ
n1−1/2
1
(n1 − 1/2)!
ρ
n2−1/2
2
(n2 − 1/2)!
ρ
n3−1/2
3
(n3 − 1/2)!
(1− ρ1 − ρ2 − ρ3)n4−1/2
(n4 − 1/2)! . (6.3.8)
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Figure 6.2: Plot of sequences allowed by the Laplace-de Finetti representation.
so that {ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, ρ4} are chances associated with each occupation number. Defining a
correlation parameter as,
φ =
ρ1 + ρ4 − ρ2 − ρ3
2
, (6.3.9)
we can easily estimate it from the posterior,
〈φ〉 =
∫
ρ1 + ρ4 − ρ2 − ρ3
2
p(ρ|n,H)dρ = n1 + n4 − n2 − n3
2(2 +N)
, (6.3.10)
but it is more informative to look at the posterior of φ than just its mean estimate.
Transforming into marginals and correlation parameters,
ρ1 = ρBρL + φ ρ2 = ρBρL − φ
ρ3 = ρBρL − φ ρ4 = ρBρL + φ.
(6.3.11)
In calculating the posterior we will focus on general methods and use a more scenic route
to calculating in the hope that it would make the answer more digestible. First compute
the general generating function where ρ1 + ρ2 + ρ3 + ρ4 = ρ with the attention of setting
ρ equal to one later,
p(ρ|n,H) = (N + 1)! ρ
n1−1/2
1
(n1 − 1/2)!
ρ
n2−1/2
2
(n2 − 1/2)!
ρ
n3−1/2
3
(n3 − 1/2)!
ρ
n4−1/2
4
(n4 − 1/2)! . (6.3.12)
We take the generating function in ρ to µ and in φ to ic. In general for (0,∞) support
we use the Laplace transform and for the support (−∞,∞) we use the Fourier transform.
Hence, for the probabilities we use the Laplace transform and the Fourier transform for
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the correlation parameter.
Φ [µ, ic] =
∞∫
0
p(ρ|H)e−µ(ρ1+ρ2+ρ3+ρ4)+ic(ρ1+ρ4−ρ2−ρ3)dρ
= (N + 1)!
(
µ− ic
2
)−n1−n4−1(
µ+
ic
2
)−n2−n3−1 (6.3.13)
From the integral we see that each of the factors is the generating function of a gamma
distribution and the product is thus the convolution of two gamma distributions,
ρ∫
0
[
e
ic
2
s s
n2+n3−1
(n2 + n3 − 1)!
] [
e
ic
2
(ρ−s) (s− ρ)n1+n4−1
(n1 + n4 − 1)!
]
ds
= e
ic
2
ρ ρ
N+1
(N + 1)!
1F1
[
n2 + n3 + 1
N + 2
∣∣∣∣icρ
] (6.3.14)
and
∞∫
0
e
ic
2
ρ ρ
N+1
(N + 1)!
1F1
[
n2 + n3 + 1
N + 2
∣∣∣∣icρ
]
e−µρdρ =
(
µ− ic
2
)−n1−n4−1(
µ+
ic
2
)−n2−n3−1
.
(6.3.15)
Setting ρ = 1 we have,
Φ [ic] = e
ic
2 1F1
[
n2 + n3 + 1
N + 2
∣∣∣∣ic
]
, (6.3.16)
which can easily be shown to be the Fourier transform of a Beta distribution,
p(φ|n,H) = (N + 1)!(
1/2 − φ)n2+n3(1/2 + φ)n1+n4
(n2 + n3)!(n1 + n4)!
. (6.3.17)
We promised to give some additional arguments for the Jeffreys prior and this is it. Exam-
ine the no data case, n1 = n2 = n3 = n4 = 0: the posterior gives all possible correlations
as equally likely. Contrast this with the Bayes-Laplace prior which states that all data
sequences are equally likely but if you examine the posterior for the correlation parameter
you find,
p(φ|H) = 3! (1/2 − φ) (1/2 + φ) . (6.3.18)
Thus the Jeffreys-Perks takes all correlations as equally likely which we prefer over all
data sequences equally likely.
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Chapter 7
Assigning probabilities for
exchangeable sequences
This chapter will be a repeat of Chapter 4, trying to answer the question of how to assign
probabilities. Assuming exchangeability will basically change our evidence assignment
from formulae of Maxwell-Boltzmann to those resembling the corresponding Bose-
Einstein and Fermi-Dirac statistics. In the Bose-Einstein case this is equivalent to
using Laplace’s rule of succession to assign probabilities and Von Mises’s idea of relative
frequency. While we will again follow the methodology of Khinchin (1960) and use the
Darwin-Fowler method, a subtlety arises in that we are forced to switch to the grand
canonical ensemble by introducing a prior for R to keep the mathematics sane. While the
mathematical answer is well-known, the route taken in this chapter seems to be a new
idea to base entropy on exchangeability; see Jaynes (1986).
This chapter is organised as follows:
• In Section 7.1 we derive the rule of succession which is a generalisation of the Prin-
ciple of Insufficient Reason.
• In Section 7.2 we introduce the prior distribution for R, the total number of trials.
• In Section 4.7 we started from a set of logical independent prior probabilities ρ which
we then updated to a set of posterior probabilities ρ′ after imposing a constraint
δ(G−∑ gbrB). In Section 7.3 below, we will do the same but within the wider class
of exchangeability.
• Section 7.4 contains the calculation of the exact predictions for exchangeable trials
in terms of the structure function.
• Section 7.5 applies the saddlepoint approximation to our structure function for ex-
changeable trials.
• In Section 7.6 we reconsider the Principle of Relative Entropy and thereby find a
new distance measure.
95
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• In Section 7.7 we solve a few simple examples.
• Section 7.8 introduces the opposite case of finite populations.
• In Section 7.9 we introduce the corresponding prior distributions for the number of
trials.
• In Section 7.10 we define the relevant structure and partition functions.
• Section 7.11 is the calculation of the predictions for finite trials in terms of the
structure function.
• Section 7.12 applies the saddlepoint approximation to our structure function for
finite trials.
• In Section 7.13 we reconsider the Principle of Relative Entropy which leads us to a
second entropy measure for finite populations.
• In Section 7.14 we again solve some simple example problems.
For orientation, we once again start with the key set of Bayesian equations. Essentially
repeating Eqs. (5.6.1)–(5.6.3) but having already taken the limit mb/M → ρb, the evidence
p(n|a,H) for data n, posterior p(ρ|n,a,H) for Bernoulli probabilities ρ and prediction
p(r|n,H) for future counts r, given the data, are
p(n|a,H) =
∫
A(ρ)
dρ p(n|ρ,a,H) p(ρ|a,H), (7.0.1)
p(ρ|n,a,H) = 1
p(n|a,H)p(n|ρ,a,H) p(ρ|a,H), (7.0.2)
p(r|n,a,H) =
∫
A(ρ)
dρ p(r|n,ρ,H) p(ρ|n,a,H), (7.0.3)
where A(ρ) is the B-dimensional simple 0 ≤ ρb ≤ 1,
∑
b ρb = 1.
7.1 Laplace’s rule of succession for exchangeable sequences
A prediction of future counts based on past counts is called Laplace’s rule of succession.
We have shown that for exchangeable sequences two different approaches lead to a negative
hypergeometric evidence,
Neg. Hypergeometric[n|a] = Hypergeometric[n|m] ∧Neg. Hypergeometric[m|a]
(7.1.1)
or
Neg. Hypergeometric[n|a] = Multinomial[n|ρ] ∧Dirichlet[ρ|a], (7.1.2)
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where we write ∧ for a mixture i.e. we sum or integrate out the shared variable. As
the two viewpoints are completely equivalent because they assign the same evidence to
all data sequences, we will adopt the second approach, based on the Laplace-de-Finetti
theorem with a Dirichlet prior
p(ρ|a,H) = Γ[∑bab]∏
b
ρab−1b
Γ[ab]
, (7.1.3)
which together with a multinomial likelihood was shown in (5.5.18) also to result in the
stated negative hypergeometric evidence, which in the present notation reads
p(n|a,H) =
∫
dρ
[
N !
∏
b
ρnbb
nb!
][
Γ[A]
∏
b
ρab−1b
Γ[ab]
]
=
(−A
N
)−1∏
b
(−ab
nb
)
. (7.1.4)
As argued in Section 5.6, there are essentially three defensible choices for the metaparam-
eter prior p(a|H), all three of which are special cases of the Dirichlet prior, namely the
uniform Bayes-Laplace prior with ab = 1 ∀ b, the Jaynes-Haldane prior (5.6.12) with ab = 0
and the Jeffreys-Perks prior (5.6.21) with ab =
1/2. In our view, the Bayes-Laplace prior is
suboptimal since it is “too informative”, while the Jaynes-Haldane prior is improper and
therefore unusable in those cases where the evidence needs to be calculated. We hence
make the fixed choice of a Jeffreys-Perks prior a = {1/2, . . . , 1/2},
p(ρ|H) = Γ
[
B
2
]∏
b
ρ
−1/2
b
Γ[1/2]
=
[(B/2)− 1]!
piB/2
∏
b
ρ
−1/2
b (7.1.5)
throughout this chapter, and will correspondingly stop explicitly specifying a in the no-
tation. The resulting posterior is
p(ρ|n,H) = (N +B/2− 1)!
∏
b
ρ
nb−1/2
b
(nb − 1/2)! . (7.1.6)
The probability assigned to a future set of counts r
p(r|ρ,H) = R!
∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
(7.1.7)
combined with our posterior gives us, as we already know, a negative hypergeometric
distribution for the prediction r of R future trials
p(r|n, R,H) =
(
N +B/2 +R− 1
R
)−1∏
b
(
rb + nb − 1/2
rb
)
. (7.1.8)
When predicting a single future trial R=1, only one of the B occupation numbers rb can
be nonzero. The single-trial prediction for this count to be in bin b is
p(rb = 1|R = 1,n,H) = nb +
1/2
N + 1/2B
, (7.1.9)
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which is the generalised Laplace’s rule of succession, see also Jaynes (2003). It is
equivalent to Von Mises’s idea of assigning predictive probabilities equal to their relative
frequency. Compare this to the original rule of succession of Laplace (1812)
p(rb = 1|R = 1,n) = nb + 1
N + 2
, (7.1.10)
who derived it using the uniform Bayes-Laplace prior. (For a history of the rule of succes-
sion see Zabell (1989).) To clarify the generalised rule of succession we investigate its large
data limit N  B,R. Multiplying and dividing (7.1.8) by (N + 1/2B)R =
∏
b(N +
1/2B)
rb ,
we define
p(r|n, R,H) = C
∏
b
Fb (7.1.11)
and setting ρb = (nb +
1/2)/(N +
1/2B), the factors converge with the help of (2.1.18) to
Fb = lim
NB,R
1
(N + 1/2B)rb
(
rb + nb − 1/2
rb
)
= lim
NB
1
rb!
(
nb +
1/2
N + 1/2B
)(
nb +
1/2 + 1
N + 1/2B
)
. . .
(
nb + rb − 1/2
N + 1/2B
)
=
ρrbb
rb!
,
C = lim
NB
(N + 1/2B)
R
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)−1
= R!
(7.1.12)
so that we recover the logically independent answer
lim
NB,R
p(r|n, R,H) = R!
B∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
. (7.1.13)
ie we have seen many counts we can assign exact probabilities to a specific outcome and we
are back to our logical independence assumption. The other limit is the large prediction
limit, where R N while keeping ρ′b = rbR fixed. Proceeding in the same way, we multiply
and divide by RN−1/2B =
∏
bR
nb−1/2rb ,
1
Rnb−1/2
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
=
1
(nb − 1/2)!
(
rb + 1
R
)(
rb + 2
R
)
. . .
(
nb + rb +
1/2
R
)
, (7.1.14)
so that
1
Rnb−1/2
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
→ ρ
′
b
nb−1/2
(nb − 1/2)!
RN−
1/2B
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)−1
→ (N +
1/2B − 1)!
R
(7.1.15)
or
lim
RN,B
p(r|R,n,H) = (N + 1/2B − 1)!
∏
b
ρ′b
nb−1/2
(nb − 1/2)! , (7.1.16)
a Dirichlet distribution. This shows again that the prior distribution is equal to the large
prediction limit and the large data limit gives the likelihood function.
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7.2 Outcome space and prediction for variable R
Using Laplace’s rule of succession to change constraints into models requires us to change
our procedure slightly. The method followed below is based on Khinchin (1960), but we
must point out that our formulas are different and our interpretation is very different.
The first change is to consider the number of predicted trials R as a variable, possibly
with an additional constraint like in the Maximum Entropy formalism. This change is
basically forced upon us because there does not seem to be a corresponding multinomial
theorem for the negative hypergeometric distribution. As we have seen in physics terms,
this implies switching to a Grand Canonical Ensemble. The prior we shall use is a Gen-
eralised Negative Binomial for R which depends not on the detailed occupation numbers
n but only on their sum N =
∑
b nb,
p(R|n, θ,H) = p(R|N, θ,H) =
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)
θN+
1/2B(1− θ)R. (7.2.1)
It is a negative binomial rather than a negative multinomial since there is only one meta-
parameter θ. Combining with the rule of succession we find
p(r|n, θ,H) =
B∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
θnb+
1/2(1− θ)rb (7.2.2)
= p(r|R,n, θ,H)p(R|n, θ,H). (7.2.3)
The motivation for choosing a generalised negative binomial prior is that if we use Fisher’s
artifice on a set of negative binomial distributions,
p(R, r|n, θ,H) = p(R|r,H) p(r|n, θ,H) = δ(R−∑brb) B∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
θnb+
1/2(1− θ)rb ,
(7.2.4)
then the total R would be distributed like our prior again,
p(R|n, θ,H) =
∑
U(r)
p(R, r|n, θ,H) =
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)
θN+
1/2B(1− θ)R, (7.2.5)
and if we condition on it, we recover our negative hypergeometric distribution
p(r|R,n, θ,H) = p(R, r|n, θ,H)
p(R|n, θ,H) =
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)−1 B∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
. (7.2.6)
The parameter θ is connected to the importance we assign to the past and the future: for
example, the expected number of counts of our prior is,
〈R〉 =
∑
R
Rp(R|N, θ,H) = (N + 1/2B)
(
1− θ
θ
)
, (7.2.7)
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so here we will make a definite choice to weight our predictions and prior equally by
choosing θ = 1/2, so that (7.2.1) and (7.2.2) become
p(R|n, 1/2,H) = p(R|N, 1/2,H) =
(
N +R+ 1/2B − 1
R
)
2−N−R−
1/2B (7.2.8)
p(r|n, 1/2,H) =
B∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
2−nb−rb−
1/2 . (7.2.9)
We can also connect this construction with the Poisson distribution we derived in Section
4.13, by simply adding a prior distribution. The logically independent assignment can be
written as (4.13.15)
p(r|s,H) =
∏
b
e−sb
srbb
rb!
, (7.2.10)
and the uncertainty in the source strength can be modelled with a Gamma prior on each
bin,
p(s|n,H) =
∏
b
e−sb
s
nb−1/2
b
(nb − 1/2)! (7.2.11)
So that marginalising out the s, we recover (7.2.9),
p(r|n,H) =
∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
2−nb−rb−
1/2 . (7.2.12)
The fact that a negative binomial can be decomposed into a Poisson-Gamma mixture was
first used by Greenwood and Yule (1920). The formulation also implies that systems in
general look like a collection of Planck Oscillators (4.12.16).
7.3 Constraints for exchangeable trials
This section essentially repeats the derivations of Section 4.7, comparing and contrasting
what happens when the premise of logical independence is replaced by exchangeability.
Adding constraints for G and for R to our product of oscillators (7.2.9), the joint proba-
bility is
p(R,G, r|n,H) = p(R|r,H)p(G|r,H)p(r|n,H)
= δ (G−∑bgbrb) δ (R−∑brb)∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
2−nb−rb−
1/2 ,
(7.3.1)
where again we suppress g in the notation, considering it to be part of the background
knowledge base H. In order to marginalise over r to find the evidence
p(R,G|H) =
∑
U [r]
p(R,G, r|H), (7.3.2)
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it is is easier to compute the joint moment generating function (G → λ, R → µ) first as
we did in (4.7.10), remembering R =
∑
b rb and G =
∑
b gbrb
Φ[µ, λ | p(R,G, r|n,H)] =
∑
U(r)
p(R,G, r|n,H)e−µ
∑
b rb−λ
∑
b gb rb
=
∏
b
(
1/2
1− 1/2e−µ−λgb
)nb+1/2
.
(7.3.3)
Following the nomenclature of Khinchin (1960) we define a “volume”
V = N + 1/2B (7.3.4)
making explicit the large parameter we shall use in the saddlepoint approximation. The
limit V → ∞, often called the “bulk limit”, is in our terminology just the large data
limit N  R which we for the purposes of constructing forward probabilities. From the
generalised rule of succession (7.1.9), we shall take
ρb =
nb +
1/2
N + 1/2B
=
nb +
1/2
V
. (7.3.5)
As in (4.7.12), the structure function Ω[R,G] = p(R,G|n,H) for exchangeable sequences
is the inverse of the generating function,
∑
G,R
Ω [R,G] e−µR−λG = Φ[µ, λ | p(R,G, r|n,H)] (7.3.6)
and defining the partition function as
Z [µ, λ] =
∏
b
(
1/2
1− 1/2e−µ−λgb
)ρb
, (7.3.7)
we have, again in analogy to (4.7.12),
∑
G,R
Ω [R,G] e−µ−λG = Z[µ, λ]V . (7.3.8)
From (7.1.13) it is clear that the updated probabilities would have the same definition as
before
ρ′b =
〈rb|G〉
V
, (7.3.9)
while G/V is again taken to be a constant ratio
G
V
= γ. (7.3.10)
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7.4 Predictions using the exchangeable structure function
Continuing the generalisation, now in parallel with Section 4.8, the definition (4.8.1) of
〈rc|G〉 becomes
〈rc|G〉 =
∑
r
rc
p(r, R,G|H)
p(R,G|H)
=
1
Ω[R,G]
∑
r
rc
B∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
2−nb−rb−
1/2δ (G−∑bgbrb) δ (R−∑brb)
(7.4.1)
and using the identity
r
n+ 1/2
(
n+ r − 1/2
r
)
=
∞∑
k=1
(
r + n− 1/2 − k
r − k
)
(7.4.2)
we obtain
〈rc|G〉 = nc +
1/2
Ω[R,G]
∑
k,r
(
rc + nc − 1/2 − k
nc − k
)
2−nc−rc−
1/2
×
B∏
b6=c
(
nb − 1/2 + rb
rb
)
2−nb−rb−
1/2δ (G−∑bgbrb) δ (R−∑brb) .
(7.4.3)
Relabelling the rc term simplifies the equation of 〈rc|G〉,
〈rc|G〉 = nc +
1/2
Ω[R,G]
∑
k,r
B∏
b
(
nb−1/2+rb
rb
)
2−nb−rb−k−
1/2δ (G− kgc −
∑
bgbrb) δ (R− k −
∑
brb)
(7.4.4)
or, in terms of structure functions and generalising (4.8.3),
ρ′c =
〈rc|G〉
V
= ρc
∞∑
k=1
2−kΩ[R− k,G− kgc]
Ω[R,G]
. (7.4.5)
Similarly we can show that
〈rc|G〉 = V ρc
∞∑
k=1
2−kΩ[R− k,G− kgc]
Ω[R,G]
〈rc, rd|G〉 = V ρcV ρd
∞∑
j,k=1
2−j−kΩ [R− j − k,G− gcj − gdk]
Ω [R,G]
, ∀c 6= d
〈rc(rc − 1)|G〉 = V ρc(V ρc + 1)
∞∑
k=1
(k − 1)2
−kΩ [R− k,G− kgc]
Ω [R,G]
.
(7.4.6)
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7.5 Saddlepoint approximations for exchangeable trials
To approximate the structure function, we must do two saddlepoint calculations simulta-
neously, one for the λ parameter,
− ∂
∂λ
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
ρbgb
2eµ+λgb − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
G
V
= γ (7.5.1)
and one for the µ parameter,
− ∂
∂µ
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
=
∑
b
ρb
2eµ+λgb − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
=
R
V
= 1. (7.5.2)
In general the ratio RV can be chosen to be less than one, but we choose the ratio equal
to one based on symmetry. We wish to use the negative hypergeometric distribution as a
distance function so we cannot weight one vector of counts as more important than the
other.
Solving both these equations simultaneously is the major computational effort that
goes into the approximation. The accuracy of the approximation is then described by the
second derivative around the saddle point,
σλ,λ =
∂2
∂λ2
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
2ρbg
2
be
µ+λgb
(2eµ+λgb − 1)2
> 0
σµ,µ =
∂2
∂µ2
logZ[θ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
2ρbe
µ+λgb
(2eµ+λgb − 1)2
> 0
(7.5.3)
and the covariance between the two
σµ,λ =
∂2
∂µ∂λ
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
2ρbgbe
µ+λgb
(2eµ+λgb − 1)2
. (7.5.4)
The approximation to Ω [R,G] is then, using (2.6.10)
Z [µ∗, λ∗]V eµ∗R+λ∗G
−4pi2
×
i∞∫
−i∞
i∞∫
−i∞
exp
[
V
σµ,µ(µ− µ∗)2 + 2σµ,λ(µ− µ∗)(λ− λ∗) + σλ,λ(λ− λ∗)2
2
]
dµ dλ
' Z [µ
∗, λ∗]V eµ∗R+λ∗G
2piV
√
σµ,µσλ,λ − σ2µ,λ
.
(7.5.5)
Applying this approximation to our three predictions (7.4.6) we find
〈rc|G〉
V
=
ρc
2eµ∗+gcλ∗ − 1 ,
〈rc, rd|G〉
V 2
=
(
ρc
2eµ∗+gcλ∗ − 1
)(
ρd
2eµ∗+gdλ∗ − 1
)
∀c 6= d,
〈rc(rc − 1)|G〉
V 2
=
ρc(ρc + 1)
(2eµ∗+gcλ∗ − 1)2
.
(7.5.6)
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The prediction for the next trial would be,
ρ′c =
〈rc|G〉
V
=
ρc
2eµ∗+gcλ∗ − 1 , (7.5.7)
which from equation (7.5.2) will sum to one and from equation (7.5.1) have the correct
mean γ.
7.6 Reconsidering relative entropy
Again we seek an entropy function to maximize. First we try to find the most probable
set of counts r∗b . Applying the discrete difference operator ∇ to our product of oscillators,
∇rc log
[∏
b
(
nb + rb − 1/2
rb
)
2−rb−nb−
1/2e−µrb−λgbrb
]
= 0 ∀ c, (7.6.1)
the resulting set of formulas are
log
(
nb + rb − 1/2
2rb
)
− gbλ− µ = 0 ∀c (7.6.2)
and solving, we obtain
r∗b =
V ρb − 1/2
2eµ∗+gbλ∗ − 1 , (7.6.3)
so for small V the most probable and mean values do not coincide, but the difference
decreases as we increase V .
For a generalised principle of Maximum Entropy we first apply Stirling’s approximation
directly to the product to find
H[ρ′||ρ] =
∑
b
[
−ρb log
(
ρ′b + ρb
2ρb
)
− ρ′b log
(
ρ′b + ρb
2ρ′b
)]
, (7.6.4)
which we call a Bose-Einstein Divergence. From the inequality − log x ≥ 1 − x with
equality if and only if x = 1, we have,
∑
b
[
−ρb log
(
ρ′b + ρb
2ρb
)
− ρ′b log
(
ρ′b + ρb
2ρ′b
)]
≥
∑
b
[
ρb − ρ
′
b + ρb
2
+ ρ′b −
ρ′b + ρb
2
]
= 0,
(7.6.5)
so that the Bose-Einstein divergence is always positive and will be zero if and only if
ρb = ρ
′
b. This is our new entropy function which would be maximised to construct models
corresponding to exchangeable trials with an ignorance prior. It seems to be an improve-
ment over the Maxwell-Boltzmann (Kullback-Leibler) divergence because it is more general
and it is symmetric in its arguments.
We now show that the Bose-Einstein Divergence is a convex function but not a distance
(norm). Note that f [t] = t log t is a strictly convex function, since f ′′[t] = 1t for all positive
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t and rewriting Jensen’s inequality as formulated in Cover and Thomas (2012) for convex
functions f
∑
j
wjf(xj) ≥ f
∑
j
wjxj
 , xj ≥ 0, ∑
j
wj = 1, (7.6.6)
with λ′ = 1− λ and
w =
{
λ(ρ+ f)
λ(ρ+ f) + λ′(ρ′ + f ′)
,
λ′(ρ′ + f ′)
λ(ρ+ f) + λ′(ρ′ + f ′)
}
x =
{
ρ
2(ρ+ f)
,
ρ′
2(ρ′ + f ′)
}
or
{
f
2(ρ+ f)
,
f ′
2(ρ′ + f ′)
} (7.6.7)
gives us(
λρ+ λ′ρ′
)
log
λρ+ λ′ρ′
λ(ρ+ f) + λ′(ρ′ + f ′)
+
(
λf + λ′f ′
)
log
λf + λ′f ′
λ(ρ+ f) + λ′(ρ′ + f ′)
≤ λp log λp
λ(p+ f)
+ λf log
λf
λ(p+ f)
+ λ′p′ log
λ′p′
λ′(p′ + f ′)
+ λ′f ′ log
λ′f ′
λ′(p′ + f ′)
,
(7.6.8)
after multiplying with λ(ρ+ f) +λ′(ρ′+ f ′). Replacing ρ, ρ′, f, f ′ with ρb, ρ′b, fb, f
′
b respec-
tively and summing over all b we have
H
[
λρ+ (1− λ)ρ′||λf + (1− λ)f ′] ≤ λH [ρ||f ] + (1− λ)H [ρ′||f ′] . (7.6.9)
So the Bose-Einstein divergence is a convex function in the pair {ρ, f}, but it is still not
a distance between distributions as it does not satisfy the triangle inequality as a simple
counter example will show: Take,
f0 =
{
1
2
,
1
2
}
f1 =
{
1
3
,
2
3
}
f2 =
{
1
6
,
5
6
}
, (7.6.10)
then
H[f0||f1] ≈ 0.0287252 H[f1||f2] ≈ 0.0375949 H[f2||f0] ≈ 0.12932, (7.6.11)
i.e. it is shorter to go from f0 to f2 via f1 than to go directly from f0 to f2.
7.7 Examples
Consider again first the Planck oscillator ρb = const., gb = b = 0, 1, 2, . . . , so that the
partition function
logZ[µ, λ] = const.
∞∑
b=0
log
1/2
1− 1/2e−µ−gbλ (7.7.1)
is approximated with the two saddlepoint approximations,
− d
dµ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
=
∞∑
b=0
1
2eµ−bλ − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
≈ − log
[
1− 1/2e−µ∗
]
λ∗
= 1
− d
dλ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
∞∑
b=0
b
2eµ−bλ − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
≈ Li2
[
1/2e
−µ∗]
λ∗2
= γ
(7.7.2)
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where we have replaced the sum over b with a continuous integral to keep the answer
analytical and Lin[x] is the polylogarithm,
Lin[x] =
∞∑
k=1
xk
kn
. (7.7.3)
The Fermi oscillator, secondly, has partition function
Z[µ, λ]V =
(
1/2
1/2 − e−µ
)V/2( 1/2
1/2 − e−µ−λ
)V/2
, (7.7.4)
and inverting we find the structure function
Ω[R,G] = 2−V−R
(
G+ V/2− 1
V/2− 1
)(
V/2 +R−G− 1
V/2− 1
)
R ≥ G. (7.7.5)
Using (7.4.6), our predictions are
ρ′s =
G
V
= γ ρ′f =
R−G
V
= 1− γ. (7.7.6)
Compare this to (4.12.23) which is essentially the same answer.
Thirdly, we return to the Kangaroo example as defined in (4.12.27) and first try to solve
it analytically. Define G1 as the number of blue-eyed kangaroos and G2 as the number of
left-handed kangaroos. The partition function is
Z[µ, λ1, λ2]
V =
[(
2− e−µ) (2− e−µ−λ1)(2− e−µ−λ2)(2− e−µ−λ1−λ2)]−V/4 , (7.7.7)
and after some algebra we find the Kangaroo structure function
Ω [R,G1, G2] = 2
−R−V (−1)R
G1∑
g=0
(−V/4
g
)( −V/4
G1 − g
)( −V/4
G2 −G1 + g
)( −V/4
R− g −G2
)
.
(7.7.8)
Explaining what the structure function is doing is pretty simple. We label the number
of kangaroos of a certain outcome with g specifically (B,L). The constraint on the total
associated with B is G1 thus g cannot exceed G1 and the number of trials in (B,L) must
be G1 − g. The same holds for (B,L) with G2 − G1 − g which must add up to G2. The
last outcome (B,L) must ensure that all the trials add up to R, thus R− g−G2. Each of
these trials is drawn from a negative binomial distribution and the structure function is
then the sum of all possible values of g. If we were to use (7.4.6) the mathematics would
become unwieldy for a problem that is conceptually very simple. So let us take a shortcut
by focusing on the most probable value of g,
0 = ∇g log
(−V/4
g
)( −V/4
G1 − g
)( −V/4
G2 −G1 + g
)( −V/4
R− g −G2
)
2−R−V (−1)R (7.7.9)
= log
( −1 + g +G2 −R
g +G2 −R− V/4
)(−1 + g + V/4
g
)(
1− g +G1
−g +G1 + V/4
)(−1 + g −G1 +G2 + V/4
g −G1 +G2
)
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Figure 7.1: Bose-Einstein divergence (7.6.4) of the Kangaroo example as a function of the corre-
lation (1− x)/4
which for the large V case with x = gV , γ1 =
G1
V , γ2 =
G2
V and V = R results in
0 = 2 log
(
1 + 4x
4x
)
+ log
(
1 +
3
12x− 11
)
+ log
(
1 +
3
12x− 7
)
(7.7.10)
The same equation could have been found by minimising the Bose-Einstein divergence.
Plotting in Figure (7.1) the Bose-Einstein Entropy as a function of (1− x)/4, which is an
indication of the amount of correlation between B and L, we see that the presence of a
constraint on the marginals removes some of the negative correlation as possibilities. In
any case the negative binomial distribution prefers positive correlations as we must allow
for infinite sequences and in infinite sequences there are no negative correlations. Solving
the equation gives us
0 = 144x3 − 108x2 + 7x+ 2, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/3
x = 0.212108.
(7.7.11)
This solution differs from that found with the conventional maximum entropy maximi-
sation, which we previously determined as x = 29 . In fact we expect positive correlation
between two unknown propositions because it is far more likely than independence.
7.8 Finite populations
Having treated the case of infinite populations, we now turn back to the case of finite
populations, which we shall indicate by the use of the symbol F . Consequences of finiteness
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are immediate. The Laplace’s rule of succession, for example, does not hold because if the
population size is known and fixed then the trials must be negatively correlated. Fixing
the population size in each bin nb or V ρb we then add a constraint to the system that
changes the trials rb that we can see. In this case the data consists of us knowing the
populations sizes in each bin.
The hypergeometric prior and likelihood are
p(m|n,F) =
(
N
M
)−1∏
b
(
nb
mb
)
, p(r|R,m,F) =
(
M
R
)−1∏
b
(
mb
rb
)
, (7.8.1)
and the resulting evidence and posterior are
p(r|R,n,F) =
(
N
R
)−1∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
, p(m|R, r,n,F) =
(
N −R
M −R
)−1∏
b
(
nb − rb
mb − rb
)
.
(7.8.2)
R and rb now enter the single-trial prediction with minus signs,
p(rc=1 |R=1,n,F) = nc − rc
N −R , (7.8.3)
which is the opposite of the usual rule of succession: Seeing a particular outcome reduces
the probability of the same outcome happening again. The prediction for general r is
p(r|R,n,F) = 1
N rb
(
nb
rb
)
=
1
rb!
nb
N
nb − 1
N
. . .
nb − rb
N
(7.8.4)
and in the large population limit N →∞ with ρb = nbN gives
1
N rb
(
nb
rb
)
→ ρ
rb
b
rb!
N rb
(
N
R
)−1
→ R!, (7.8.5)
and thus the prediction again reduces to the logical independent limit
lim
N→∞
p(r|R,n,F) = R!
B∏
b
ρrbb
rb!
. (7.8.6)
7.9 Prior distribution for R
As before we must introduce a prior for the number of trials to switch to the Grand Canon-
ical view. In analogy with our previous prior (7.2.1) the obvious choice is a Binomial
distribution,
p(R|N,F) =
(
N
R
)
θR(1− θ)N−R. (7.9.1)
and combining it with the hypergeometric distribution, yields the evidence
p(R, r|n,F) =
∞∑
R=0
p(r|n, R,F)p(R|F) =
∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
θrb(1− θ)nb−rb (7.9.2)
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The motivation for this choice is as before Fisher’s artifice,
p(R, r|n,F) = δ
(
R−
∑
b
rb
)
B∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
θrb(1− θ)nb−rb , (7.9.3)
where the total trials are distributed like the individual trials,
p(R|n,F) =
(
N
R
)
θR(1− θ)N−R (7.9.4)
and if we condition on it we recover our original hypergeometric distribution,
p(r|R,n,F) = p(r|n,F)
p(R|n,F) =
(
N
R
)−1∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
. (7.9.5)
Applying the pinciple of indifference to our Binomial distribtuion we set θ = 1/2,
p(r|R,n,F) =
∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
2−nb . (7.9.6)
Our prior distribution for the amount of trials,
p(R|n,F) =
(
N
R
)
2−N , (7.9.7)
gives us the expected amount of R,
〈R〉 = N
2
. (7.9.8)
We also define ρ′b =
〈rb|G〉
V as before.
7.10 Constraints for finite trials
Adding a constraint for G and a constraint for R,
p(G,R, r|n,F) = δ
(
G−
∑
b
gbrb
)
δ
(
R−
∑
b
rb
)∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
2−nb (7.10.1)
gives us the exponential generating function (G→ λ,R→ µ),
Φ[{µ, λ}, {R,G}|p(G,R, r|n,F)] =
∑
R,G,r
p(R,G, r|n,F)e−µR−λG
=
∏
b
(
1/2 +
1/2e
−µ−λgb
)ab
.
(7.10.2)
The partition function is defined as,
Z[µ, λ] =
(
1/2 +
1/2e
−µ−λgb
)ρb
, (7.10.3)
and with V = N and ρb =
nb
N , we have∑
R,G
Ω[R,G]e−µR−λG = Z[µ, λ]V . (7.10.4)
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7.11 Predictions using the finite structure function
Using the identity
r
n
(
n
r
)
=
∞∑
k=1
−(−1)k
(
a
r − k
)
(7.11.1)
and from the definition of 〈rc|G〉 =
∑
r rcp(r|G,F),
〈rc|G〉 = 1
Ω[R,G]
∑
r
rc
B∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
2−nbδ
(
G−
∑
gbrb
)
δ
(
R−
∑
rb
)
(7.11.2)
=
nc
Ω[R,G]
∑
k,r
−(−1)k
(
nj
rc − k
)
2−nc
B∏
b6=c
(
ab
rb
)
2−nbδ
(
G−
∑
gbrb
)
δ
(
R−
∑
rb
)
(7.11.3)
=
nc
Ω[R,G]
∑
k,r
−(−1)k
B∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
2−rbδ
(
G− kgc −
∑
gbrb
)
δ
(
R− k −
∑
rb
)
,
(7.11.4)
where we relabelled the rc term in the last line. Simplifying the solution we find
〈rj |G〉 = nc
∞∑
k=1
−(−1)kΩ[R− k,G− kgc]
Ω[R,G]
. (7.11.5)
Similarly we can derive,
〈rc|G〉 = nc
∞∑
k=1
−(−1)kΩ[R− k,G− kgc]
Ω[R,G]
〈rc, rd|G〉 = ncnd
∞∑
j=1,k=1
(−1)j+kΩ [R− j − k,G− gcj − gdk]
Ω [R,G]
c 6= d
〈rc(rc − 1)|G〉 = nc(nc − 1)
∞∑
k=1
(k − 1)(−1)kΩ [R− k,G− kgc]
Ω [R,G]
.
(7.11.6)
7.12 Saddlepoint approximation for finite populations
Repeating our saddlepoint method of approximation on the finite population partition
function
− ∂
∂µ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
=
∑
b
ρb
1 + eµ∗+gbλ∗
=
R
V
(7.12.1)
and the other saddle point equation,
− ∂
∂λ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
gbρb
1 + eµ∗+gbλ∗
=
G
V
= γ, (7.12.2)
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the variances are,
σµ,µ =
∂2
∂µ2
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
ρbe
µ+λgb
(1 + eµ+λgb)
2 > 0
σλ,λ =
∂2
∂µ2
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
ρbg
2
be
µ+λgb
(1 + eµ+λgb)
2 > 0
(7.12.3)
and the covariance between the two is
σµ,λ =
d2
dµdλ
logZ [µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗,λ=λ∗
=
∑
b
ρbgbe
µ+λgb
(1 + eµ+λgb)
2 . (7.12.4)
The approximation is then,
Ω [R,G]
=
Z [µ∗, λ∗]V eµ∗R+λ∗G
−4pi2
×
i∞∫
−i∞
i∞∫
−i∞
exp
[
V
σµ,µ(µ− µ∗)2 + 2σµ,λ(µ− µ∗)(λ− λ∗) + σλ,λ(λ− λ∗)2
2
]
dµdλ
=
Z [µ∗, λ∗]V eµ∗R+λ∗G
2piV
√
σµ,µσλ,λ − σ2µ,λ
.
(7.12.5)
Applying the approximation to our predictive formulas (7.11.6) we find,
〈rc|G〉 = V ρc
1 + eµ∗+gcλ∗
〈rc, rd|G〉 = V ρc
1 + eµ∗+gcλ∗
V ρd
1 + eµ∗+gdλ∗
〈rc(rc − 1)|G〉 = ρc (V ρc − 1)
(eµ∗+gcλ∗ + 1)
2 .
(7.12.6)
The prediction for the next trial would be,
Rρ′c = 〈rc|G〉 =
Rρc
1 + eµ
∗+gjλ∗
, (7.12.7)
which from equation (7.12.2) will sum to one and from equation (7.12.1) have the correct
mean.
7.13 Fermi-Dirac entropy
Again we seek an entropy function to maximize. Taking our generalised binomial distri-
bution with θ = 12 and adding a Lagrange multiplier,
p(R,G, r|n,F) =
∏
b
(
nb
rb
)
2−nbe−µrb−λgbrb . (7.13.1)
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Searching for the set of predicted counts r that maximizes the probability is equivalent
to taking the logarithm and examining where the difference in counts, ∇cf(rc) = f(rc)−
f(rc − 1), in counts is zero,[
log
1 + nc − rc
rc
− µ− gcλ
]
δrc = 0. (7.13.2)
Defining the ratios,
ρc =
nc
V
ρ′c =
rc
V
ν =
R
V
, (7.13.3)
the bulk limit becomes ∑
b
[
log
[
ρb
νρ′b
− 1
]
− µ− gbλ
]
δρb = 0. (7.13.4)
Integrating in ρ′b we find,
H
[
ρ′||ρ] = ∑
b
[
−ρ′b log
(
ρb − νρ′b
νρ′b
)
+
ρb
ν
log
(
ρb − νρ′b
ρb
)
− µρ′b − λgbρ′b
]
, (7.13.5)
which we could also have found by applying Stirling’s expansion directly to the generalised
binomial distribution. Thus our new entropy function to construct models with finite
populations,
H
[
ρ′,ρ
]
=
∑
b
[
−ρ′b log
(
ρb − νρ′b
νρ′b
)
+
ρb
ν
log
(
ρb − νρ′b
ρb
)]
(7.13.6)
which we will call the Fermi-Dirac Divergence.
7.14 Examples
Our first example is the Planck Oscillator again: ρb = 1/B, gb = b and b = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
so that the partition function is,
logZ[µ, λ] ∝
∞∑
b=0
log
(
1/2 +
1/2e
−µ−bλ
)
(7.14.1)
and approximating it by solving the saddlepoint equations,
− ∂
∂µ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
µ=µ∗
=
∞∑
b=0
1
1 + eµ∗+bλ∗
≈ log [1 + e
−µ]
λ
= ν
− ∂
∂λ
logZ[µ, λ]
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗
=
∞∑
b=0
b
1 + eµ∗+bλ∗
≈ −Li2 [−e
−µ]
λ2
= γ,
(7.14.2)
where the sum was again approximated with the corresponding integral.
The partition function for the fermi oscillator is: gf = 0 and gs = 1, with ρf =
1/2 and
ρs =
1/2,
Z[µ, λ]V =
(
1/2 +
1/2e
−µ)V/2 (1/2 + 1/2e−µ−λ)V/2 (7.14.3)
= 2−V
(
1 + e−µ
)V/2 (
1 + e−µ−λ
)V/2
(7.14.4)
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and the corresponding structure function is
Ω[R,G] =
(
V/2
G
)(
V/2
R−G
)
2−V G ≤ R ≤ G+ V/2 0 ≤ G ≤ V/2. (7.14.5)
Using (7.11.6) the predictions are,
ρ′s =
G
R
ρ′f =
(R−G)
R
. (7.14.6)
Redoing the Kangaroo example for the third time we have,
Z[µ, λ1, λ2]
V
=
(
1/2 +
1/2e
−µ)V/4 (1/2 + 1/2e−µ−λ1)V/4 (1/2 + 1/2e−µ−λ2)V/4 (1/2 + 1/2e−µ−λ1−λ2)V/4
(7.14.7)
and the structure function,
Ω [R,G1, G2] = 2
−V
G1∑
g=0
(
V/4
g
)(
V/4
G1 − g
)(
V/4
G2 −G1 + g
)(
V/4
R− g −G2
)
. (7.14.8)
The structure function is simply the sum of all the possible configurations that are allowed
by our constraints. Focusing on the most probable value of g gives us,
0 = ∇ log
(
V/4
g
)(
V/4
G1 − g
)(
V/4
G2 −G1 + g
)(
V/4
R− g −G2
)
= log
(
1− g + V/4
g
)(
1− g +G1
g −G1 + V/4
)(
1− g +G1 +G2 + V/4
g −G1 +G2
)(
1− g +G2 +R
g +G2 −R+ V
)
(7.14.9)
and asymptotically with x = gV ν ,γ1 =
G1
V ν , γ2 =
G2
V ν and ν =
1/2,
log
[
(x− γ1)(−1 + x+ γ2)(−1 + 4xν)(−1 + 4xν − 4γ1ν + 4γ2ν)
x(x− γ1 + γ2)(1 + 4xν − 4γ1ν)(1 + 4ν(−1 + x+ γ2))
]
(7.14.10)
Substituting in γ1 =
1
3 , γ2 =
1
3 and ν =
1
2 ,
log
[
(−23 + x)(−13 + x)(−1 + 2x)2
(1 + 2(−23 + x))x2(13 + 2x)
]
(7.14.11)
and solving gives
x = 1/4. (7.14.12)
We plot the Fermi-Dirac divergence in Figure (7.2). In this example we assumed that we
examined half of the kangaroos out of a population that spread uniformly between the
outcomes. Interestingly we find a simple analytical answer which might indicate that we
can solve this example analytically.
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Figure 7.2: Fermi-Dirac entropy of the Kangaroo example as a function of the correlation (1−x)/4
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Chapter 8
Summary and conclusions
We end by providing a topics-based overview.
1. As outlined in the Introduction, the topic of this dissertation was inspired by the dis-
covery of the conceptual and mathematical superiority of the Bayesian approach to
statistical probability and thereby to statistical physics. Reconceptualising probabil-
ity as originating not as a ratio of counts but as a state of knowledge or information
is a fundamental shift that has required us to question, rethink and redefine many
ideas and quantities familiar to physics classrooms and laboratories.
2. With Chapter 2 preparing the way by summarising some of the relevant mathemat-
ical tools and techniques, the framework for knowledge-based probability is outlined
in Chapter 3. The Bayesian concepts of prior, likelihood, evidence and prediction
and the corresponding mathematics together provide the foundation which pervades
the rest of the work.
3. The shift from a counts-based to a knowledge-based view of probability has not
been completed but on the contrary only started. One of the fundamental rethinks
concerns the status of the concept of independence. The Bayesian view is that
the ubiquitous usage of what in physics is called independence does not necessarily
relate to, or rely on, the physical independence of the quantities under scrutiny but
is rather about logical independence, whereby knowledge of one particular answer
gives no clue about the answer to another. Logical independence is equivalent to the
impossibility of learning.
This dissertation is about a secondary shift within this larger context, namely from
logical independence to exchangeability, an attempt to work out the consequences of
replacing the one with the other. Logical independence is defined as the factorisation
of joint probability, while exchangeability is defined by the invariance of probabil-
ity under permutation of its arguments. Clearly, exchangeability includes logical
independence as a special case but is more general.
115
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The central idea developed in this dissertation is that some seemingly arcane cases
of exchangeability beyond logical independence have in fact properties that, while
mathematically challenging, yield not only some relations and results that seem
surprisingly familiar in form (but not in context), but also a bunch of new relations
and properties which are new to us and to the field.
4. To set the scene and define our terms for the independence-exchangeability debate,
the first part of Chapter 4 focuses on conventional logical independence-based prob-
ability, but based not on relative frequency but on information and knowledge. It
sets out the foundations and stages of constructing probability based on determining
the outcome space and Laplace’s Principle of Indifference. We show in some detail
how to project from the primordial outcome space onto partitions (the equivalent of
binnings in experimental physics) and the corresponding change to counts or occupa-
tion numbers. This is done in several ways, including the entirely different approach
of waiting-time and stopping-rule problems. Along the way, it becomes clear that
both the concepts of indistinguishability and occupation numbers are associated not
with independence per se but rather with the wider class of exchangeability.
In Section 4.11 it is shown that the Principle of Maximum Entropy is really a special
case of the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy (also termed the Kullback-Leibler
divergence) and that the latter could therefore apply in cases where Maximum En-
tropy would not.
We have also shown that the usual grand canonical ensemble requires a prior for the
number of trials (the equivalent of particle number in gases) which to our knowledge
has not been mentioned in the literature before.
5. The simplest example of a logically non-independent but exchangeable sequence is
the urn, since the drawing of a ball without replacement changes all the probabilities.
Starting with the resulting hypergeometric distribution, we provide in Chapter 5 two
views or approaches to probabilities for exchangeable sequences.
The first is based on the Po´lya urn generalisation and conjugate priors. In the sec-
ond, we rederive two representation theorems for exchangeable sequences commonly
known as de Finetti’s theorem and the Heath-Sudderth representation. These gives
us a general framework to assign probabilities and construct models which can be
viewed as an equivalent formulation of Bayes’ Theorem.
The statement that the Laplace-De-Finetti theorem is applicable if we do not have
information on the population sizes seems to be a new insight into an old theorem.
6. In Section 5.6, we apply known arguments of stability directly to priors and hence
show how various transformation laws can be used to construct stable priors. For
example, while Jaynes used invariance of a mean to argue that the likelihood should
be a Cauchy distribution, we consider this train of thought to be much more appli-
cable to priors. Normally, such invariance arguments are used to construct forward
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probabilities. We believe they are much better suited to the construction of prior
probabilities. Some other priors derived in this section such as the stable-scale are,
to our knowledge, unknown in the literature.
7. Chapter 7 attempts to follow the steps and logic of the original conventional logical-
independence-based statistical physics, but now based on the exchangeability rela-
tions of Chapter 5. Among many other relations, we derive a generalised entropy
corresponding to the Laplace rule of succession and also an entropy corresponding
to finite sampling. This gives us two additional methods of constructing models and
analysing correlations. The Bose-Einstein divergence and Fermi-Dirac divergence
are the corresponding generalisations of the Kullback-Leibler divergence and there-
fore also of the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy of Chapter 4. We therefore
claim that the Principle of Minimum Relative Entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence)
is not the most general formulation and that Bose-Einstein type statistics follows
from exchangeablity.
8. New analytical results on posteriors for a correlation coefficient under different cir-
cumstances have been relegated to Appendix A because of their high degree of math-
ematical complexity. We there also derived three different entropies or methods to
construct models for them.
9. Examples of various insights and relations are given throughout the dissertation, e.g.
certain statistics combined with fixed “energy” levels. In some cases these models
are not independent of the prior distribution and the examples lead to a whole set
of general families of distributions.
Many of these little examples are mere hints at what can be done with the formalism
and structure developed and are far from complete. At the moment, they are on the
level of mathematical proof of concept; physical applications will follow wherever
equivalents of these mathematical quantities appear in physics.
The application in Section 6.2 of Bayes Factors to high energy physics data obtained
from the L3 Collaboration is the one exception where real data is analysed. In this
dissertation, we have improved on the approach of our conference proceedings in
de Kock et al. (2011a) by introducing Cauchy priors. This attempt to automate the
use of Bayes Factors by assigning Cauchy priors to each parameter differs from what
is found in the literature and we believe it is an improvement.
Both the proceedings and the analysis in this section are about understanding the
workings of Bayes Factors, priors and the relation to conventional minimum-χ2 fit-
ting, showing how both χ2 and Maximum Likelihood also naturally fit into the
Bayesian framework, while missing the contributions of the determinants and the
automatic Bayes “Occam’s penalty” for introducing extra parameters.
10. Logical independence or, as it is usually understood, physical or statistical indepen-
dence has proven a hugely successful premise for physics. Whether the expansion
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to exchangeability will do the same remains to be seen. But there are enough in-
teresting examples and there is enough mathematical analogy in exchangeability to
warrant the hope that the physical applications will follow. For example, interpre-
tation of the “sampling without replacement” methodology within the urn analogy
in terms of physics and physical experiments is as yet unclear. We do not doubt,
however, that interpretations and applications will be found in time.
In conclusion, a simple extension from logical independence to exchangeability has
proven to have many consequences. The success of logical independence has been put into
a new context and its limitations highlighted. The extensions based on exchangeability
are fundamental, wide-ranging and exciting.
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Appendix A
Hypergeometric functions
We shall find the hypergeometric function useful specifically the Gaussian hypergeometric
function, which is defined as
2F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
∞∑
n=0
anbn
cn
xn
n!
= 1 +
ab
c
x+
a(a+ 1)b(b+ 1)
c(c+ 1)2!
x2 + . . . (A.0.1)
see Exton (1976) and similarly,
1F1
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
∞∑
n=0
an
cn
xn
n!
0F1
[
−
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
∞∑
n=0
1
cn
xn
n!
. (A.0.2)
The subscripts refer to the number of terms in the numerators and denominator and
obviously 2F1 [a, b; c, x] = 2F1 [b, a; c, x]. The functions is not defined for negative values of
c and the sum terminates for non-positive integer values of a. When the sum is infinite it
converges if |x| < 1 and diverges if |x| > 1. It can be represented by an Eulerian integral,
2F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
(c− 1)!
(a− 1)!(c− a− 1)!
1∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1(1− xu)−bdu, (A.0.3)
where c > a > 0. Furthermore, the integral A.0.3 remains unchanged in form under the
transformations,
u = 1− v, u = v/(1− x− vx) and u = (1− u)/(1− vx) (A.0.4)
and we have the Euler transformations,
2F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
= (1− x)−a2F1
[
a, c− b
c
∣∣∣∣ xx− 1
]
= (1− x)−b2F1
[
c− a, b
c
∣∣∣∣ xx− 1
]
= (1− x)c−a−b2F1
[
c− a, c− b
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
.
(A.0.5)
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The incomplete beta function can also be expressed as a Gauss function (0 < z < 1),
z∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1du = z
a
a
2F1
[
a, 1− c+ a
1 + a
∣∣∣∣ z
]
. (A.0.6)
The hypergeometric function is also a Laplace transform,
2F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣ ks
]
=
sb
(b− 1)!
∞∫
0
e−suub−11F1
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣ ku
]
du. (A.0.7)
There are many such simplified forms; for example from the negative binomial theorem it
follows that,
2F1
[
a, b
b
∣∣∣∣x
]
= (1− x)−a = 1F0
[
a
−
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
∞∑
n=0
an
xn
n!
. (A.0.8)
1F1 is called the confluent hypergeometric function and follows from
lim
|b|→∞ 2
F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣ xb
]
= 1F1
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
(A.0.9)
If a = c this series simplifies even further and we have 0F0[x] = e
x. Again the following
Eulerian integral representation is useful,
1F1
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
(c− 1)!
(a− 1)!(c− a− 1)!
1∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1exudu. (A.0.10)
The other confluent form was introduced by Tricomi (1947),
U
[
a
a− c+ 1
∣∣∣∣x
]
= x−a2F0
[
a
b
∣∣∣∣ − 1x
]
, (A.0.11)
which is represented by the integral,
U
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
=
1
Γ[a]
∞∫
0
e−xtta−1(1 + t)c−a−1dt (A.0.12)
and is related to the error function and incomplete gamma functions,
Erfc(x) =
∞∫
x
e−t
2
dt = 1/2Γ
(
1/2, x
2
)
= e−x
2
U
[
1/2
1/2
∣∣∣∣x2
]
. (A.0.13)
A.1 Multivariate hypergeometric functions
We can generalise the hypergeometric function to two variables by considering the product
of two hypergeometric functions,
2F1
[
a, b
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
2F1
[
a′, b′
c′
∣∣∣∣ y
]
=
∞∑
j1,j2
aj1(a′)j2bj1(b′)j2
cj1(c′)j2
xj1yj2
j1!j2!
, (A.1.1)
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and then replacing each pair of products aj1(a′)j2 by the composite aj1+j2 and cj1(c′)j2
by the composite cj1+j2 to obtain a non-factorisable bivariate hypergeometric function.
Appell (1880) was the first author to treat this in a systematic way and defined four
functions that bear his name. We are only interested in the first function,
F1
[
a, b, b′
c
∣∣∣∣x, y
]
=
∞∑
j1,j2
aj1+j2bj1(b′)j2
cj1+j2
xj1yj2
j1!j2!
, (A.1.2)
because of its single integral representation due to Picard (1880), which we use in the next
section,
(a− 1)!
(c− a− 1)!(c− 1)!F1
[
a, b, b′
c
∣∣∣∣x, y
]
=
1∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1(1− ux)−b(1− uy)−bdu,
(A.1.3)
where a > 0 and c− a > 0. Again we can express a double incomplete beta integral with
an Appell function (0 < z1 < z2 < 1),
z2∫
z1
ua(1− u)b = (z2 − z1)za1(1− z1)bF1
[
1,−a,−b
2
∣∣∣∣ 1− z2z1 , 1− 1− z21− z1
]
= (z2 − z1)za2(1− z2)bF1
[
1,−a,−b
2
∣∣∣∣ 1− z1z2 , 1− 1− z11− z2
]
.
(A.1.4)
There is also corresponding limiting forms for the Appell functions, which was first dis-
cussed by Humbert (1921), for example,
lim
→0
F1
[
1
 , b, b
′
c
∣∣∣∣ x, y
]
= Φ2
[
b, b′
c
∣∣∣∣x, y
]
=
∑
k1,k2
bk1(b′)k2
ck1+k2
xk1yk2
k1!k2!
, (A.1.5)
where Φ2 is the second Humbert function. Functions of more than two variables where
investigated by Lauricella (1893), who defined multiple hypergeometric functions, of which
we only need the generalisation of the Appell F1 function,
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
=
∑
k
ak1+···+knbk11 . . . b
kn
n
ck1+···+kn
xk11 . . . x
kn
n
k1! . . . kn!
(A.1.6)
and the confluent form
Φ
(n)
2
[
b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
=
∑
k
bk11 . . . b
kn
n
ck1+···+kn
xk11 . . . x
kn
n
k1! . . . kn!
. (A.1.7)
The Eulerian integral is,
Γ[a]Γ[c− a]
Γ[c]
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
=
1∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1(1− ux1)−b1 . . . (1− uxn)−bndu,
(A.1.8)
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where <[a] and <[c− a] are positive. If we apply one of the 2n+ 1 transformations
u = 1− v u = v/([1− x1] + vx1), . . . , u = v/([1− xn] + vxn),
u = (1− v)/(1− vx1), . . . , u = (1− v)/(1− vxn)
(A.1.9)
then the following (2n+ 1) forms of the function F
(n)
D arise:
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
= (1− x1)−b1 . . . (1− xn)−bnF (n)D
[
c− a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣ x1x1 − 1 , . . . , xnxn − 1
]
= (1− x1)−aF (n)D
[
a; c− b1 − · · · − bn, b2, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣ x1x1 − 1 , x1 − x2x1 − 1 , . . . , x1 − xnx1 − 1
]
= (1− x1)c−a−b1(1− x2)−b2 . . . (1− xn)−bn
× F (n)D
[
c− a; c− b1 − · · · − bn, b2, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, x2 − x1x2 − 1 , . . . , xn − x1xn − 1
]
.
(A.1.10)
The simplification,
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x, . . . , x
]
= 2F1
[
a, b1 + · · ·+ bn
c
∣∣∣∣x
]
, (A.1.11)
also follows from the Eulerian integral. The incomplete integral is (0 < z < 1),
z∫
0
ua−1(1− u)c−a−1(1− ux1)−b1 . . . (1− uxn)−bndu (A.1.12)
= za−1F (n+1)D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn, 1 + a− c
1 + a
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn, z
]
(A.1.13)
and the double incomplete integral (0 < z1 < z2 < 1),
z2∫
z1
(x1u)
b1
n∏
k=2
(1− xbu)bk du
= (z2 − z1)(x1z1)b1
n∏
k=2
(1− xkz1)bk
× F (n)D
[
1;−b1, . . . ,−bn
2
∣∣∣∣ 1− z2z1 , 1− 1− x2z21− x2z1 . . . , 1− 1− xnz21− xnz1
]
= (z2 − z1)(x1z2)b1
n∏
k=2
(1− xkz2)bk
× F (n)D
[
1;−b1, . . . ,−bn
2
∣∣∣∣ 1− z1z2 , 1− 1− x2z11− x2z2 . . . , 1− 1− xnz11− xnz2
]
.
(A.1.14)
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The Lauricella F
(n)
D function also has interesting multiple Laplace integral representations,
Γ[b1] . . .Γ[bn]F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
(A.1.15)
=
∞∫
0
. . .
∞∫
0
e−t1−···−tntb1−11 . . . t
bn−1
n 1F1
[
a
c
∣∣∣∣x1t1 + · · ·+ xntn
]
dt1 . . . dtn, (A.1.16)
where <[b1], . . . ,<[bn] > 0, and the single integral representation
Γ[a]F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
(A.1.17)
=
∞∫
0
e−tta−1Φ(n)2
[
b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1t, . . . , xnt
]
dt, (A.1.18)
where <[a] > 0. A Taylor expansion takes the form,
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1 + y1, . . . , xn + yn
]
=
∑
j1,...,jn
aj1+···+jn1 b
j1
1 . . . b
jn
n
cj1+···+jnj1! . . . jn!
F
(n)
D
[
a; b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
.
(A.1.19)
A.2 Applications
To illustrate the use of multivariate hypergeometric functions we examine the 2x2 contin-
gency table of Section 6.3.1 again, but keep one of the the marginals fixed and known.
Our 2x2 table was,
B B
L n1 n2
L n3 n4
and say we have some additional information that half of the counts will have the property
L. What is the posterior for the correlation? Previously in eq. (6.3.13) with both marginals
free we found that our generating function for the joint probability distribution was,
Φ [µ, ic] =
∫
p(ρ|n,H)eµ(ρ1+ρ2+ρ3+ρ4)−ic(ρ1+ρ4−ρ2−ρ3)dρ
= (N + 1)!
(
µ− ic
2
)−n1−1/2 (
µ+
ic
2
)−n2−1/2 (
µ+
ic
2
)−n3−1/2 (
µ− ic
2
)−n4−1/2
.
(A.2.1)
If we now add a fixed marginal (ρA = ρ1 + ρ2 → λA) we find for Φ[µ,λA,ic](N+1)! ,(
µ+ λA − ic
2
)−n1−1/2 (
µ+ λA +
ic
2
)−n2−1/2 (
µ+
ic
2
)−n3−1/2 (
µ− ic
2
)−n4−1/2
.
(A.2.2)
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To invert this generating function we need the second confluent Humbert function (A.1.5),
Φ
(n)
2
[
b1, . . . , bn
c
∣∣∣∣x1, . . . , xn
]
=
∑
k
bk11 . . . b
kn
n
ck1+···+kn
xk11 . . . x
kn
n
k1! . . . kn!
, (A.2.3)
so that we can write,
Φ [µ, λA, ic]
=
∫
e
(
ic
2 −µ
)
ρ
ρN+1Φ
(3)
2
[
n1 +
1/2, n2 +
1/2, n3 +
1/2
N + 2
∣∣∣∣ − λAρ, (−ic− λA)ρ,−icρ
]
dρ,
(A.2.4)
which follows from the Euler integral. Setting ρ = 1, we have,
Φ [λA, ic] = e
ic
2 Φ
(3)
2
[
n1 +
1/2, n2 +
1/2, n3 +
1/2
N + 2
∣∣∣∣ − λA, (−ic− λA),−ic
]
= e
ic
2
∑
j2,j3
(n2 +
1/2)
j2(n3 +
1/2)
j3
(N + 2)j2+j3
(−ic)j2+j3
j2!j3!
1F1
[
1 + n1 + n2 + j2
N + 2 + j2 + j3
∣∣∣∣λA
]
,
(A.2.5)
where the second line is a Taylor expansion around c = 0. We recognise our beta distri-
bution generating function again, which we then use to invert the λA → ρA transform,
Φ [pA, ic] = (N + 1)!
ρn1+n2A
(n1 + n2)!
(1− ρA)n3+n4
(n3 + n4)!
× e ic2 1F1
[
n2 +
1/2
1 + n1 + n2
∣∣∣∣ − icρA
]
1F1
[
n3 +
1/2
1 + n3 + n4
∣∣∣∣ − ic(1− ρA)
]
.
(A.2.6)
From this we can read off that ρA is distributed like a beta distribution,
p(ρA|n,H) = (N + 1)! ρ
n1+n2
A
(n1 + n2)!
(1− ρA)n3+n4
(n3 + n4)!
, (A.2.7)
which is good to know and a simple consequence of our Dirichlet posterior. We assumed
that the value of ρA is known and thus we can condition on it using Bayes theorem which
results in,
Φ [ic | pA] = e
ic
2 1F1
[
1/2 + n2
1 + n1 + n2
∣∣∣∣ − icρA
]
1F1
[
1/2 + n3
1 + n3 + n4
∣∣∣∣ − ic(1− ρA)
]
, (A.2.8)
So that our correlation parameter is distributed like the convolution of two beta distri-
butions. The convolution of two beta distributions represents a mathematical challenge
because the special function representation of the convolution is a piece-wise Appell func-
tion which is not the most transparent construction to use, see also Pham-Gia and Turkkan
(1998). We want to solve,[
(n1 + n2)!
ρn1+n2A
(ρA
2 + φ
)n1−1/2
Γ[n1 + 1/2]
(ρA
2 − ρ
)n2−1/2
Γ[n2 + 1/2]
]
⊗
 (n3 + n4)!
(1− pA)n3+n4
(
1−ρA
2 − φ
)n3−1/2
Γ[n3 + 1/2]
(
1−ρA
2 + φ
)n4−1/2
Γ[n4 + 1/2]
 .
(A.2.9)
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Defining a prefactor,
(n1 + n2)!(n3 + n4)!
Γ[n1 + 1/2]Γ[n2 + 1/2]Γ[n3 + 1/2]Γ[n4 + 1/2]ρ
n1+n2
A (1− ρA)n3+n4
, (A.2.10)
the rest of the formulas will be unnormalised. For −12 < φ < −
∣∣ρA − 12 ∣∣, we have −1−ρA2 +
φ < −ρA2 < 1−ρA2 + φ < ρA2 , so that the integral starts at the beginning of the first
beta distribution a = −12ρA and stops at the beginning of the second beta distribution
b = 1−ρA2 + φ. With these limits, the convolution is
b∫
a
(ρA
2
+ p
)n1−1/2 (ρA
2
− p
)n2−1/2
×
(
1− ρA
2
− φ+ p
)n3−1/2 (1− ρA
2
+ φ− p
)n4−1/2
dp,
(A.2.11)
and making the transformation v = b−pb−a
(b− a)n1+n4 (−a− b)n2−1/2(2b− 2φ)n3−1/2
×
1∫
0
(1− v)n1−1/2 vn4−1/2
[
1− b− a
a+ b
v
]n2−1/2 [
1− b− a
2b− 2φv
]n3−1/2
dv
(A.2.12)
Using Picard‘s result Eq. (A.1.3), we find an Appell function,
Γ[n1 +
1/2]Γ[n4 +
1/2]
Γ[n1 + n4 + 1]
(
1
2 + φ
)n1+n4 (ρA − 12 − φ)n2−1/2 (1− ρA)n3−1/2
× F1
[
n4 +
1/2,−n2 + 1/2,−n3 + 1/2
n1 + n4 + 1
∣∣∣∣ − 12 + φρA − 12 − φ,
1
2 + φ
1− ρA
]
.
(A.2.13)
Similarly for
∣∣1
2 − ρA
∣∣ < φ < 12 the integral starts at the end of the second beta distribu-
tion a = φ − 1−ρA2 and ends at the end of the first beta distribution b = ρA2 , using the
transformation v = ρ−ab−a ,
(
1
2 − φ
)N−1 1∫
0
(
ρA
1
2 − φ
− v
)n1−1/2
vn2−
1/2 (1− v)n3−1/2
(
φ+ 12 − ρA
1
2 − φ
+ v
)n4−1/2
dp
=
Γ[n2 +
1/2]Γ[n3 +
1/2]
(
1
2 − φ
)n2+n3 (φ+ 12 − ρA)n4−1/2 ρn1−1/2A
Γ[n2 + n3 + 1]
× F1
[
n2 +
1/2,−n1 + 1/2,−n4 + 1/2
n2 + n3 + 1
∣∣∣∣ 12 − φρA ,−
1
2 − φ
φ+ 12 − ρA
]
.
(A.2.14)
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Finally, for − ∣∣12 − ρA∣∣ < φ < ∣∣12 − ρA∣∣ and if ρA < 12 , a = −ρA2 and b = ρA2 . Using
v = p−ab−a ,
ρN−1A
1∫
0
vn1−
1/2 (1− v)n2−1/2
(
1
2 − φ
ρA
− (1− v)
)n3−1/2 ( 1
2 + φ
ρA
− v
)n4−1/2
dp
=
Γ[n1 +
1/2]Γ[n2 +
1/2]ρ
n1+n2
A
(
1
2 − φ− ρA
)n3−1/2 (1
2 + φ
)n4−1/2
Γ[n1 + n2 + 1]
× F1
[
n1 +
1/2,−n3 + 1/2,−n4 + 1/2
n1 + n2 + 1
∣∣∣∣ − ρA1
2 − φ− ρA
,
ρA
1
2 + φ
]
.
(A.2.15)
If ρA >
1
2 , a = φ− 1−ρA2 and b = φ+ 1−ρA2 and we use v = p−ab−a ,
(1− ρA)N−1
1∫
0
(
φ− 12 + ρA
1− ρA + v
)n1−1/2 ( 1
2 − φ
1− ρA − v
)n2−1/2
vn3−
1/2 (1− v)n4−1/2 dp
=
Γ[n3 +
1/2]Γ[n4 +
1/2] (1− ρA)n3+n4
(
φ− 12 + ρA
)n1−1/2 (1
2 − φ
)n2−1/2
Γ[n3 + n4 + 1]
× F1
[
n3 +
1/2,−n1 + 1/2,−n2 + 1/2
n3 + n4 + 1
∣∣∣∣ − 1− ρAφ− 12 + ρA , 1− ρA12 − φ
]
.
(A.2.16)
This completes the example of section 6.3.1 namely it gives the posterior of a correlation
variable with the marginal probabilities fixed analytically.
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Cox’s theorems
Following Cox (1961), we will first consider some desiderata that we require for a calculus
of probable inference. Commentary on the derivation can be found in Jaynes (2003),
Paris (1994), Dupre´ and Tipler (2009), van Horn (2003) and Halpern (1999), while the
functional equation theory can be found in Acze´l (1966) and Acze´l (2003).
B.1 Cox’s properties
A probable inference, as in common usage, is a partial agreement on the evidence. Every-
one agrees more fully on some inferences than others. Hence it is natural to suppose that
plausibility can be ordered, which leads us to the first Cox property,
If A is believed more than B, and B is believed more than C,
then A is believed more than C.
For the second property, consider the plausibility of an assertion made by a famous
author that Noah’s ark can still be seen on a clear day, resting where it was left by the
receding waters of the Flood, on the top of Mount Ararat. For this statement to be
plausible it must be based on the memory of the author and not his imagination. Then
assuming it was made from memory, to be plausible his memory must still be trustworthy
after many years. Finally, assuming his recount his truthful and his memory sound it
must be plausible that he or those he depended on could be sure that they had truly seen
Noah’s Ark. This shows that any assertion can be broken in a chain of propositions and
the second Cox property is,
The plausibility on given evidence that both inferences are true
is determined by their separate plausibilities, one on the given
evidence and the other on this evidence with the additional
assumption that the first inference was true.
The third property is simple: if an argument makes a certain inference more plausible
then it makes the contradictory inference less plausible, thus
128
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The plausibility of an inference on given evidence determines the
plausibility of its contradictory on the same evidence.
The three properties together we will call Cox’s properties and we will demand them from
our calculus of probable inference.
B.2 The Algebra of propositions
Ordinary algebra is the algebra of quantities. Boolean algebra on the other hand is the
calculus of propositions which we will denote by calligraphy letters A,B, . . . . A is read as
NOT A and is the denial of it. Obviously, the denial of A is to affirm A,
A = A. (B.2.1)
The proposition A AND B is called the conjunction of A and B and as in normal speech
the ordering is unimportant,
(A,B) = (B,A) (B.2.2)
Similarly the expression (A,A) implies that we have stated proposition A twice and not
that it has occurred twice thus,
(A,A) = A. (B.2.3)
Logically the proposition ((A,B), C) is the same as (A, (B, C)) so we can omit the paren-
theses,
((A,B), C) = (A, (B, C)) = (A,B, C). (B.2.4)
The proposition A OR B is called the disjunction. Combining it with the conjunction leads
to
A B
Figure B.1: Venn diagram for A and B.
De Morgan’s law, which we will argue from a
Venn diagram: All the results on which propo-
sition A is true is marked black and gray, all the
results on which proposition B is true is shaded
black and light gray and all results on which
both propositions are true is shaded black. Re-
sults for which both propositions are false are
marked white. Then the conjunction of A and
B is the white and light gray area combined
with the white and gray area which is the white
and both gray areas. This is equivalent to all
the non-black areas which is A,B and gives De
Morgan‘s law,
(A,B) = A+ B. (B.2.5)
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More complicated structures can also arise; for example: when we assert (A + B, C)
either A or B is true, but C is true in any case, which is the same as saying either (A, C)
or (B, C) is true,
(A+ B, C) = (A, C) + (B, C). (B.2.6)
We can also form invariants in Boolean algebra, namely the truism A+A and the absurdity
(A,A), which are mutually contradictory. The invariants are the same no matter the
content of the proposition A. In summary we have the collection of formulas,
A = A,
(A,A) = A A+A = A,
(A,B) = (B,A) A+ B = B +A,
(A,B) = A+ B (A+ B) = (A,B)
((A,B), C) = (A, (B, C)) ((A+ B) + C) = (A+ (B + C))
(A+ B, C) = (A, C) + (B, C) (A,B) + C = (A+ C,B + C)
(A+ B,B) = B (A,B) + B = B
(A+A,B) = B (A,A) + B = B
(A+A,B) = B (A,A) + B = B
A+A+ B = A+A (A,A,B) = (A,A),
(B.2.7)
which form the basic equations for Boolean algebra.
B.3 Desiderata
Cox’s properties leads to certain desiderata or things that we desire from our axioms.
From the first property we require Transitivity and Universal Comparability and
from this it follows that plausibility can be represented by rational numbers, for which we
will write,
pi(A|X ) ≡ A rational number assigned to the logical proposition A
given the evidence X.
To see that this follows, we note that transitivity asserts that if A ≥ B and B ≥ C, A ≥ C
follows and universal comparability asserts that we can compare any two propositions i.e.
we believe one of them is more certain or we are equally certain of them. Next note that
any finite set of propositions {A1, . . . , An} has a specific ordering that can be represented
by rational numbers. And if we add a new proposition An+1, transitivity and universal
comparability ensures that the proposition will have a unique place in the ordering. The
new proposition can still be represented by a rational number because we can always
find a rational number between any two rational numbers, thus always preserving our
representation. The rational number representation has massive computational benefits
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as well and it would be foolish to deny ourself this advantage. Also as a convention we shall
assume greater certainty will be represented with a greater number and lesser certainty
with a lesser number, we can also reverse this order but we do not gain anything by doing
this, so we make the natural choice. Hence we formulate
Desideratum I: Degrees of belief in logical propositions are
represented by rational numbers. As a convention greater
certainty will correspond to a larger number.
For the second Cox property we have to remember that it is the ordering of the propositions
that is important, not the actual numerical value; thus there is no natural scale. The
consequence of using the rational numbers is that our learning rule must be homogeneous
i.e. multiplying all the numbers with a fixed positive number does not change the ordering
or our conclusions. The learning rule must also be commutative because Boolean algebra
is commutative. Hence follows
Desideratum II: We desire a homogeneous, commutative learning
rule that takes pi(A|X ) and pi(A|B,X ) to give pi(A,B|X ).
The third desiderata follows directly from the third cox property,
Desideratum III: We desire a function that maps plausibilities
onto themselves that corresponds to the logical NOT operation.
B.4 Axioms
Cox’s properties are intuitive principles that we seek in a calculus of plausible reasoning,
which translates into three mathematical desiderata for the axioms of our calculus. Now
we will show that the desiderata are strong enough to specify our axioms.
Let us investigate the functional equation for the learning rule,
F [pi(A|X ), pi(B|A,X )] = pi(A,B|X ) (B.4.1)
and change the background information slightly X → X ′,
F [pi(A|X ′), pi(A|B,X ′)] = pi(A,B|X ′). (B.4.2)
Since our rational number representation is scaled by a fixed positive number a, of course
our homogeneity property, yields
F [api(A|X ), api(A|B,X )] = akF [pi(A|X ), pi(A|B,X )]. (B.4.3)
Writing x = pi(A|X ) and y = pi(A|B,X ) we have,
F [ax, ay] = akF [x, y] a > 0, k > 0. (B.4.4)
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According to (B.4.4),
F [x, y] = F
[
x · 1, x · y
x
]
= xkF
[
1,
y
x
]
(B.4.5)
and the functions,
F [x, y] = xkf
(y
x
)
x 6= 0 (B.4.6)
do in fact satisfy (B.4.4). Since this approach does not make sense for x 6= 0, we consider
F [0, y] = F [0 · y, 1 · y] = ykF [0, 1] y 6= 0, (B.4.7)
and (with x = y = 0 and k 6= 0)
F [0, 0] = 0. (B.4.8)
Combining the equations we have for k 6= 0,
F [x, y] =

xkf
( y
x
)
(x 6= 0)
ykc (x = 0, y 6= 0)
0 (x = y = 0),
(B.4.9)
where c is an arbitrary constant and f is an arbitrary function of one variable. Clearly
zero is an invariant of our homogeneous learning rule and the other invariant we label e.
These two invariants must correspond to the invariants of Boolean algebra namely the
truism and the absurd. As a convention we will choose zero to be the absurd and e as the
truism thus we have from Boolean algebra for x 6= 0,
F [x, e] = F [e, x] = x
= xkf
[ e
x
]
= ekf
[x
e
]
,
(B.4.10)
implying that
f [x] =
(x
e
)k−1
and f [x] =
x
ek−1
, (B.4.11)
which can only be true if k = 2. Hence follows
Axiom I: The only commutative, homogeneous learning rule is
multiplication on the interval [0,e],
pi(A|X )pi(B|A,X ) = pi(A,B|X ). (B.4.12)
As a convention we assign one to the propositions that are
truisms and zero to propositions we know are absurd,
pi(X|X ) = 1 pi(X|X ) = 0. (B.4.13)
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The third Cox’s property seeks a function that negates itself, thus
S [S [pi(A|X )]] = pi(A|X ). (B.4.14)
and
S [pi(A|X )] = pi(A|X ). (B.4.15)
from which we have S(0) = 1 and S(1) = 0 as well. S is also strictly decreasing. Suppose
that it is not: take γ < δ, but insist that S(λ) = S(δ). Applying S again we have,
λ = δ which is a contradiction. It also follows that S is continuous because it is strictly
decreasing and maps the whole interval (0, 1) onto (0, 1), implying there are no gaps and
no gap discontinuities. Since S is continuous and S(0) > 0, S(1) < 1 we can pick 0 < ν < 1
to give S(ν) = ν. Our second convention is that for probabilities we have,
S
[
1/2
]
= 1/2, (B.4.16)
thus
p(A|X ) = pi(A|X )k, (B.4.17)
where k is chosen to ensure (B.4.16). Notice that it preserves multiplication as our learning
rule. The difference between plausibilities and probabilities is that probabilities has 1/2 as
a fixed point for the negation operation S.
Consider the following y = p(Y |Z) and xy = p(X|Y,Z),
yS
(
x
y
)
= p(Y |Z)S[p(X|Y, Z)] = p(Y |Z)p(X|Y,Z)
= p(X,Y |Z)
(B.4.18)
whilst
S[y] = p(Y |Z) = p((X + Y ,X + Y )|Z),
S[x] = p(X + Y |Z).
(B.4.19)
Examining,
S[x]S
[
S[y]
S[x]
]
= S[x]S[p(X + Y |X + Y , Z)]
= p(X,Y ,X + Y |Z)
= p(X,Y |Z)
(B.4.20)
and combining we have,
yS
[
x
y
]
= S[x]S
[
S[y]
S[x]
]
0 < x ≤ y ≤ 1, (B.4.21)
which is our functional equation for S.
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We construct a operation ◦ which is commutative,
u ◦ v = S
[
S[u]S
[
v
S[u]
]]
= S
[
S[v]S
[
u
S[v]
]]
= v ◦ u
(B.4.22)
by using our functional (B.4.21) and where 0 < v ≤ 1 and 0 < u ≤ S[v]. Applying our
functional (B.4.21) to this construction,
(u ◦ v)S
[ u
u ◦ v
]
= S[u]S
[
S[u ◦ v]
S[u]
]
= S[u]
v
S[u]
= v.
(B.4.23)
So in some sense the ◦ operator is the inverse of our functional equation (B.4.21). Reversing
the order of the operations we see[
uS
[v
u
]]
◦ v = S
[
S[v]S
[
uS
[
v
u
]
S[v]
]]
= S
[
S[v]
S[u]
S[v]
]
= u,
(B.4.24)
the same behaviour. On the left hand side of our associativity equation, we apply our
functional (B.4.21),
u ◦ (v ◦ w) = S
S[u]S
S
[
S[v]S
[
w
S[v]
]]
S[u]
 = S
S[v]S [ w
S[v]
]
S
 u
S[v]S
[
w
S[v]
]
 ,
(B.4.25)
and comparing it to the right hand side of our associativity equation,
(u ◦ v) ◦ w = S
S[v]S ( u
S[v]
)
S
 w
S[v]S
(
u
S[v]
]

= S
S[v]S ( w
S[v]
)
S
 u
S[v]S
(
w
S[v]
]
 ,
(B.4.26)
we see they are equal and that the operator ◦ is also associative. Expanding au using
B.4.23
au = a(u ◦ v)S
[ v
u ◦ v
]
= a(u ◦ v)S
[
av
a(u ◦ v)
]
,
(B.4.27)
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and then applying the operation ◦av, we have
au ◦ av =
[
a(u ◦ v)S
[
av
a(u ◦ v)
]]
◦ av
= a(u ◦ v),
(B.4.28)
according to (B.4.24) and ◦ is also distributive. Knowing S[1/2] = 1/2 we can show 1/2◦1/2 =
1. Using induction and the distributive property, we have for n > 0,
1
2n
◦ 1
2n
=
1
2n−1
. (B.4.29)
Let ◦m ( 12n ) stand for 12n ◦ 12n ◦ · · · ◦ 12n , m times. Since ◦m ( 12n ) = 1 if m = 2n by induction
this notation is well defined. Suppose ◦m ( 12n ) < m2n , choose a number between them 12p/q ,
◦m
(
1
2n
)
<
1
2p/q
<
m
2n
, (B.4.30)
and take the qth power, (◦mq) 1
2nq
<
1
2p
<
mq
2qn
. (B.4.31)
The last part of the inequality gives mq > 2nq−p, resulting in,(◦mq) 1
2nq
>
(
◦2nq−p
)( 1
2nq−p
)
=
2nq−p
2nq
=
1
2p
. (B.4.32)
Contradicting ourselves, repeating the derivation for < follows the same manner, thus we
have,
◦m
(
1
2n
)
=
m
2n
. (B.4.33)
Finally choosing u = m12n and v =
m2
2n ,
(u ◦ v) = m1
2n
◦ m2
2n
= ◦m1 1
2n
◦ ◦m2 1
2n
= ◦m1+m2 1
2n
=
m1 +m2
2n
= u+ v.
(B.4.34)
Using the negation identity we have,
(u+ v)S
(
u
u+ v
)
= v = u+ v − u, (B.4.35)
and solving for S,
S(x) = 1− x. (B.4.36)
Axiom II: All operators that correspond to the logical NOT
operation can be transformed to the probability base in which
the operator takes the form,
p(A|X) = 1− p(A|X) (B.4.37)
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